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Summary 
The thesis analysed unique data collected in the Environmental Law Foundation (E.L.F.), a London-
based charity with a network of legal advisers located throughout the UK.  It had two main purposes: 
firstly, to prove that costs constitute a barrier to judicial review and; secondly, to understand better the 
concept of environmental justice in light of polycentricity. Environmental justice focuses on patterns 
of disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards and promotes increased access to information 
and participation in decision-making. Adjudication is said to have a limited role in achieving 
environmental equity as it rarely addresses issues of political and economic distribution. The thesis 
analysed the UNECE Aarhus Convention which is binding in the UK. It is alleged that the UK 
Government is in breach of the Convention’s third pillar which requires access to a review procedure 
not to be “prohibitively expensive” (art 9(4)). E.L.F. receives calls for support from primarily poor 
communities facing environmental problems and refers the viable ones to a legal adviser for free 
initial advice. The study reviewed 774 referrals focusing on 219 of these at various stages of judicial 
review.  A half of these referrals received a negative opinion as to the prospects of success at judicial 
review and the remaining half were advised to proceed. In the latter pool there were 54 cases which 
were prevented by the cost barrier. A significant number concluded in out-of-court/in-court 
settlement. The latter sample consisted of planning law-based claims which are polycentric due to the 
variety of involved interests.  The data was also matched with the Indices of Multiple Deprivation to 
show polycentricity. The findings were analysed through the participatory thesis of judicial review 
and the concept of limits of adjudication. Thus access to adjudication may create opportunities for 
engagement and contributes to achieving environmental justice.  
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Introduction 
This thesis will analyse unique data collected in the Environmental Law Foundation 
(E.L.F.) with a particular emphasis on judicial review in context of environmental 
justice (environmental equity). Its main purpose is to understand better the 
environmental justice concept which originated in the US. Environmental justice 
focuses on patterns of disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards and 
promotes increased access to information and participation in decision-making. 
Adjudication has been said to have a limited use in the US due to environmental 
justice’s political and economic character. Moreover, literature review suggests that 
environmental justice is polycentric thus unsuitable to adjudication and suitable to 
negotiation and settlement. In the UK the Supreme Court had favoured preventive 
public law based claims over private law claims requiring proprietary interests. 
ELF is a London-based charity with a network of legal advisers located throughout the 
UK. It receives calls for support from primarily poor communities facing environmental 
problems and refers viable cases to a legal adviser for free initial advice. The study will 
review 774 referrals (between 2005-09) which concern various environmental matters. 
It will thereafter focus on 219 of these at various stages of judicial review from initial 
assessment to the full hearings. The research reviewed cases from all four UK 
jurisdictions. However, the vast majority of cases were filed by clients living in England 
and Wales. Thus, this author will focus on the English and Welsh law when discussing 
judicial review and other relevant mechanisms in this thesis. 
20 
 
 
 
Research questions 
The study will attempt to answer the following questions by taking a pragmatist mixed 
method approach: 
1. What are the key characteristics of the ELF clients whose cases have been referred to an 
adviser? Do these characteristics suggest polycentricity? 
2. What are the key features of the referrals? Do these features suggest polycentricity? 
3. What proportion of judicial review referrals received a negative opinion as to the 
prospects of success at judicial review? What is the proportion of judicial review cases 
where clients were advised to take further steps towards judicial review?  
4. Given the answer to the above question, did clients not proceed primarily because of 
costs? 
5. Are judicial review referrals polycentric? 
6. What are the ramifications of the above findings for understanding of environmental 
justice? 
The research questions intend to address two main purposes of the thesis: namely to 
prove that costs constitute a barrier to judicial review and; secondly, to understand 
better the concept of environmental justice in light of polycentricity.  
The first purpose was negotiated with E.L.F. at the time of conducting preliminary 
research and the findings (covering slightly shorter study period until between January 
2005-July 2009) were known shortly after the data has been collected and analysed via 
statistical software (SPSS) at the end of 2009. The charity allowed access to its 
documents in order to use the findings to inform the nation-wide debate over the UK’s 
alleged incompliance with Article 9(4) of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe’s Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
21 
 
 
 
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). The 
findings proved that, as regards E.L.F. cases, costs constitute barrier to judicial review 
in the UK. The findings were published in a BRASS/ELF report1 which was officially 
launched at a high level reception in the House of Lords hosted by Lord Justice Woolf. 
The finding subsequently informed the debate in the UK and were cited by NGOs2, the 
Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee3 and the UK Government4. 
The second wider purpose is closely associated with the first one and constitutes an 
attempt to understand better the ramifications of the above findings. Thus, 
environmental justice claims are said to be polycentric, that is, encapsulating many, 
often conflicting, interests and having impact upon other parties (or interests) in the 
space where the environmental hazard originated5. This thesis accepts a Lon Fuller’s 
definition of polycentricity in context of adjudication, namely as disputes with 
“interacting points of influence”6 which “normally involve many affected parties and a 
somewhat fluid state of affairs”7.  As a result, adjudication may not be the appropriate 
avenue for resolving such conflicts which are political or economic in nature. The 
E.L.F. cases form an empirical base for measuring the variety of interests potentially 
involved in the environmental justice disputes. If the thesis proves that the E.L.F. claims 
are polycentric then it may be appropriate to consider the ramifications of the findings 
in light of the conclusions stemming from the first purpose of the thesis.  
1 Radoslaw Stech, Robert G Lee and Deborah Tripley, ‘Costs Barriers to Environmental Justice’ (Report 
for Environmental Law Foundation and BRASS, Alen & Overy 2009) 
2 WWF, 'European Commission Refers UK to European Court over Access To Environmental Justice' 
(WWF, 6 April 2011) < http://www.wwf.org.uk/wwf_articles.cfm?4815>  accessed 6 April 2011 
3 Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/33 concerning compliance 
by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; adopted by the Compliance Committee on 
24 September 2010, at 17 
4 Ministry of Justice, 'Cost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial Review Claims Outline 
proposals for a cost capping scheme for cases which fall within the Aarhus Convention' (Response to 
Consultation CP(R) 16/11) (London 2012) 
5 Laurence Etherington ''Mandatory Guidance' for dealing with Contaminated Land: Paradox or 
Pragmatism?' (2002) 23(3) Statute Law Review 203 
6 Lon Fuller,‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‘ (1978-1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 395 
7 Ibid 397 
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 Broader regulation for environmental justice 
This thesis concentrates on the role of judicial review in England and Wales in 
delivering environmental justice. The focus stems from the fact that, at the time of 
conducting the research and writing the thesis, the United Kingdom’s government 
struggled to satisfy the access to justice provisions entrenched in the Aarhus 
Convention. However, this author acknowledges that judicial review is not the only 
available avenue to foster greater equality in terms of access to environmental goods. 
Broader regulatory approach has been pursuit early in the environmental justice 
paradigm in the United States. In 1993 John Lewis introduced8 the Environmental 
Justice Bill which was not enacted. The Bill included a duty on federal agencies “to 
ensure that significant adverse health impacts that may be associated with 
environmental pollution [...] are not distributed inequitably”9.  In 1994 President 
Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, titled "Federal Actions to Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" 10. The 
order requires the federal agencies to include the goal of “achieving environmental 
justice” 11 as part of their strategies. The Executive Order did not create a new right 
enforceable by law since it was “intended only to improve the internal management of 
the executive branch”12. 
There is no dedicated environmental justice statute in England and Wales. Still, wider 
environmental laws, planning laws, human rights laws can contribute to achieving 
greater environmental equity. In Scotland, Mark Poustie wrote a seminal report13 as to 
8 The Bill was re-introduced twice in the Congress in 1998 and in 1999 but was not enacted. 
9  Environmental Justice Bill H.R. 2105, S.2(6) Available at < 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr2105/text> 
10  Executive Order 12898 of February 11, 1994 
11  Ibid, at 1-101 
12  Ibid, at 6-609 
 
13 Mark Poustie ‘Environmental justice in SEPA's environmental protection activities: a report for the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency’ (Strathclyde Law School, 2004); See also: Mark Poustie 
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how the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) could use existing 
environmental frameworks to foster environmental justice through its activity. The 
report recognised a number of opportunities embedded, inter alia, into the water 
pollution controls, integrated pollution controls, waste management controls, planning 
laws, contaminated land regime or statutory nuisance.  It put forward a number of 
recommendations addressed to SEPA in context of enforcement of environmental law 
and some of these could also be applicable to the legal frameworks in England and 
Wales. Thus, for example, the Environment Agency in England could pay particular 
attention to environmental justice issues in relation to the public inhabiting special sites 
under the contaminated land regime14. Both Environment Agency in England and 
Natural Resources Wales act as statutory consultees in the planning decision process 
and could influence the respective planning authorities to pay particular attention to 
issues of inequality. Local authorities could also use their investigatory powers under 
Part III Environmental Protection Act 199015 to identify above average exposure to 
nuisance of certain sections of the society. Further, an earlier report by Environmental 
Justice Project16 recognised a significant role of criminal justice system in removing 
environmental injustice. This could include stricter fines for polluters, effective 
handling of environmental cases by Magistrates Courts and granting stronger 
enforcement powers to the statutory agencies such as Environment Agency.     
Judicial review – an avenue for success for environmental justice 
movement? 
Overall, there are opportunities for using existing legal and regulatory environmental 
mechanisms in the environmental justice context. In principle, this author acknowledges 
‘SEPA and environmental justice’ (2006) 115 Scottish Planning and Environmental Law 54 
14 See Part 2A Environmental Protection Act 1990 and Regulations 2 and 3 of Contaminated Land 
(England) Regulations 2006 
15 s. 79(1) Environmental Protection Act 1990 
16 Pamela Castle, Martyn Day, Carol Hatton, Paul Stookes ‘A Report by the Environmental Justice 
project’ (London 2003) 
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that such frameworks may be better suited for removing the deeply engrained 
environmental equalities than judicial review. The former are capable to address issues 
relating to wider population living in the large areas. Crucially, these mechanisms can 
provide benefits early in the decision-making processes, which result in the allocation of 
environmental hazards in particular areas, alongside the benefits of constant monitoring 
and enforcement. Judicial review, on the other hand, is largely limited in addressing 
environmental justice issues early in the decision-making processes. It is rather down to 
political pressure that is ancillary to an intended judicial review action; this pressure 
could influence the administrative decisions. Beyond that, the grounds for judicial 
review, costs and the restricted time limits severely reduce the opportunities for the 
wider public to redress the balance in relation to the availability of environmental goods 
and hazards. Thus, judicial review may not be the most effective way of removing 
environmental inequalities. 
However, this author decided to centre on the usefulness of judicial review in this 
thesis. It is because judicial review constitutes an end on its own right especially in light 
of the Aarhus Convention provisions. As a result, the topic deserves an extended 
exploration to understand better the role of costs in inhibiting access to courts in 
England and Wales and wider implications of the barrier for environmental justice.  
Meaning of success 
The meaning of success in relation to environmental judicial review can be seen in 
narrower and wider contexts. The former relates to the mere possibility of filing a case 
in the High Court without a chilling threat of being exposed to large costs following the 
review. This carries opportunity for reviewing the relevant material facts followed by an 
order (such as a quashing order), court judgment or withdrawal.  The wider context may 
be of particular importance for the environmental justice advocates. It carries ancillary 
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benefits of publicising the issues of inequalities and gaining wider political influence. In 
this sense it offers opportunities for addressing inequalities in the wider community 
rather than being restricted to the rights and claims of the particular applicant. Crucially, 
judicial review carries also opportunities for settlement both in court and out-of-court. 
Such settlement can also address wider environmental justice issues. This thesis focuses 
primarily on the narrow meaning of judicial review by assessing whether or not there is 
a cost barrier to courts on the basis of E.L.F. cases. However, it also looks into judicial 
review in the wider sense in the context of polycentricity. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis aims at presenting a literature review, the methodology and 
the findings in a coherent and transparent fashion. Nevertheless, it has been difficult to 
arrive at a final structure for the reasons explained below. 
The access to the unique E.L.F.’s database had been negotiated and the author had to 
publish the findings relating to the first purpose of the thesis in the BRASS/E.L.F. 
Report in January 2010.  There was then a period of follow-up research on E.L.F. 
database to collect additional data so as to extend the study period until December 2009. 
The collection of data ceased in June 2010 and the author decided to address the 
questions relating to the second purpose of the thesis. This has been underpinned by a 
pragmatist approach which allows a degree of experimentation with the data leading to 
inductive analysis. It could have been be viable approach to structure the thesis by 
starting with the statistical research relating to the first purpose of the thesis followed by 
literature review and then additional analysis of the data to measure polycentricity. 
However, such a structure might disturb the reader’s perception and would result in 
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duplication as the same data would have to be analysed at the beginning and in later 
chapters of the thesis. As a result the following structure is proposed. 
The thesis is organised into three main Parts: Part I focuses on the literature review and 
the overview of the main legal concepts. Part II explains the research settings, the 
E.L.F.’s modus operandi and the pragmatist methodology. Part III presents and analyses 
the statistical findings and discusses the ramifications of the findings in light of the 
concept of polycentricity. The analysis in the first two Chapters of Part III focuses on all 
774 referrals and subsequent Chapter focuses on the referrals which have been 
identified to be at the judicial review stage during the study period.  The three parts are 
divided into nine chapters the content of which is now summarised. 
Part I 
Chapter 1 will analyse the concept of environmental justice by looking into its 
inception, evolution and conceptualization. It will draw on both US and UK literature. It 
will show that environmental justice is multi-faceted as it has been extended to cover a 
range of issues beyond environmental hazards (such as medical issues). Crucially, it 
will show that environmental justice claims involve a variety of and, in many 
circumstances, conflicting interests. The Chapter will conclude with an attempts at 
conceptualizing the substantive and procedural polycentricity of environmental justice 
claims. 
Chapter 2 will review the usefulness of adjudication in overcoming environmental 
injustice. It will start by reviewing the US literature which suggests a limited role for 
adjudication within environmental justice. The Chapter will then review the main 
features of private law based claims and judicial review in England and Wales and the 
link between human rights regime and environmental judicial review. The Chapter will 
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identify the main limitations of the legal avenues for environmental justice. It will also 
highlight the main difficulties in measuring polycentricity in legal claims. The Chapter 
will conclude by favouring the statistical approach to measure polycentricity of 
environmental justice claims over qualitative analysis of cases. 
Chapter 3 will review the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention, namely the 
informational pillar, the participatory pillar and the access to justice pillar. The Chapter 
will then focus on tracing the implementation of each pillar in the UK. It will pay 
particular attention to the third pillar given the focus of the thesis. 
Part II 
Chapter 4 will review the research settings and explain the way in which E.L.F. handles 
environmental cases. It will also review the charity’s funding arrangements to estimate 
the extent to which E.L.F.’s role falls within the Article 9(5) of the Aarhus Convention. 
The Article prescribes that the Parties to the Convention could establish assistance 
mechanisms to overcome the financial barriers to justice. If E.L.F. is primarily funded 
from the public purse then it could constitute such a mechanism. 
Chapter 5 will describe and defend the ontological and epistemological underpinnings 
of the study, the choice of mixed methodology and, stemming from these, the ethical 
and political issues associated with the research. Furthermore, the Chapter shall 
illustrate how the author collected and analysed the data and how he incorporated 
procedures of reflection.  
Part III 
Chapter 6 will present results from the analysis of all 774 E.L.F. enquiries. It will 
measure the major characteristics of the clients thus will constitute an opportunity to 
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measure the interests involved in the cases. The following variables will be explored: 
regional representation; gender; age; employment status; income; registered disability; 
nationality; first language; ethnic origin; and client status. 
Chapter 7 will also present results from the analysis of all 774 E.L.F. enquiries. It will 
measure the major characteristics of the referrals and their nature. The following 
variables will be explored: number of people affected; funding of cases; type of 
environmental problems; area of law; Human Rights and wellbeing; concerns over the 
Aarhus pillars; bias; and stages of cases. The analysis will also identify, so far as 
possible, polycentricity embedded into the referrals. 
Chapter 8 will focus on 219 referrals which were at the stage of judicial review during 
the study period. The main purpose of the Chapter is to address the two questions 
relating to the first purpose of the study. Thereafter the Chapter will focus on measuring 
polycentricity of the judicial review cases which originated in England only. The author 
will match the clients’ postcodes with the Indices of Multiple Deprivation in order to 
observe the wider context in which the cases are embedded.  
Chapter 9 will discuss the ramifications of the findings and will be followed by a short 
conclusion. 
Significance of the thesis 
The thesis is important as the environmental justice concept has been channelled into 
the UK policy making. In 2005 the government published a sustainable development 
strategy17 (hereafter SD strategy) in which it committed itself to adopt a number of 
indicators through which progress would be measured. The measures to be adopted 
17 Securing the future – delivering UK sustainable development strategy (Norwich, Stationery Office) 
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included a separate title of “Social justice/Environmental equality”.18 The document put 
an emphasis on active community participation under the ‘Society’ heading. The 
inclusion of the environmental justice concept into the overall government strategy was 
endorsed by the Environment Agency.19 It is also clear that the inclusion was informed 
by the sociological and spatial research, which was reviewed above in this Chapter20 
and against the background of the Aarhus Convention.21 The current Coalition 
government committed itself to “a refreshed vision" and committed itself to "build on 
the principles that underpinned the UK’s 2005 SD strategy”.22 The crucial commitment 
is to mainstream SD to guide other government policies. The understanding of 
sustainable development and environmental justice will inevitably be linked to the idea 
of Big Society thus promoting fairness through public empowerment and engagement.23 
Funding for Big Society projects will be available partly from the Big Fund of the 
National Lottery which supported E.L.F. in 2007.24 The UK SD strategy has echoes in 
each devolved administration as these adopted their own strategies.  In Scotland, 
sustainable justice concept was explicitly included into the strategy.25 The Northern 
Irish and Welsh strategies use concepts of equity and social justice.26 
18 Ibid 144 
19 Environment Agency, ‘Addressing Environmental Inequalities’ (Position Statement) 
<http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/ca221final_888457.pdf> accessed 2 
June 2011 
20 See above, p. 50 
21 Environment Agency, ‘Addressing Environmental Inequalities’ supra note 19 
22Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Mainstreaming sustainable Development – The 
Government’s vision and what this means in practice’ <http://sd.defra.gov.uk/documents/mainstreaming-
sustainable-development.pdf> accessed 10 June 2011 
23 Ibid 5 
24 See p. 176 
25Scottish Executive, ‘Choosing our future: Scotland's sustainable development strategy’ (Edinburgh 
2005). It was replaced by the Scottish Government's Economic Strategy which makes no mention of 
environmental justice or indeed sustainable development but focuses on 'increasing sustainable economic 
growth'. Compare with Scottish Executive, ‘The Government Economic Strategy’(Edinburgh 2011), p. 
12. 
26 Northern Ireland Executive, ‘Everyone’s Involved. Sustainable Development Strategy’ (Belfast 2010), 
Welsh Assembly Government ‘One Wales, One Planet. A new Sustainable Development Strategy for 
Wales’ (Cardiff 2009) 
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Environmental justice and especially its procedural aspect has been entrenched into the 
UK legislation. The most notable example is the Aarhus Convention which was 
transposed into the UK law through the European directives and will be reviewed in this 
thesis. In England and Wales, the Sustainable Communities Act 2007 provides a 
mechanism for local people to generate and promote ideas to improve the economic, 
social and environmental wellbeing of their area. It is built on an assumption that local 
knowledge may be best to promote the sustainability of an area, and provides for local 
people to ask central government to take enabling action to improve the economic, 
social or environmental wellbeing. Embracing a holistic idea of sustainable 
development, the Act is wide ranging and, in line with a bottom up approach, places no 
limits on the type of action that could be put forward. In this way, the Sustainable 
Communities Act seeks to empower local communities, which have available a simple 
process whereby their ideas can be channelled through local authorities to central 
government following a “short-listing” process27. The Government is charged with 
reaching agreement on which of the short-listed proposals should then be implemented, 
but must respond to all short-listed suggestions.  The Sustainable Communities Act also 
ensures greater transparency of information relating to local public spending through the 
publication of ‘Local Spending Reports’. This is part of a programme to inform local 
communities of priorities set for the area in an attempt to pursue better-informed 
choices which will promote local sustainable development. The Act is significant 
therefore in creating an arena in which sustainability policy may be debated and 
generated.28  
27 Under s. 2 of the Sustainable Communities Act 2007 “The Secretary of State must invite local 
authorities to make proposals which they consider would contribute to promoting the sustainability of 
local communities”. 
28 Robert G Lee and Radoslaw Stech, ‘Mediating Sustainability: Constructivist Approaches to 
Sustainability Research’ in Alex Franklin and Paul Blyton (eds), Researching Sustainability: A Guide to 
Social Science Methods, Practice and Engagement (Earthscan 2011) 178-179 
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Thesis in context 
The thesis draws upon and elaborates research conducted in the Environmental Law 
Foundation which initial findings were published in BRASS/E.L.F. Report. The latter 
draws upon earlier research conducted in E.L.F. in 2003 and focused on an examination 
of E.L.F. referrals between January 1999 and December 2002 (hereafter “E.L.F. 2003 
Study”29). This research reviewed 668 cases tracking the conclusions of these cases.  
The E.L.F. 2003 Study analysed the following data: the type of environmental concerns 
affecting or potentially affecting the communities; the likely cause of action at law; and 
the number of people potentially affected by the environmental concerns. Further, the 
study examined the socio-economic profile of the clients contacting E.L.F. based upon 
information from an Equal Opportunities Forms. 
The E.L.F. 2003 study reviewed the conclusions of the cases over a narrower timeframe 
between 2001 and 2002. This part of the study found that: 79 cases concluded 
successfully; 140 had unsuccessful conclusion; 49 remained ongoing; and 104 cases 
could not be determined due to a lack of recent data.  
The study subsequently looked at those cases which concluded successfully and 
revealed that a significant body (46 percent) ended in “successful representation to 
planning committee meetings and appeals”.30  
Crucially, the study looked at the cases which did not conclude successfully and sought 
to establish the barriers to a satisfactory conclusion:  
“In 35% of these cases the clients were advised that there were no reasonable 
29 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects of Environmental Justice’(Environmental Law Foundation, London, 
2003) 
30 Ibid 25 
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prospects of success. In a further 31 % of cases the cost of pursuing legal action 
was the main reason for its failure i.e., they were advised that they could 
reasonably pursue the matter and were likely to have done so but for the cost or 
potential costs they may be incurred”.31 
The other reasons identified, such as stress, personal reasons, or adverse court 
judgments, represented much smaller proportions of the cases. Thus, the E.L.F. 2003 
Study identified costs as a major barrier to pursuing legal action in connection with 
environmental concerns”32. 
Originality 
This thesis is original for a number of reasons relating to the methodology and 
theoretical underpinnings. Firstly, by following the previous research33, it analyses 
newer data by applying innovative and more rigorous methodology. The quantitative 
data was input into SPSS statistical package and linked with socio-economic variables 
found in the Equal Opportunities Forms via postcodes. Secondly, the author conducted 
qualitative documentary analysis of the referrals leading to the creation of additional 
quantitative variables not found in the E.L.F. 2003 Study34. Thirdly, the data is 
reviewed specifically in the context of environmental justice, which is polycentric thus 
giving rise to conflicts between various interests. The polycentricity lies in the 
substantive and procedural aspect of environmental justice. The substantive 
polycentricity stems from the heterogeneity of parties claiming the right to better quality 
environment at various levels of governance (global, national, regional, local, family 
and individual). Thus, exposure to environmental hazards can be studied through 
31 Ibid 25 
32 Radoslaw Stech, Robert G Lee and Deborah Tripley, ‘Costs Barriers to Environmental Justice’ (Report 
for Environmental Law Foundation and BRASS, Alen & Overy 2009) 6 
33 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects of Environmental Justice’ supra note 29 
34 Ibid 
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numerous variables (age, disability etc) at these levels to measure the degree of 
environmental justice of different groups. Further, procedural rights, mainly access to 
information and participation in decision making, have twofold functions: as ‘integral’ 
part of environmental justice concept and as the catalyst for or tool through which 
environmental justice can be achieved. 
 In the first context procedural rights constitute the supplementary elements of the 
substantive environmental justice. Thus, availability of (or exposure to) the procedural 
rights can be studied through numerous variables at various levels of governance to 
measure the degree of environmental justice of different groups. In the second context 
the access to a better environment could be achieved through access to environmental 
information and participation in decision-making. Crucially, however, this access 
allows certain claimants to argue for their own central interest: that is, claim access to a 
better environment. In other words, the procedural elements of environmental justice, if 
distributed equally, can constitute a platform for exchange of information (including 
experience) and negotiation over the interest in the priority of groups. Illustratively, a 
waste site in a deprived local area may be prejudicial to health of all members of the 
community but, in particular, to children or people with respiratory problems. At the 
same time the waste site may provide jobs and may offer benefits of community waste 
management in the area thus benefit the majority of its citizens. The whole community 
which suffers environmental injustice will have to decide whether or not to give a 
priority to the children and those with respiratory problems and oppose the 
development. The interest of children may be undisputable but the interest of adults 
with the respiratory illness may give rise to conflicts in the community. Thus the 
withdrawal of the development may lead to the loss of jobs, impoverishment, poor diet, 
inactivity leading to illnesses and the acceleration of environmental injustice. On the 
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other hand, the withdrawal of the development may lead to fly-tipping and the situation 
whereby people may not have a chance to effectively dispose of their waste. 
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Part I Environmental justice: the concept and the law 
This Part consists of three chapters providing a literature and law review relating to the 
concept of environmental justice. First Chapter will review the relevant sociological, 
political and, to some extent, medical research which underpins the concept. Second 
Chapter will review the legal avenues of challenge in context of environmental justice. 
Given the particular features of the environmental justice claims which involve wider 
public interest the author will focus on the public law mechanism and, in particular, 
judicial review and human rights regime. Moreover, given the particular emphasis 
attributed to the informational and participatory aspects of environmental justice the 
review of the relevant law is necessary. The most useful way of performing the analysis 
of such a large legal arena is to take the Aarhus Convention as a basis especially 
because of the link between the Convention and judicial review. Overall, the three 
Chapters aim at providing tangible foundation for the analysis of the author’s data 
collected in the Environmental Law Foundation. It will follow from the review that 
environmental justice is multi-faceted and polycentric and that the pillars of the Aarhus 
Convention serve best in providing access to environmental justice without necessarily 
achieving it. 
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Chapter 1  
Unwrapping Environmental justice  
This chapter will analyze the concept of environmental justice by looking into its 
inception, evolution and conceptualization. The concept has been studied extensively 
and conceptualized in the US and borrowed and developed by researchers worldwide. 
Given that most of the UK scholars working on environmental justice refer back to the 
US roots, the author will take a similar approach. Academic research provides the 
evidence for understanding the concept; it has been predominantly quantitative 
sociological research concentrating on the spatial distribution of environmental hazards 
within disadvantaged communities. It follows from the research in the US that Black 
and low-income communities have suffered an overexposure to environmental hazards 
and risks. The review of the UK literature will show that the number of independent 
socio-economic variables is wider and includes gender, age and disability. This suggests 
the polycentric character of environmental justice claims because of the variety of 
interests that has to be addressed. Moreover, the review will note the recent trends of 
extending environmental justice claims to the spheres initially reserved for medical 
research, food justice, urban regeneration and others. This suggests that environmental 
justice is multi-faceted.  
Evolution and early environmental justice research 
The concept of environmental justice was explicitly coined following the clamorous 
demands of the mostly Black and poor people battling against environmental threats in 
the 1980s. Nevertheless, aspects of the concept had been discussed and mentioned 
intermittently before in the US35 and in the UK. This section will provide a review of 
selected examples accordingly and provide an explanation for late conceptualisation of 
35 See also Jesse C McEntee and Diego Vazquez Brust ‘Surveying the Field: Applying the Just 
Sustainability Paradigm to Survey Research’ in Alex Franklin and Paul Blyton (eds), Researching 
Sustainability: A Guide to Social Science Methods, Practice and Engagement (Earthscan 2011) 
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environmental justice concept by reference to Taylor’s ‘paradigms theory’.36 The next 
Chapter will show that an aspect of environmental inequity has been long entrenched 
into the UK legal system in the form of the locality rule in private nuisance.37 
Early examples from the US 
A Report of the Council of Hygiene and Public Health of the Citizens’ Association of 
New York38 is cited39 as the first statistical account of the poors’ urban environment in 
the US. The Report (like the earlier Chadwick Report40 in the UK) described appalling 
conditions of the poors’ housing being source of disease. The Citizens' Association 
noted also a threat of a spill-over to the middle-classes areas. 
 
Half a decade later the Chicago School of Sociology’s researchers focused their 
interests on urbanisation and saw the growing cities in the USA as the institution with 
“a moral as well as a physical organization”41. This was a perfect place to note certain 
human behaviour, which was said to mimic the behaviour in the natural world. 
McKenzie as early as in 1928 noticed that certain people tended to inhabit places closer 
to the industrial zones: 
 
“It is in the Seattle neighbourhoods, especially those on the hill-tops, that the 
conservative, law-abiding, civic-minded population elements dwell. The 
downtown section and the valleys, which are usually industrial sites, are 
populated by a class of people who are not only more mobile but whose mores 
36 Dorceta E Taylor, ‘The Rise of the Environmental JusticeParadigm. Injustice Framing and the Social 
Construction of Environmental Discourses’ (2000) 43(4) The American Behavioral Scientist 508 
37 See p. 77 
38 Citizens’ Association of New York, ‘Sanitary Conditions of the City’ (Report by the Council of 
Hygiene and Public Health) (New York 1865)  
39 Julie Sze, Noxious New York. The Racial Politics of Urban Health and Environmental Justice  (The 
MIT Press 2007) 34 
40 Supra note 54 
41  Robert E Park, ‘The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City 
Environment’ (1915) 20(5) The American Journal of Sociology 577, 578 
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and attitudes, as tested by voting habits, are more vagrant and radical.”42 
 
Later, Wirth made more precise analysis of the factors influencing the settlement of the 
people in the cities: 
 
“Density, land values, rentals, accessibility, healthfulness, prestige, aesthetic 
consideration, absence of nuisances such as noise, smoke, and dirt determine the 
desirability of various areas of the city as places of settlement for different 
sections of the population. Place and nature of work, income, racial and ethnic 
characteristics, social status, custom, habit, taste, preference, and prejudice are 
among the significant factors in accordance with which the urban population is 
selected and distributed into more or less distinct settlements.”43 
 
Fuller considered irrigation and flooding in the context of distributive justice in the 
1960s. Irrigation is brought to earth by the weather which allows the transfer of water to 
the soil and “places in human hands the responsibility for directing the available 
moisture to the proper places”.44 In this humans used a number of rules of justice to 
allocate the irrigation including “first come, first served, to each according to his 
contribution, to each according to his needs, to each according to the needs of society, to 
each according to the luck of the throw”. Similarly flood control includes the question 
of distributive justice and leads to complex decision-making dilemma, especially when 
the needs of the less wealthy are opposed with the more affluent: 
 
“If a river is left without dikes, no one assumes responsibility for the precise 
42  R D McKenzie, ‘The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community’ (1924) 30(3) The 
American Journal of Sociology 287,  301 
43  Louise Wirth, ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’ (1938) 44(1) The American Journal of Sociology 1, 15 
44 Lon Fuller, ‘Irrigation and Tyranny’ (1965) 17 Stanford Law Review 1021, 1037-1038 
39 
 
                                                 
 
 
point where flood waters break through. If, however, the public undertakes a 
system of embankments to hold the river in its course, A, whose land is flooded, 
may complain that the dikes protecting his land were less well maintained than 
those protecting B's. Worse yet, if A's land is upstream and is deemed less 
valuable than B's, which is downstream, the question may arise whether the 
dikes protecting A's ought not to be opened deliberately to save B's land. Or, 
again, if this procedure is explicitly rejected, then B may complain that in effect 
his land was sacrificed to save the less valuable land of A.”45 
 
The above constitutes an example of polycentric disputes which Fuller developed in a 
later article to be discussed in Chapter 746 of this thesis. It is sufficient to note that such 
disputes “are inherently unsuited to adjudicative solution, involving as they do a 
complex interplay of diverse interests.”47 Fuller was convinced that the solution to such 
complex problems could only be provided by those who knew the interests of the 
parties “intimately”48. 
 
The early research considered the interplay between environment and medical 
conditions in occupational settings. Take for example a Lloyd’s piece of research on 
respiratory problems of nearly 60 thousand steelworkers labouring in a coke-oven plant 
in Pensylvania published in 1971 and reported in the Lancet’s Editorial49. The 
researcher found that the coloured workers’ mortality from respiratory cancer was three 
times higher than the expected rate whereas the white workers’ mortality rates were not 
influenced. The reason for the significant variation laid in an ethnically-driven division 
45 Ibid 1040-1041 
46 See Chapter 7, p. 315 
47 Ibid 1042 
48 Ibid 
49 A P R Wilson, ‘Less Equal than Others’ (Editorial) (1994) 343(8901) The Lancet 1 
40 
 
                                                 
 
 
of labour, where 19% of the coloured workers toiled near the oven filled with coal 
compared with 3% of white workers.50 
Early examples from the UK 
The Industrial Revolution commenced in the UK and led to accelerated growth at the 
expense of the environment and environmental conditions of the working classes. 
Thompson51traced the development and evolution of English working classes including 
their urban environment, which deteriorated significantly, even “in some of the “high-
wage” areas”52 in the height of the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, the working 
conditions and urban environment at that time were subject to some statistical and 
sociological observations, which constituted a driving force for a legal reform. Holland 
proved the disparities in the Sheffield’s inhabitants’ quality of immediate environment 
to be dependent on wealth53. Most notably Chadwick conducted research, which could 
also be coined as socio-legal, on sanitary conditions of the working classes in Great 
Britain54. The report, upon closer analysis, is an environmental justice treatise including 
extended and detailed descriptions of the poor’s environmental conditions, effectiveness 
of common law and legislation in addressing the inequalities and proposals for reforms. 
Chadwick exposed pollution of environmental elements such as water and soil and 
noticed working classes’ disproportionate exposure to certain environmental factors 
such as smoke, stench and other substances (faeces). He noticed some effectiveness of 
legislation such as the Chimney Sweepers and Chimneys Regulation Act 1840 which 
raised the minimum age of chimney sweepers to 16. The labour of children at that time 
50 W Lloyd, ’ Long-term mortality of steelworkers, V: respiratory cancer in coke plant workers’ (1971) 13  
Journal of Occupational Medicine 53 
51 E P Thompson The Making of the English Working Class (Vintage Books 1966) 
52 Ibid 319 
53 George Calvert Holland, The vital statistics of Sheffield (1843) 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=57kHAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA44&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onep
age&q=forty&f=false> accessed 1 June 2011 
54 Edwin Chadwick,  ‘Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population and on the Means of 
its Improvement’ (London, 1842) 
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is an example of one of the cruellest environmental injustices affecting children whose 
environment was literally limited to the claustrophobic space of a chimney. The 
legislation, including the later Chimney Sweepers’ Acts, is an example of 
environmental justice law aiming at improving the conditions of the particular age 
groups in the poorest cohort. 
 
In the age of industrial revolution it was easy to indicate the victims of environmental 
injustice yet it was much more difficult to find the culprits. According to Thompson all 
classes contributed to the deterioration thus the author placed the responsibility in the 
population growth, industrialism, “aggravated by the predatory drives of laisez faire 
capitalism”55. Similarly to Chicago School of Sociology, albeit much earlier, Holland 
saw the peoples’ disposition to seek better environment for their retirement as part of 
the human nature: 
 
“All classes, save the artisan and the needy shopkeeper, are attracted by country 
comfort and retirement. The attorney,- the manufacturer,- the grocer,- the 
draper,- the shoemaker and the tailor, fix their commanding residences on some 
beautiful site [...] [W]e adduce it simply as a fact which is familiar to all, and 
presented in no exaggerated colours”.56  
 
In Paris v Levy the Common Bench noted that the work in poor environmental 
conditions could still lead to profits and liberation. The citation below can be seen as an 
example of early understanding of polycentricity of environmental justice in the UK: 
 
“There are several chimney-sweepers and dust-contractors in London who are 
55 Ibid 322 
56 Holland, 'The Vital Statistics... supra note 53 
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men of wealth and substance. Handsome investments can be made in chemical 
works for deodorizing manure. The process is not pleasant to the olfactory 
nerves; but the returns are, we hear, remunerative. Fortunes have been made in 
the cats' meat trade: sewer-hunters and mudlarks sometimes find gold watches 
and silver spoons during their unsavoury labours. George the Fourth's Major 
Hanger kept a coal and potato shed in Tottenham Court Road”.57 
 
Environmental justice paradigm 
Taylor58 provided a useful historic and evolutionary analysis of the environmental 
justice movement in the US context, which explains the fairly late framing of the 
concept. Framing echoes Thomas Kuhn’s ‘paradigm shift’ theory59. She distinguished 
the mainstream environmentalist movement from the environmental justice one where 
the latter is rooted in the Nineteenth century. Environmentalists have evoked “images 
related to wilderness and wildlife protection to motivate their supporters” embedded in 
“Romantic/Transcendentalist environmental ideology” inspired by Jean-Jacque 
Rousseau60 (hereafter Romantic Environmental Paradigm). The movement included  
pragmatic conservationists who supported wise and scientific approach to the 
development and business environmentalists such as hunters and explorers. It followed 
the “exploitative capitalist paradigm”61 which justified environmental exploitation and 
was followed by “the new environmental paradigm”62  rooted in the 1960s and 70s. The 
latter “enunciated a stronger pro-environmental stance” partly due to its membership 
57 Paris v Levy [1860] 142 E.R. 135 
58 Dorceta E Taylor, ‘The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm...’ supra note 36 
59 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press 1962)  
60 Ibid 514 
61 Ibid 529 
62 Ibid 531 
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with weaker business connections63. New Environmental Paradigm's members directed 
their attention to environmental planning, risk avoidance, limits to growth and new 
politics including informational, participatory and wider human rights. The 
environmental justice movement followed in the 1980s by emphasising the experience 
of people of colour which differed significantly from paradigms “constructed by 
middle- and working class Whites” who had “accumulated the controlled resources by 
appropriating land and labor and by controlling the movement of people of color”64. 
Taylor elaborates socio-linguistic terminology and uses the terms of framing and 
submerged frames. The former “refers to the process by which individuals and groups 
identify, interpret, and express social and political grievances”,65 whereas the latter  
 
“identify problems in the society, make diagnostic attributions, and suggest 
solutions, but these problems are not the major focus of movement or framing 
activities””66. 
 
She finds that “environmental justice activism has been a submerged frame in the 
politics”67 of the people of colour since 1800s. Taylor gives a number of examples 
where, for example, Blacks fought to improve their housing conditions, segregation in 
access to public parks and beaches in the city of Chicago. In the mid century the Blacks 
were engaged in the actions aiming at improving their “fishing rights [...], worker health 
and safety”68 and worker rights. Later the Black activists focused on a number of other 
environmental problems such as waste, air pollution, and housing energy clearly 
reflected in the below review of environmental justice research. Moreover, the 
63 Ibid 533 
64 Ibid 533 
65 Ibid 511 
66 Ibid 516 
67 Ibid 534 
68 Ibid 535 
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environmental justice movement has been rooted in “with religious institutions and with 
community organizations and educational institutions”69. 
 
In summary, environmental justice problems have been present at least since 1980s in 
the US but hidden behind the mainstream environmental paradigms as submerged 
frames. As a result, early research discussed above did not use the environmental justice 
terminology but can be seen as an example of environmental justice research. The 
research provides a good example of the multi-faceted and polycentric character of 
environmental justice claims. The Chicago School’s ‘sociological observations’,70 
Lloyd’s ‘medical observations’ and Fuller’s ‘socio-legal observations’ permeate the 
later research and environmental justice discourse.  
 Love Canal and Warren County 
 
There are two incidents that are widely cited71 as the major triggers for forming the 
environmental justice movement, the case of Love Canal in 1977 and the public protests 
in the Warren County in 1982. The first case concerned a legacy of the toxic waste, 
including dioxins and Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), placed in an unfinished canal 
in Buffalo, New York between 1942 and 1952. The Hooker Chemicals and Plastics 
Corporation, which guaranteed to place the waste safely was reluctant to sell the land 
for residential purposes. Nevertheless, the land was subject to compulsory purchase and 
a location for future elementary school and housing project. The constructors damaged 
69 Ibid 549 
70 I borrow this term from Allison who used it when referring to Galanter’s litigotiation mentioned in the 
final Chapter, see p. 324 
71  See for example David Harvey, ‘ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE’ in F Fischer and M Hajer (eds), 
Living with Nature Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse (OUP 1999);  J M Smith and P 
Pangsapa, Environment and Citizenship. Integrating Justice, Responsibility and Civic Engagement (Zed 
Books 2008)  
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the clay seal protecting the waste leading to the toxic dump. The Environment 
Protection Agency evacuated residents from the so called ‘Ring 1’ zone, said to be the 
most dangerous. The residents from outside the zone initiated a campaign highlighting 
the causal effect between the toxins and deteriorating health of children attending the 
school. The Love Canal features the problem of the contradictory scientific evidence. 
The residents in association with the nearby University of Buffalo found the causal 
effect, which was initially contested by the officials on the basis that it was compiled 
through unsystematic and unscientific methods. The case features also the way citizens 
organised themselves by making contacts with researchers and leaders of other groups, 
community leaders and religious representatives. In the end the officials performed a  
partial evacuation from outside the Ring 1 and bowed to the residents’ pressure.72 The 
second case featured a first national protest of Black people over environmental matters 
that took place in Warren County, North Carolina. The residents protested against the 
illegal dumping of PCBs – contaminated soil in fourteen counties of the state. Bullard, 
widely recognised as the leader of the environmental justice movement in the US, 
highlighted the socio-economic structure of the district: 
 
“Warren County has the highest percentage of blacks in the state and is one of 
the poorest counties in North Carolina. The county had a population of 16,232 in 
1980. Blacks composed 63.7 percent of the county population and 24.2 percent 
of the state population. Per capita income for Warren County residents was 
$6,984 in 1982 compared with $9,283 for the state”73 
 
Love Canal featured the participatory aspect of the environmental justice movement, 
72  M J Smith and P Pangsapa, Environment and Citizenship... Ibid 15-19 
73  Robert D Bullard, Dumping in Dixie. Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (3rd edn, Westview 
Press 2000) 30 
46 
 
                                                 
 
 
where residents were encouraged to engage in scientific activities, whereas the Warren 
County highlighted the race-based aspect of the environmental injustice. The latter has 
been explored in various pieces of research in the following years. 
 
The Love Canal incident, alongside the Times Beach incident in late 70s, prompted the 
government to establish the Superfund on the basis of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 1980.  It gives power to 
Environment Protection Agency to perform clean ups of, inter alia, hazardous waste 
sites or to compel responsible parties to do such clean-ups or cover the costs of the 
Agency-lead cleaning activities. 
 
Environmental justice - Sociological research 
 
Examples from the USA 
The sociological research in the 1980s and 1990s proved that the minorities, especially 
the Blacks, were more likely to be exposed to environmental threats. Bullard proved 
that Black residents, though comprising 28% of the community, were more likely to live 
nearby waste disposal sites in Houston.74 The United Church of Christ’s national 
research focused on the surroundings of the 415 hazardous waste sites in the country. 
By compiling socioeconomic data from 1980s census and relating it to the locations by 
means of the post codes concluded that the greater number of the hazardous facilities 
was correlated with the greatest number of minority residents75. The researchers proved 
also that Black and working class families were more likely to be exposed to air 
74  Robert D Bullard, ‘Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community’ (1983) 53 Sociological 
Inquiry 273 
75  United Church of Christ (UCC), ‘Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on 
the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics with Hazardous Waste Sites’  (UCC 1987) 
<http://www.ucc.org/about-us/archives/pdfs/toxwrace87.pdf> accessed 1 January 2011 
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pollutants in Detroit and Louisville.76 The 1990s were abundant in research proving that 
the poor, mainly Black and other ethnic minorities were more likely to be exposed to air 
pollution,77 hazardous waste facilities,78 toxic chemicals released by various facilities79 
and other environmental hazards. It had not been until 1994 when the researchers gained 
interest in the history of the hazardous sites, namely whether or not they were placed in 
the disadvantaged, ethnic minority areas. Been suggested that there were cases where 
environmental threats were located in both already disadvantaged communities and in 
communities that did not show such characteristics. This suggested that policy should 
focus on the process of sitting80 the hazardous waste sites and the market forces that 
may lead ethnic minorities to live nearby such facilities.81  
Research in the UK 
In the UK, the initial sociological research was led by NGOs, government and 
academics. In 1999 Friends of the Earth correlated household income with the 
proximity to industrial facilities registered under Integrated Pollution Control. The 
researchers proved that “the poorest families (reporting average household incomes 
below £15,000) are twice as likely to have a polluting factory close by than those with 
76  Robert J Earickson and Irwin H Billick, ‘The Areal Association of Urban Air Pollutants and 
Residential Characteristics: Louisville and Detroit’ (1988) 8 (1) Applied Geography 5 
77  Victor Brajer and Jane V Hall ‘Recent Evidence on the Distribution of Air Pollution Effects” (1992) 
10 (2 Contemporary Policy Issues  63;  Susan A Perlin and others, ‘Distribution of Industrial Air 
Emissions by Income and Race in the United States: An Approach Using the Toxic Release Inventory’ 
(1995) 29(1) Environmental Science and Technology 69 
78 Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, ’Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law 
(1992) National Law Journal  2; Paul Mohai and Bryant Bunyan, ‘Environmental Racism: Reviewing the 
Evidence’ in Paul Mohai and Bryant Bunyan (eds), Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A 
Time for Discourse (Westview Press 1992); Eric J Krieg, ‘The Two Faces of Toxic Waste: Trends in the 
Spread of Environmental Hazards’ (1998) 13(1) Sociological Forum 3; Tracy Yandle and Burton Dudley, 
‘Reexamining Environmental Justice: A Statistical Analysis of Historical Hazardous Waste Landfill 
Sitting Patterns in Metropolitan Texas’ (1996) 77(3) Social Science Quarterly 477  
79  Liam Downey, 'Environmental Injustice: Is Race or Income a Better Prediction?' (1998) 79 (4) Social 
Science Quarterly 766 
80 The process will inevitably include negotiations. 
81  Vicki Been, ‘Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or 
Market Dynamics?’ (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 1383 
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average household incomes over £60,000”82. DEFRA sponsored three studies 
concerning the correlation between air quality and social deprivation. The researchers 
focused specifically on the exposure to nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and fine particulates 
(PM10). In the first, King and Stedman proved that there was positive correlation 
between the two variables in Greater London, Birmingham and Belfast.83 In the second, 
Pye came to a similar conclusion with an exception of Cardiff where the opposite 
correlation was observed84. In the third study Pye, King and Sturman concluded that 
ambient air in the English most deprived areas is more likely to be contaminated from 
point sources. The authors could not establish a similar correlation for Wales. In 
addition, the authors looked at the age profile of the identified areas and found that the 
most deprived areas had a greater proportion of children (between 0-14 years old). The 
elderly (65+) were more likely to live in the least deprived areas in England. The 
authors concluded: 
 
“Relative to other age groups, inequalities appear to be even larger for the 0-14 
age group, who experience higher average concentrations of pollutants (NO2 
and PM10) in the most deprived deciles than other age groups. This is important 
because this group is more susceptible to the effects of air pollution, i.e. this 
compounds inequalities. The most deprived deciles have a greater proportion of 
children relative to other age groups. However, it is not possible to say that these 
82 Duncan McLaren and others, (Report) ‘The Geographic Relation between Household Income and 
Polluting Factories’ (Friends of the Earth Trust 1999) 
<http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/income_pollution.html> accessed 1 January 2011 
83 Katie King and John Stedman, 2000 ‘Analysis of Air pollution and social deprivation’ (Report 
AEAT/R/ENV/0241 for Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, The Scottish 
Executive, The National Assembly for Wales and Department of Environment for Northern Ireland) 
(AEA Technology 2000) < http://uk-air.defra.gov.uk/reports/cat09/aeat-r-env-0241.pdf> accessed 1 
January 2011 
84 Steve Pye and others, ‘ Further analysis of NO2 and PM10 air pollution and social deprivation’ (Report 
AEAT/ENV/R/0865 produced for DEFRA, The National Assembly for Wales and The Northern Ireland 
Department of the Environment) (AEA Technology 2001)  < http://uk-
air.defra.gov.uk/reports/empire/2001socialdeprivation_v4.pdf> accessed 1 January 2011 
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deciles are more susceptible than other decile populations overall, as they have 
lower numbers of the elderly population.”85 
 
The above report mirrors an earlier study published in the Environment and Planning A 
journal. The authors found the positive and clear correlation between pollution and 
deprivation in the 10% most deprived areas. Yet, the authors also noted that the 
inhabitants of the 10% least deprived areas were also exposed to the above average 
concentration of air contaminants. This led to the overall conclusion that “[t]he poorest 
tend to experience the worst air quality, but the least poor do not fair best”.86 
 
The authors highlighted that injustice was more obvious in relation to the poor yet noted 
examples of increased exposure to the environmental hazards by the wealthy. 
Interestingly, the authors tested the ‘polluter pays principle’, namely examined whether 
those who suffered from the worst air quality contributed most to the contaminated 
ambience. Specifically, in context of car ownership "a `polluter pays' situation 
operates, with people in areas of poorest air quality contributing most emissions per 
car”.87 The authors found that "those wards that emit the least NOx, but which 
experience the greatest NO2 concentrations, are very clearly the most deprived".88 
 
In another study authors proved and argued that unequal access to good quality air was 
evident in both England and Wales.  At the same time the researchers expressed doubts 
over linking the inequality with the unfairness: 
85  Steve Pye, Katie King and James Sturman, ‘Air Quality and Social Deprivation in the UK: 
an Environmental Inequalities Analysis’ (Final Report AEAT/ENV/R/2170 to Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (Netcen, AEA Technology 2006)  < http://uk-
air.defra.gov.uk/reports/cat09/0701110944_AQinequalitiesFNL_AEAT_0506.pdf> accessed 1 January 
2011,  p. 81  
86 Gordon Mitchell and Danny Dorling, ‘An Environmental Justice Analysis of British Air Quality’, 
(2003) 35(5) Environment and Planning A, 909, 920 
87 Ibid 924 
88 Ibid 
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“The deprived that drive older more polluting cars, for example, may have little 
choice to do otherwise, due to a lack of access to public transport, and the higher 
cost of cleaner vehicles. Conversely, those that suffer higher air pollution in 
urban areas may choose to do so given the greater access to jobs and services, 
whilst others may be economically constrained to a particular more polluted 
location, without equivalent compensatory access. Thus in interpreting 
distributions of air quality (or other environmental 'bads') there is a need to 
consider the wider distribution of costs and benefits.”89 
 
Further, the empirical research demonstrated some occurrences of unequal exposure to 
the environmental ‘bads’ in relation to waste sites, flooding dangers and access to the 
river quality water in the UK. An Environment Agency study showed that landfill sites 
were more likely to be situated in the most deprived areas.90 Another and later 
Environment Agency study which focused solely on Wales indicated that the most 
deprived were more likely to live closer to waste recycling and transfer sites. The 
landfill sites tended to be situated in the rural areas far from the populations and such 
correlation could not be established with certainty.91 As for flooding hazards in England 
and Wales, one study found some evidence of inequality in relation to fluvial 
flooding,92 whereas another one could not establish the correlation.93 Research focusing 
89 Gordon Walker and others, ‘Environmental Quality and Social Deprivation’  (R&D Technical Report 
E2-067/1/TR)  (Environment Agency 2003) 
<http://geography.lancs.ac.uk/envjustice/downloads/technicalreport.pdf>  accessed 1 January 2011, 50 
90 Environment Agency, ‘The Urban Environment in England and Wales: a detailed Assessment’ 
(Environment Agency, Bristol 2002) 
91 Gordon Walker and others, ‘Addressing environmental inequalities: flood risk, waste management and 
river water quality in Wales’ (Science Report: SC020061/SR5) (Environment Agency, Bristol 2007) 
<http://www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/sciences/geography/links/IESR/downloads/SC020061_SR1%20report%
20-%20inequalities%20%20flood%20risk.pdf> accessed 1 January 2011 
92 Walker at al, ‘Environmental Quality... supra note 89 
93 Jane Fielding and Kate Burningham, ‘Environmental inequality and flood hazard’ (2005) 10(4) Local 
Environment 379 
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on Wales established a bias towards the population ranked in the middle of the 
deprivation deciles: 
 
“The least deprived are least at risk, but the highest proportions of people in 
flood risk areas are from the middle of the deprivation range.”94 
 
 As for Scotland, the correlation between deprivation and population proximity was 
“less distinct” than in relation to air quality. The same study showed that population 
from both most and least deprived areas had good access to green spaces. However, 
when taking access to the woodland as the environmental justice variable the most 
deprived enjoyed the least access.95 
Traditional environmental justice – theoretical perspectives 
Crowder96 highlights that the US researchers focusing on environmental racism are 
divided over the correlation between the disproportionate concentration of 
environmental threats on the one hand and the residential mobility and socioeconomic 
characteristics. The “racial income-inequality thesis” points out that the “racial 
differences in exposure and proximity to environmental hazards largely reflect group 
differences in socioeconomic resources”97. According to this the areas consisting of 
larger greater number of hazardous facilities causing rents prices to fall and attracting 
the poorer residents, which are predominantly non-Whites. The “residential 
discrimination thesis” suggests that the racial and ethnic differences in exposure and 
94 Walker et al, ‘Addressing environmental inequalities...’ supra note 91, 75 
95 John Fairburn, Gordon Walker and Graham Smith, ‘Investigating Environmental Justice In Scotland: 
Links Between Measures Of Environmental Quality And Social Deprivation’ (Final Report, Project 
UE4(03)01)  (Scottish Executive 2005) 14 
96 Kyle Crowder and Liam Downey, ‘Inter-neighborhood Migration, Race, and Environmental Hazards: 
Modeling Microlevel Processes of Environmental Inequality’ (2010) 115(4) American Journal of 
Sociology 1110 
97  Ibid 1115 
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proximity to environmental threats result “from housing-market discrimination that 
restricts the housing options available to members of at least some minority groups”.98 
According to this, the discrimination is caused by real estate agents, local governments 
and mortgage lenders create barriers for minorities’ residential attainments. 
 
The US theoretical work highlighted also a ‘socio-economic inequality thesis’ in 
Harvey’s political and economic analysis. The author built his argument partly upon a 
former World Bank’s chief economist’s leaked internal memorandum, where Lawrence 
Summers wrote99: 
 
"A given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country 
with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages...[...] I 
think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-
wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that."100 
 
Harvey saw this as “the characteristic discourse of a particular kind of political-
economic power and its discriminatory practices”.101 This theory translates into practice 
through the ‘market mechanism’ forcing the impoverished populations to move to the 
areas in the proximity of noxious facilities property prices are generally lower. 
Moreover, the existence of such facilities causes “fewer disturbances to property 
values”102 so that one can indicate where the poor communities live upon the existence 
of such noxious facilities. Finally, Harvey highlights the different response of the poor 
98  Ibid 1116 
99 The author decided to include this citation in light of the recent WikiLeaks scandal, where such internal 
documents have been deemed important and insightful as to the ‘truth’ of the current state of affairs. 
100 L. H. Summers cited in: The New York Times ‘Furor on Memo At World Bank’ (New York Times, 7 
February 1992) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEEDC1430F934A35751C0A964958260> 
accessed 1 December 2010 
101 Harvey, ‘The Environment of Justice’ supra note 71, 155 
102 Ibid 
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and the rich to the payments covering some of the effects of the toxic amenities: the 
poor are likely to accept the transfer of money whereas the latter are “unlikely to give 
up”103 whatever the price.  
 
The above theoretical anthropocentric perspectives placed the issues of distribution of 
environmental goods at the centre of environmental justice. Schlosberg saw 
environmental justice beyond these factors and noted that it was also crucial to consider 
the concept through the lenses of ‘recognition’, ‘capabilities’ and ‘participation’. The 
first refers to the recognition of nature and can be seen through “similarities and status 
injuries”.104 The former highlight the similarities between the natural world and human 
beings serving as a basis to create “a moral community and, through recognition of such 
similarities, a more inclusive theory of justice”.105 In addition, the author emphasises 
the notion that the human and natural world constitute integral systems. Recognising 
nature’s potential to develop a self-regulating and directing autonomy we should 
recognise the human beings’ abilities to create their integrity and flourish. The ‘status 
injuries’ premise dwells upon a notion that the crisis of sustainability was caused by 
“the exclusion of nature from theories of justice”106 Thus, the sustainable development 
must include “recognition of, and bond with, the rest of the natural world”.107 The 
second major theoretical perspective of Schlosberg, ‘capabilities’ is a human project 
aiming at defining nature’s capabilities and recognising that “there are a variety of 
animals, species, and systems”108. The project, if executed, would be ambitious and 
tedious as humans would have to understand and obtain enough information about the 
103 Ibid 
104 David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice. Theories, Movements, and Nature (OUP  2007) 
p.132 
105 Ibid 136 
106 Ibid 142 
107 Ibid 
108 Ibid 155 
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way of life of various sets of animals and elements of nature. Finally, ‘participation’ is a 
procedure through which we can implement recognition and capabilities. “The goal is to 
establish full status as a partner or peer for those that have been subordinated both 
culturally and distributionally”109 and this would include non human partners. 
Nevertheless, Schlosberg highlights that this would not have to necessarily include the 
conferral of voting rights to the world of nature but “the recognition of the consideration 
of the natural world in human decision-making.”110 
 
Beyond traditional research and understanding of environmental justice 
Race and social class have been shown to be dominant factors by the environmental 
justice advocates, researchers and policy makers in the Twenty First Century. The case 
of Hurricane Katrina showed that the delayed and inadequate federal support put at 
considerable disadvantage Black communities facing the environmental hazard111. 
However, recently, the concept has been examined by taking other socio-economic 
variables such as gender, age and disability. The example of the terrorist attack below 
suggests that these variables may even be of lesser importance for environmental justice 
movement.  Moreover, the emphasis on the proximity to tangible environmental hazards 
and access to quality air has been directed on less tangible environmental risks which 
will be reviewed below. 
Beyond traditional variables 
Firstly, environmental injustice has been examined from the viewpoint of established 
109 Ibid 157 
110 Ibid 158 
111  Glen S Johnson, ‘Environmental Justice and Katrina: A Senseless Environmental Disaster’ (2008) 
32(1) The Western Journal of Black Studies <http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-
9634541/Environmental-justice-and-Katrina-a.html> accessed 1 January 2011; see also: Adam Serwer, 
‘Justice Polluted: An Environmental-Justice Attorney Explains How the Civil Rights of Gulf Coast 
Residents Were Violated’ (2009) 20(2) The American Prospect 22 
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communities living in a specific location. The vantage point can be redirected to a 
location creating environmental threat which attracts people, especially the rescue 
workers, to come. This is illustrated by the suicide terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Centre in New York, which led to the collapse of the buildings and killed nearly 3,000 
people112. The collapsing towers released toxic fumes, dust and debris and caused 
serious health problems to 18,000 persons113. The event can be framed as an 
environmental disaster (hereafter 9/11 Environmental Disaster). Crucially, most of the 
affected people came to the location to provide rescue to the immediate victims and 
include “firemen, police officers, emergency workers, contractors and cleaning staff”.114 
Vanderlinden showed that the immediate priority and response to the disaster was 
framed as ‘war on terror’ and “questions about the environmental impact and potential 
health costs of the disaster were muted by national security and economic concerns”115. 
It was reflected in the media reports which reported the official data proving allegedly 
low air contamination. Immediately in the aftermath New York Times reassured citizens 
that “health problems from pollution would not be one of the legacies of the attacks”116. 
Even in November the same newspaper repeated the reassurance “amid growing 
concerns to the contrary” 117 and, as Vanderlinden notes, the positive reporting lasted till 
mid-2004118. The contrary arguments and tests were provided by a journalist for the 
New York Daily News, Juan Gonzalez, and Joel Kupferman, an activist and lawyer 
working for the  New York Environmental Law and Justice Program (NYELJP) 
112 David Shukman, ‘Toxic dust legacy of 9/11 plagues thousands of people’ BBC News US & Canada (1 
September 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14738140> accessed 1 September 2011 
113 Ibid 
114 Ibid 
115 Lisa K Vanderlinden, ‘Left in the Dust: Negotiating Environmental Illness in the Aftermath of 9/11’ 
(2011) 30(1) Medical Anthropology 30, 37 
116 Andrew C Revkin, ‘After the Attacks: The Chemicals; Monitors Say Health Risk From Smoke Is Very 
Small’ New York Times (New York, 14 September 2001) < http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/us/after-
attacks-chemicals-monitors-say-health-risk-smoke-very-small.html> accessed 1 September 2011 
117 Diane Cardwell, ‘A Nation Challenged: Lower Manhattan; Workers and Residents Are Safe, Officials 
Say’ New York Times (New York, 2 November 2001) < http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/02/nyregion/a-
nation-challenged-lower-manhattan-workers-and-residents-are-safe-officials-say.html> accessed 1 
September 2011 
118 Vanderlinden, ‘Left in the Dust...supra note 115, 37 
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“whose independent tests in September 2001 revealed high levels of asbestos 
and fiberglass in Ground Zero dust [...]. Kupferman asserted that his test results 
were more accurate than the EPA’s due to his more sensitive method of analysis, 
Transmission Electron Microscopy [...]. Under his leadership, NYELJP 
requested the release of complete EPA test data under the Freedom of 
Information Act, forcing the EPA to reveal more thorough accounts of its air 
quality testing, which showed elevated levels of other toxic contaminants, 
including benzene, dioxins, PCBs, lead, and chromium in the air and in the 
water near the WTC site [...]. Only after Kupferman contacted the Daily News 
with his test results did the EPA, presumably under threat of exposure, begin 
posting summary reports of lower Manhattan air quality to its website.”119 
 
On the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 Environmental Disaster the media reported findings 
that chronic illnesses, potentially deadly, will persist for another 20 years120. 
Interestingly, the NYELJP presents itself as an environmental justice organisation 
which believes “that environmental justice should be available to all people regardless 
of race, gender or age”.121  
 
Secondly, the feminist perspective underlined the distinct position and role of women. It 
is argued that women “suffered uniquely from environmental injustices”122 in the 
American society where, overall, they enjoy a fairly privileged position as compared 
with other countries. At the same time, authors have emphasised a distinctive role in 
119 Ibid 38 
120 Troy Rosasco quoted in Shukman, ‘Toxic dust legacy... supra note 112 
121 New York Environmental Law and Justice Program, ‘About Us’ < http://www.nyenvirolaw.org/> 
accessed 1 September 2001 
122 Nancy C Unger, ‘The Role of Gender in Environmental Justice’ (2008) 1(3) Environmental justice 
115, 115 
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achieving the goal of environmental justice: 
 
“Women are often caretakers, the daily observers who are the first to notice what 
is amiss in the family, community, and local environment; so it is often female 
relatives or caregivers who mobilise in order to protect children and other loved 
ones from ills such as asthma or lead poisoning that are aggravated by 
environmental factors. These women challenge political leaders and health 
experts who ignore or belittle their suffering while blaming mothers for poor 
care.”123 
 
The above citation clarifies that the eco-feminists working under the umbrella of 
environmental justice (as opposed to environmentalism) distrust the government and the 
mainstream expertise just as the core, race-oriented, environmental justice in the USA. 
Cole and Foster suggested that this could lead to a fusion between these major groups in 
order to exert more political power.124 This potential for such cooperation is said to be 
even greater because women form a large proportion, estimated at 60 percent, of the 
environmental justice movement leadership, organisers, researchers and policymakers 
and lawyers.125 
 
Thirdly, age has always been implicitly included into the environmental justice struggle. 
This was especially noticeable in cases such as Love Canal126 involving children, which 
prompted parents to express heightened alarm. The “Clear Skies” scheme regarding 
123  Rachel Stein, ‘Introduction’ in Rachel Stein (ed), New Perspectives on Environmental Justice: 
Gender, Sexuality, and Activism (Rutgers University Press 2004) 11 
124  Luke W Cole and Sheila R Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the 
Environmental Justice Movement (New York University Press 2001) 
125  Dorcetta Taylor, ‘Women of Color, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism’ in Kareen J Warren 
(ed), Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature (Indiana University Press 1997) 
126 See p. 46 
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cost-benefit analysis of air quality considered by the EPA in 2003 constituted one of the 
most notorious examples of age discrimination in relation to the environment. The 
Agency estimated the value of lives that could be saved through implementing stricter 
air quality standards. Each person was valued at $3.7 million except those in the 70s or 
over who were assigned a lower value of $2.3 million. Due to the public outrage the 
Agency scrapped the programme and one of the senior administrators declared that 
“E.P.A. [would] not, I repeat, not, use an age-adjusted analysis in decision making.''127 
It is interesting to note that the plan was associated explicitly with the environmental 
injustice. Take for example the blunt statement of Senator Joe Lieberman who opposed 
the scheme: 
 
“Such an approach would no doubt understate the benefits of regulatory efforts 
to protect the environment because seniors are among the populations most 
vulnerable to pollution. [...] Selling out America’s grandparents at a discount for 
the benefit of polluters is immoral and discriminatory.”128 
 
Recently age has become a free standing and independent variable in environmental 
justice thought, research and publications. In the UK the above reviewed129 research 
studies included age considerations. Mitchell and Dorling established that the exposure 
to poor air in the UK was also determined by age. Babies (under 1), children (between 
1-9) and young adults lived in most polluted areas as for 1999. Conversely, the adults 
127 Katharine Q Seelye and John Tierney, ‘E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies’ New York Times (New 
York, 8 May 2003) < http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/us/epa-drops-age-based-cost-studies.html>  
accessed 1 September 2010  
128 Joseph I. Lieberman cited in Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
‘Administration Policy Shows no Respect For Seniors. Americans 70 and Over Valued Less When 
Calculating Benefits of Regulation’(Press Release) (Washington, 20 May 2003) 
<http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=e4a370
8c-d382-456d-a6a8-136216af6c8a> accessed 1 August 2010 
129 Gordon Mitchell and Danny Dorling, 'An Environmental Justice Analysis of British Air...’ supra note 
86 
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over 45 “were much less likely to be living in highly polluted wards”130. Despite the 
tangible statistical difference the authors rightly concluded that age inequality did not 
have to constitute evidence of injustice: 
 
“Childhood exposure is a product of parental location choices and, although 
there is a clear age-related inequality, it is debatable to what extent this is unjust 
given that parents are presumably making location choices intended to maximise 
family welfare.”131 
 
The qualitative studies suggest that older people may be disadvantaged in accessing 
procedural justice. The exclusion may be a subjective impression or result from the  
power relationship which ignores the opinion of the older generation. 
 
Further, disability was explicitly included into the environmental justice paradigm by 
Cardiff University scholars132. Charles and Thomas emphasised the need of avoiding “a 
reductive notion of disability”133 and recognising the deaf “as a group with a strong 
sense of social identity, which can and should form the basis for engagement in policy 
process”134. The authors noted that the disabled  
 
“have been marginal in the environmental movement may lead to a knee-jerk 
attempt to engage any disabled people who can be inveigled to cooperate, and to 
ignore the complexities that the term ‘disability’ may obscure — i.e. to use the 
130 Ibid 919 
131 Ibid 925 
132 Andrew Charles and Huw Thomas, ‘Deafness and Disability—Forgotten Components of 
Environmental Justice: Illustrated by the Case of Local Agenda 21 in South Wales’ (2007) 12(3) Local 
Environment 209 
133 Ibid 211 
134 Ibid 
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term in an administrative way rather than analytically.”135 
 
The authors conducted a study on the engagement of the deaf community into the Local 
Agenda 21 in South Wales. The findings suggest that the deaf are perceived as a generic 
category of disabled thus “their self-identification as a distinctive linguistic 
community”136 is ignored. Further, the authors argued for greater inclusion of the 
“political arguments and conceptual innovations associated with Deafness in particular, 
and the disability movement more generally”137 into the environmental movement.  
Beyond traditional hazards 
Numerous other issues and social problems have been connected with the 
environmental justice concept alongside the trend of highlighting the environmental 
justice consequences. The US Institute of Medicine’s report concluded that the 
environmental justice permeates into the wide sphere of our existence and extended the 
meaning of the environment to include “all places where people live, work, and 
play”138. This thinking is inclusive of a range of issues beyond ‘traditional’ 
environmental hazards such as ‘hazardous work sites and underemployment, 
substandard housing, toxic schools, economic disinvestment, deteriorating 
infrastructures, as well as numerous other physical/social ills”139. The US Commission 
on Civil Rights (hereafter USCCR) went beyond racial discrimination in its 
understanding of the concept and included issues such as: 
 
“transportation equity and fairness in the placement of sound barriers along 
135 Ibid 212 
136 Ibid 218 
137 Ibid 
138  Institute of Medicine Committee on Environmental Justice, Health Sciences Policy Program, Toward 
Environmental justice: Research, Education, and Health Policy Needs (National Academies Press, 1999) 
2 
139  Stein, ‘Introduction’ supra note 123 2 
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freeways, the use of diesel buses in minority and low-income communities, light 
rail systems running underground in tunnels in affluent suburban communities 
and at street level in minority and low-income communities, and the placement 
of bus depots in minority communities.”140 
 
Horgen and Brownell, for example, refer to ‘toxic environments’141 when analysing the 
problem of childhood obesity stemming partly from the media message and advertising 
encouraging the fast food and unhealthy diet. The places possessing barriers to physical 
activity or encouraging tobacco or alcohol consumption can also be named as ‘toxic 
environments’ causing environmental injustice.  Romley conducted research examining 
“disparities in the density of liquor stores and bars across racial groups nationwide”142 
They found that the Blacks had access to many more alcohol stores than the Whites and 
that “minorities in lower-income neighbourhoods have more liquor stores in their 
neighbourhoods than whites in lower-and higher-income neighbourhoods and minorities 
in higher-income neighbourhoods”143. The authors argued that the findings could not be 
skewed by the higher demand for alcohol among ethnic minorities since the US data 
showed lower consumption by such groups. 
 
Recently Gottlieb called for adjusting the slogan ‘where we live, work and play’ to 
include “where, what, and how we eat”144. As a result, the author would reinforce the 
traditional link between food justice and environmental justice: 
140  U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, ‘Not in my Backyard: Executive Order 12,898 and Title VI as 
Tools for Achieving Environmental Justice’ (Report) (Washington 2003) 167 
141  K B Horgen and K D Brownell, ‘Confronting the toxic environment: Environmental, public health 
actions in a world crisis’ in T A Wadden and A J Stunkard (eds), Obesity: Theory and Therapy (Guilford 
Press 2002)  95 
142  John A Romley and others, ‘Alcohol and Environmental Justice: The Density of Liquor Stores and 
Bars in Urban Neighborhoods in the United States’ (2007) 68(1) Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 
48, 54 
143  Ibid 
144 Robert Gottlieb, ‘Where We Live, Work, Play . . . and Eat: Expanding the Environmental Justice 
Agenda’ (2009) 2(1) Environmental Justice 7, 7 
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“to address issues of health, globalization, worker rights and working conditions, 
disparities regarding access to environmental (or food) goods, land use and 
respect for the land, and, ultimately, how our production, transportation, 
distribution, and consumption systems are organized”145 
 
Thus the extension of environmental justice aims at exposing environmental features in 
other areas especially those traditionally associated with health. It also aims at joining 
forces between separate movements to increase the overall impact.  
 
The wider issues of environmental justice are also apparent in the UK for which tooth 
decay constitutes a good example. Fluoride has been proved to contribute to reducing 
cavities and even reversing early signs of tooth decay. It works by changing temporarily 
the chemical structure of saliva that prevents bacteria from growing excessively 
following a meal146. The constant exposure to fluoride is necessary to produce healthy 
teeth particularly during their formation in the childhood. Yet, overexposure, which 
exact levels are difficult to estimate147 can cause fluorosis manifested with stained 
enamel. Tooth decay has been linked to social justice:  empirical evidence proves that 
children and adults in deprived communities suffer most from cavities both in the US 
and the UK. The majority of scientists argue that water fluoridation can contribute to 
maintaining enough fluoride in the saliva thus contributing to oral health, and, 
effectively social justice. Since fluoridation must be performed under the supervision of 
environmental agencies the issue has been associated with environmental justice. There 
145 Ibid 
146 Ole Fejerskov, Anders Thylstrup and Mogens Joost Larsen, ‘Rational Use of Fluorides in Caries 
Prevention’(1981) 39(4)  Acta Odontologica Scandinavica 241 
147 Jenny Abanto Alvarez and others, ‘Dental fluorosis: Exposure, prevention and management’ (2009) 
14(2) Med Oral Patol Oral Cir Bucal 103 
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is however large opposition to water fluoridation on the part of ordinary people in the 
UK. The propagators argue that the treatment contributes to the environmental (social) 
justice whereas the public is sceptical arguing to the contrary that fluoridation 
contributes to creating toxic environment.148 
Further, a Sustainable Development Research Network's interdisciplinary study 
explored and summarised evidence in relation to environmental justice in the UK. The 
study focused on 21 topics divided into four groups, namely: "immediate locality front 
door issues, wider service issues, planning infrastructure and development issues" and 
"multiple environmental deprivation".149 The study explored traditional environmental 
topics but also matters concerning local transport services, access to urban green spaces, 
access to procedural rights. It concluded by highlighting that environmental injustice 
existed in the UK. Still: 
 
 "it is clear that patterns of environmental injustice are varied and complex. 
 Therefore there is a need for some caution in making claims of inequality and to 
 be wary of overgeneralisation."150 
Criticism 
 
Criticism of traditional environmental justice concept and research 
Environmental justice concept and research reviewed earlier have received substantial 
criticism. Harvey criticised the environmental justice movement for deliberately 
choosing cases capable of gaining media coverage and instilling fear and “moral 
148 Gordon Walker, Helen Fay and Gordon Mitchell, ‘ Environmental justice Impact Assessment. An 
evaluation of requirements and tools for distributional analysis’ (A Report for Friends of the Earth) 
(Staffordshire University, University of Leeds 2005) 
149 Karen Lucas and others, 'Environment and Social Justice: Rapid Research and Evidence Review' 
(Final Report by Sustainable Development Research Network) (Policy Studies Institute, London 2004) 2-
3 
150 Ibid 112 (emphasis in bold original) 
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outrage”151 and using “quasi-religious language”152. Moreover, the author attacked the 
very core of paradigm that is the struggle for more equal distribution of environmental 
hazards by referring to Benton’s ‘liberal illusion’153 which takes the following form: 
 
“In societies governed by deep inequalities of political power, economic wealth, 
social standing and cultural accomplishment the promise of equal rights is 
delusory with the consequence that for the majority, rights are merely abstract, 
formal entitlements with little or no de facto purchase on the realities of social 
life. In so far as social life is regulated by these abstract principles and in so far 
as the promise is mistaken for its fulfilment, then the discourse of rights and 
justice is an ideology, a form of mystification which has a causal role in binding 
individuals to the very conditions of dependence and impoverishment from 
which it purports to offer emancipation. The environmental justice movement 
has, by and large, seen through this illusory state of affairs”154. 
 
In similar fashion Cole argues that environmental justice activists encounter three myths 
in their work, namely: a) the truth will set them free; 2) the government is on their side; 
and 3) they need a lawyer. The first relates to the conviction that the advocates are right 
in their arguments underpinned with numerous studies and since it is ‘true’ they should 
win the struggle. It is a myth because 
“at the decision making level environmental justice struggles are not about right 
and wrong. They are not struggles about what is the best thing to do in a 
particular situation. They are struggles, about power. They are struggles about 
151 David Harvey, ‘The Environment of Justice’ supra note 71, 176 
152 Ibid 178 
153 Ted Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (Verso 1993) 
154 David Harvey, ‘The Environment of Justice’ supra note 71, 177 
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political and economic power, and the exercise of that power. To win in an 
environmental justice struggle, one has to build that power. Just being right 
alone, or just hang truth on your side alone, does not win”155.  
The second myth, which is less shared by the communities of colour, reflects a 
conviction that multi-level government will respond to environmental justice claims. 
Cole strikes it by noting that governments “respond to power”156 and in many situations 
the most powerful players are represented by the polluters. The latter deliberately 
choose to place their facilities where they will find “a not-as-powerful adversary”157 and 
government grants the permits by responding to the status quo. Given the above the law 
is not the appropriate tool to provide a solution to environmental justice power struggle. 
The third myth is discussed further in the following Chapter.158 
Bowen159 provided extended and detailed criticism of environmental justice research in 
the US. The author reviewed a large body of empirical research, exemplified above160, 
which supported the thesis that economically disadvantaged and Black communities 
were disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards. It follows from the criticism 
that some research would not pass the test of the peer review process by being 
inadequately planned or executed. Moreover Bowen attacked the issue of actual 
exposure as opposed to statistically observed patterns: 
“even assuming that the conclusions from it were strong, clear, and distinct—
suggesting that patterns of disproportionate exposure have been systematically 
155 Luke W Cole, ‘Environmental Justice and the Three Great White Myths of America’ (2008) 14 
Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 449, 451 
156 Ibid 452 
157 Ibid 
158 See p. 75 
159 William M Bowen Environmental Justice Through Research-Based Decision-Making (Garland 
Publishing 2011) 
160 See p. 47 
66 
 
                                                 
 
 
identified throughout the country—essentially none of the research is 
meaningfully linked to actual exposure and associated public health effects. As a 
consequence, little to nothing can be said with scientific authority regarding the 
existence of geographical patterns of disproportionate distributions and their 
health effects on minority, low-income, and other disadvantaged 
communities.”161 
Furthermore, Crowder and Downey162noted that “virtually all” sociological research is 
based upon “aggregate-level data to assess the correspondence between neighbourhood 
sociodemographic composition [...] and neighbourhood hazard levels”.163 Such 
approach leads to ecological fallacy: 
“[S]ome aggregate-level studies attempt to assess the relative effects of race and 
socioeconomic resources on exposure to pollution by regressing neighborhood 
hazard levels on average neighborhood income levels and the percentage of 
minorities living in the neighborhood. Any conclusions drawn from such tests, 
however, are based on the questionable assumption that higher neighborhood 
incomes necessarily reﬂect higher levels of income among individual minority 
residents of the area.”164 
Schlosberg165 reiterates the industry and government criticism of environmental justice 
paradigm of racial or income discrimination. Basically, it is argued that the 
disadvantaged move to more polluted and toxic areas because of the availability of 
cheaper properties and specific jobs offered to working-class communities. Schlosberg 
gives an immediate response to such arguments stating that  
161 Bowen, Environmental Justice... 179 
162 Kyle Crowder and Liam Down, ‘Interneighborhood Migration... supra note 96 
163 Ibid 1113 
164 Ibid 
165 Schlosberg Defining Environmental Justice... supra note 104 
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“Merely because the distribution is caused by, for example, market forces rather 
than targeting minorities does not mean that the overall process is just. Whether 
an industry purposefully locates in an overwhelmingly minority area, the very 
existence of so many polluting sites in poor and minority areas illustrates 
institutionalized racism, classism, and misrecognition.”166 
In UK context according to Stallworthy environmental justice term is “something of a 
misnomer”167 emphasising that the concept is “is fundamentally about social justice, 
pressing anthropocentric concerns for equitable sharing of burdens”168. Stallworthy, in 
his environmental analysis of coastal erosion management in context of climate change, 
notes the complexity and polycentricity of environmental distribution. Further, the 
researchers who performed inquiry concerning the exposure to flooding reviewed above 
allowed themselves some self-criticism: 
“It is also the case that vulnerable people do not all live in deprived 
communities. Not all poor people will live in poor neighbourhoods and 
vulnerable people are not necessarily poor; vulnerabilities associated with age, 
gender and disability do not map simply onto measures of socio-economic 
status. In a number of respects, not enough is known about how different types 
of neighbourhoods are affected by flooding.“169 
The above citation concerns the problem which can be found in other research 
measuring exposure to any environmental hazards and is closely related to the above 
criticism of using aggregate-level data in US context. Pedersen170notes that, unlike in 
166 Ibid 59 
167 Mark Stallworthy, ‘Sustainability, Coastal Erosion and Climate Change: An Environmental Justice 
Analysis’(2006) 18(3) Journal of Environmental Law 357, 363 
168 Ibid 367 
169 Walker et al, ‘Addressing environmental inequalities...’ supra note 91 
170 Ole W Pedersen, ‘Environmental Justice in the UK: Uncertainty, Ambiguity and the Law’ (2011) 
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the US, the UK scholars and activists have omitted the discussion concerning the 
benefits which the environmental hazards may bring to the communities. Further, 
Pedersen suggests a possibility of framing the environmental hazards in light of 
‘compensation’: 
“It could likewise be asserted that the deprived populations living in the most 
polluted areas are ‘compensated’ through cheaper house prices and thus stand to 
‘gain’ from living in proximity to a facility”.171 
‘Fat and proud’ – criticism of the extended environmental justice concept 
The attempts of expanding the meaning of environmental justice can also be criticised. 
This can be seen through an example of overweight and obesity, which has “more than 
doubled since 1980”172. The increase in the population’s weight can produce an 
environmental hazard if not properly monitored by relevant public authorities. This is 
illustrated by an aircraft crash at take-off at Charlotte Airport in 2003. The plane was 
too heavy due to the outdated system of calculating the overall weight, that is, based on 
average weight of an American resident. The calculations have not been updated to take 
account of the increased weight of the population173.  
 
There is growing body of evidence supporting the thesis that the affliction is largely 
caused by environmental factors. The environmental contribution is understood as a set 
of factors which increase behaviour resulting in positive energy balance. These are 
divided into those that promote overeating and physical inactivity. The former include 
31(2) Legal Studies 279 
171 Ibid 289 
172 World Health Organisation, ‘Overweight and obesity. Fact Sheet’ (WHO, 2011, Geneva) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/index.html> accessed 1 June 2011 
173 National Transportation Safety Board, ‘Loss of Pitch Control During Takeoff Air Midwest Flight 5481 
Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV Charlotte, North Carolina January 8, 2003’ (Aircraft Accident 
Report NTSB/AAR-04/01) (Washington 2004) 
<http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2004/AAR0401.pdf> accessed 1 January 2011 
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availability and portion size apparent especially in fast-food restaurants and of high-fat 
diets. The latter relate to the lack of physical activity among schoolchildren and 
adults.174 The environmental factors have also been linked to race, class, sex and age to 
complement and justify the environmental justice approach. Thus African and Mexican 
American women were found to be significantly more overweight and obese than white 
American women. The similar correlation was found when African and Mexican 
American girls at the age between 6 and 19 were compared with white American 
children and adolescents. Conclusions were also drawn that overweight and obesity are 
more likely to afflict less educated people and those on a low income.175  
 
There are similarities between the population weight and the problem of fluoridation. In 
a number of US jurisdictions such as Michigan and San Francisco the discrimination on 
the basis of weight is prohibited. It suggests that being overweight may be an inherent 
feature of life as is sex, gender, race which are subject to discrimination laws. It may 
serve a positive goal by reducing the instances of bullying or increasing the access to 
employment, as in Michigan176. However, it may also lead to potentially difficult 
scenarios where doctors are limited in giving advice and encouragement to lose weight 
before admitting obese patients for a complicated treatment177. A San Francisco lawyer 
explains how the law should work in practice during the doctor appointments: 
 
"The San Francisco ordinance says you may want to mention weight to the 
patient but if the patient says they do not want to talk about that then you are 
174 James O Hill and John C Peters, ‘Environmental Contributions to the Obesity Epidemic’ (1998) 280 
Science 1371   <http://portalsaudebrasil.com/artigospsb/obes078.pdf> accessed 6 June 2011 
175 Wendell C Taylor and others, ‘Environmental Justice: Obesity, Physical Activity, and Healthy Eating’ 
(2006) 3(s1) Journal of Physical Activity and Health 30 
176 Consult Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act in Michigan 
177The Week, ‘Opinion brief’  <http://theweek.com/article/index/215391/should-doctors-be-allowed-to-
refuse-obese-patients> accessed 6 June 2011 
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asked to respect those wishes."178 
 
Moreover, recent research published in Journal of the American Medical Association 
provided evidence that overweight, unlike underweight, and obesity, “was associated 
with significantly decreased all-cause mortality overall”179. Such uncertainty and 
contradictory information linked with the feeling of being discriminated leads some 
weight campaigners to issue statements of being 'fat and proud'180.  
Summary 
 
Environmental justice is a concept which focuses on disproportionate exposure of 
certain groups of people to environmental hazards and risks. The literature review in 
this Chapter showed that issues of disproportionate environmental distribution have 
been a focus of attention of scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth century and were 
explicitly framed as environmental justice in the 1980s. Environmental justice is 
multifaceted as the environmental concerns on which it focuses range from specific 
environmental hazards to less tangible ‘toxic environments’. Further, originally, 
environmental justice has been associated with the struggle of Black and pauperised 
communities in the US. Today, environmental justice concerns various groups and is 
measured through such variables as age, gender, disability. The 9/11 Environmental 
Disaster shows that environmental justice advocates can disregard these variables and 
focus on the whole population facing environmental problems regardless of income or 
race.  
178 Sondra Solway as cited in BBC News, ‘Overweight 'should be protected'’ BBC News Monday, 19 
October 2009 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8314125.stm> accessed 6 June 2011 
179 Katherine M Flegal and others, ‘Cause-Specific Excess Deaths Associated With Underweight, 
Overweight, and Obesity’ (2007) 298(17) Journal of the American Medical Association 2028, 2037 
180 BBC London 'Fighting fat discrimination' BBC London (London, 16 October 2009)  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/london/hi/tv_and_radio/newsid_8311000/8311220.stm> accessed 17 
October 2009 
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The literature review suggests that environmental justice has two main aspects, namely 
substantive and procedural. The former emphasises the need to overcome the 
inequalities and provide certain groups (Blacks, women, children etc) access to better 
environment. The latter emphasises the procedural rights (such as access to information 
and participation in decision-making) through which the groups facing environmental 
problems can improve their situation. 
Crucially, environmental justice is polycentric thus giving rise to conflicts within the 
environmental justice cohort. The environmental justice cohort brings together people 
who claim access to a healthier environment by reference to various characteristics such 
as age, ethnicity, disability or gender.  The polycentricity lies in the substantive and 
procedural aspect of environmental justice. The substantive polycentricity stems from 
the heterogeneity of parties claiming the right to better quality environment at various 
levels of governance (global, national, regional, local, family and individual). Thus, 
exposure to environmental hazards can be studied through numerous variables (age, 
disability etc) at these levels to measure the degree of environmental justice of different 
groups. The substantive polycentricity is increased in situations involving doubts over 
the degree of environmental hazard or risk, as water fluoridation illustrates. Secondly, 
procedural rights, mainly access to information and participation in decision making, 
have twofold functions. Firstly, they serve as an ‘integral’ part of the concept of 
environmental justice and thereby a catalyst for or tool through which environmental 
justice can be achieved. Secondly as a corollary of substantive polycentricity, allowing 
various environmental justice parties to assert their rights to the healthier environment 
at the cost of other environmental justice parties.   
In the first context the procedural rights constitute the supplementary elements of the 
substantive environmental justice. The exercise of these rights empowers the affected 
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communities to achieve the access to healthier environment at the cost of the more and 
most privileged. The availability of (or exposure to) the procedural rights can be studied 
through numerous variables at various levels of governance to measure the degree of 
environmental justice of different groups. In the second context the access to procedures 
allows the environmental justice claimants to argue for their own central interest. In 
other words, the procedural elements of environmental justice, if distributed equally, 
can constitute a platform for exchange of information (including experience) and 
negotiation to establish the priority of certain subgroups. This is especially important 
when a degree of environmental hazard is at doubt. Illustratively, a waste site in a 
deprived local area may be prejudicial to health of all members of the community but, in 
particular, to children or people with respiratory problems. At the same time the waste 
site may provide jobs in the area thus benefit the majority of its citizens. The whole 
community which suffers environmental injustice will have to decide whether or not to 
give a priority to the children and those with respiratory problems and oppose the 
development. The interest of children can be undisputable but the interest of adults with 
the respiratory illness may give rise to conflicts in the community. Thus the withdrawal 
of the development may lead to the loss of jobs, impoverishment, poor diet, inactivity 
leading to illnesses and the acceleration of environmental injustice. 
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Chapter 2 
Environmental justice: a legal challenge 
This Chapter will focus on the usefulness of adjudication. Given the purpose of this 
thesis this Chapter will pay a particular attention to the usefulness of judicial review in 
overcoming environmental inequality in the UK. It will initially look at the US literature 
which insisted that environmental justice movement should not resort to a legal 
challenge. 
 
Environmental justice and the courts 
Usefulness of adjudication 
Various forms of legal challenge  have been used by environmental justice activists 
since the beginning of the environmental justice movement. Bullard181, for example, 
notes a 1980 class action against Olin Chemical Company, which had released residual 
chemicals affecting residents in Triana. The case was settled in 1983 and the company 
agreed to pay 25 million US dollars. Bowen182 notes a case of residents of the West 
Dallas who were poisoned by lead. The challenge was brought on behalf of ill children 
and concluded in a 20 million dollars settlement. Both authors provide numerous other 
instances of lawsuits that concluded with a court judgment, out-of-court settlement or in 
a withdrawal of a case.  
 
In light of the fact that the lawsuits were used by the environmental justice movement’s 
181 Bullard ‘Dumping the Dixie...’ supra note 73 
182 W M Bowen Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision-Making (Garland Publishing 
2001) 
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activist, Cole analysed their overall strategies and published results in an academic 
journal. The third part of his work is titled explicitly as “The Politics of environmental 
justice Cases”183 and opens with these words: 
 
“Because the struggles in the environmental justice movement are primarily 
political and economic struggles, not legal ones, as lawyers in the movement we 
strongly recommend against lawsuits whenever possible. But given the fact that 
sometimes a community group must go to court, the group 'should understand 
not only the legal angles of the suit, but its potential political ramifications as 
well. Environmental justice lawsuits must be brought in recognition of their 
political nature, in order to lift a community's morale, strengthen the community 
group, raise the profile of the group, and build the political momentum 
necessary to win such struggles.”184 
 
Cole is right in assuming that the environmental justice struggles are mostly political 
and economic in line with the review in the previous Chapter. The mere existence or 
additional provision of anti-discriminatory laws is not sufficient to eliminate 
inequalities, or, in abstract terms, bring justice. It is a truism that the human factors, 
such as the attitudes, mentality, and education alongside the wider economic and 
political factors must be observed. Yet Cole saw some benefits of the lawsuits in terms 
of local politics; bringing the case to the courts popularises the struggle, educates the 
community and raises its profile and creates opportunities for gaining allies. The 
‘political dimension of lawsuits’ in general has been considered earlier in US 
183 Luke W Cole, ‘Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling’ (1994) 21 Fordham 
Urban Law Journal 687 
184 Ibid 687 
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literature185 but Cole explicitly linked this with the environmental justice movement. 
 
In the UK Hilson reviewed the environmental movement’s recourse to political and 
legal means of achieving their objectives in planning development. In the early 1990s 
the environmental NGOs adopted a litigation strategy “despite the presence of access at 
various points in the administrative process“186 such as participation in decision-
making. The recourse to litigation stemmed partly from the Conservative Party’s being 
in power and favouring liberal development thus hindering effective participation. The 
effectiveness of legal challenge was poor overall due to the barriers to standing and 
limited chances of success. The movement relied also on direct national action with 
mixed results. As Hilson notes, the recourse to political opportunity available in the 
European Union institutions was much more successful: 
 
“Access was relatively easy: as numerous studies have pointed out, the 
environmental movement was among the first to make the most of lobbying 
opportunities in Brussels. And a degree of success was often assured: the 
Commission and the Parliament were very pro-environment, and the use of 
qualified majority voting after the Single European Act (SEA) for environment 
legislation which could be tied to a single market goal14 meant that even the 
Council posed few problems for the passage of environmentalist legislation”187. 
185 Derrick A Bell, ‘Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation’ (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal 470 
186 Chris Hilson, ‘New social movements: the role of legal opportunity’ 2002 9(2) Journal of European 
Public Policy 238- 245 
187 Ibid 247 
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Towards judicial review in the UK 
Common law 
In the UK the issue of environmental equity has been entrenched into nuisance 
jurisprudence, which established the locality rule. In St Helen's Smelting Co v 
Tipping188  the Court drew distinction between nuisance resulting in damage to the 
property on the one and causing personal discomfort on the other hand. The latter was 
linked to the location: 
 
“the personal inconvenience and interference with one's enjoyment, one's quiet, 
one's personal freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the 
senses or the nerves, whether that may or may not be denominated a nuisance, 
must undoubtedly depend greatly on the circumstances of the place where the 
thing complained of actually occurs”189 
 
 In Sturges v Bridgman190, the landmark case in nuisance, reiterated the locality rule 
where “what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in 
Bermondsey”191. The case acknowledged the restricted liability in more deprived 
locations. In Rushmer v Polsue & Alfieri192 Cozens-Hardy L.J. put limits on the locality 
rule upheld by Buckley J. in Dennis v Ministry of Defence193: 
 
“It does not follow that because I live, say, in the manufacturing part of 
Sheffield I cannot complain if a steam-hammer is introduced next door, and so 
188 St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 
189 Ibid 651 
190Sturges v Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852 
191 Ibid 866 
192 Rushmer v Polsue & Alfieri, Limited [1906] 1 Ch. 234 
193 Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] Env. L.R. 34 
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worked as to render sleep at night almost impossible, although previously to its 
introduction my house was a reasonably comfortable abode, having regard to the 
local standard; and it would be no answer to say that the steam-hammer is of the 
most modern approved pattern and is reasonably worked. In short, if a 
substantial addition is found as a fact in any particular case, it is no answer to 
say that the neighbourhood is noisy and that the defendant's machinery is of 
first-class character.”194 
 
Further in Gillingham BC v Medway195 Buckley J. conferred immunity on a defendant 
facing a challenge in nuisance where the grant of planning permission changes the 
character of the area. In this case the naval dockyard was turned into a commercial port 
through a planning permission resulting in considerable disturbance to the residents. In 
Wheeler v J.J. Saunders196 Staughton L.J. confirmed that the defendants could enjoy the 
immunity only in relation to the strategic planning decisions. In Murdoch v Glacier 
Metal197 the claimant lived in a mixed residential and industrial area and complained 
about the noise for the nearby factory causing sleep deprivation. The noise exceeded the 
level set by the World Health Organisation yet the case was dismissed because of the 
nature of the neighbourhood located in proximity to a busy bypass. Moreover, Pill L.J. 
noted that there were no other complaints in relation to the noise travelling from the 
factory. 
Judicial review and distributive justice 
The above analysis suggests that it can be difficult to rely on the private law of nuisance 
194 Rushmer v Polsue & Alfieri 251-251 
195 Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham Docks) Co Ltd [1993] Q.B. 343 
196 Wheeler and Another v J.J. Saunders Ltd. and Another [1996] Ch. 19 
197 Murdoch and Murdoch v Glacier Metal Company Limited [1998] Env. L.R. 732 
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in pursuing equity rights in a court of law. This is crucially because the inequality rule is 
deeply ingrained in common law. In light of the European Community law 
developments scholars argued that public law would be best suited in underpinning 
equality claims. As early as in 1996 Donson and Lee198 argued that public law would be 
best suited in pursuing the environmental rights based claims in context of distributive 
justice. The authors argued that the public law offered a wider standing irrespective of 
proprietary interests and such claims could be preventive in nature. The prevention was 
primarily associated with the precautionary principle which has become the core 
principle of the EU law. 
Judicial review process 
 
Importantly, judicial review is not, in many cases, a one-off event, but is a complicated 
process.199 It normally starts with a letter before claim. This provides an opportunity to 
resolve the matter before a formal application for judicial review. The latter commences 
by serving a claim form on the defendant and ‘unless the court otherwise directs, any 
person the claimant considers to be an interested party’.200 The courts will either grant 
leave for judicial review or give a refusing order with reasons; in the latter instance the 
claimant ‘may request the decision to be reconsidered at a hearing’.201 The use of the 
word ‘reconsidered’ is intentional as the oral hearing is not an appeal, but another 
opportunity to set out the grounds for judicial review. At this stage the courts may also 
either grant permission or issue a refusing order with an opportunity to apply ‘to the 
Court of Appeal for permission to appeal’.202 The substantive hearing will only begin 
when the claimant has been granted permission. It ends with a judgment unless the 
198 Fiona Donson and Robert Lee, ‘Environmental Protection: Public or Private Law’ (1996) 1 Judicial 
Review 56 
199 Emphasis deliberate by this author. 
200 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r. 54.7. 
201 Ibid. at r. 54.12(3). 
202 Ibid. at r. 52.15. 
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parties agree to a consent order where ‘all the parties agree the terms in which a 
judgment should be given or an order should be made’.203 The judgment may be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and could reach the Supreme Court in certain 
circumstances.204 
 
Judicial review - standing 
Initially UK courts expressed a limited approach to standing exemplified in R v 
Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre Trust205. A more liberal 
approach to standing was established in R v H.M. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte 
Greenpeace (No 2)206 where Greenpeace challenged the authorization to discharge 
radioactive waste at Sellafield (Cumbria) granted to British Nuclear Fuels Plc (BNFL). 
The BNLF argued that the NGO had no locus standi in the case notwithstanding its 
reputation and interest in environmental protection. Otton J disagreed and saw it 
“appropriate to take into account the nature of the applicant and the extent of the 
applicant's interest in the issues raised”207. The test of nature was satisfied since 
Greenpeace, in pursuing its environmental objective, had 400,000 supporters nationally 
and 2,500 in Cumbria.208 As regards interest, Otton J noted that the Greenpeace’s 
“concern naturally leads to a bona fide interest in the activities carried on by BNFL at 
Sellafield and in particular the discharge and disposal of radioactive waste from their 
premises and to which the respondents' decision to vary relates”209 Moreover, the court 
203 Ibid. at r. 40.6. 
204 Notwithstanding the possibility of reaching the Court of Justice of the European Union at any 
substantive change under Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as in R 
(Edwards & Pallikaropoulos) v Environment Agency & DEFRA [2011] 1 WLR 79 (SC) and R(on the 
application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2004] 3 All ER 21. 
205 R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre Trust [1990] 2 WLR 186 
206 R v H.M. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 
207 Ibid 78 
208 Ibid 79 
209 Ibid 81 
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highlighted that the denial of standing to Greenpeace could lead to the overall 
postponement of the case by the BNLF employees or local residents: “[i]n this case it is 
unlikely that either would be able to command the expertise which is at the disposal of 
Greenpeace”210. Further, Otton J made a reference to good administration of resources. 
The less experienced claimants could bring a challenge but it would not make the best 
use of and provide assistance to the courts. In the words of the court:  
 
“a less well-informed challenge might be mounted which would stretch 
unnecessarily the court's resources and which would not afford the court the 
assistance it requires in order to do justice between the parties.”211 
 
The fact that Greenpeace was granted locus standi partly on the basis of its expertise 
will be of utmost importance in the final analytical chapter in this thesis. As the above 
case concerned the locus standi of an established NGO, Lord Justice Sedley considered 
standing of an individual citizen in R v Somerset CC ex parte Dixon212. Mr Dixon, a 
parish councillor, opposed a planning permission for quarrying at Whatley Quarry in 
Somerset. The defendants’ adviser proposed that Mr Dixon lacked sufficient interest as 
he did not have a proprietary interest in land which would be affected by the proposed 
quarry. Lord Justice Sedley disagreed and suggested that a citizen acting for the 
environmental benefit ought to enjoy standing: 
 
“Mr Dixon is plainly neither a busy body nor a mere troublemaker, even if the 
implications of his application are troublesome for the intended respondents. He 
is, on the evidence before me, perfectly entitled as a citizen to be concerned 
210 Ibid 82 
211 Ibid 
212 R. v Somerset County Council and ARC Southern Limited [1998] Env. L.R. 111 
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about, and to draw the attention of the court to, what he contends is an illegality 
in the grant of a planning consent which is bound to have an impact on our 
natural environment”213. 
 
However, in R v North Sommerset DC ex parte Garnett214, a similar case concerning 
quarrying permission, the applicants lived between three to four miles from an opposed 
development and were held not to have the locus standi. As a result the geographical 
proximity is taken into account when granting the standing215. Yet, in present case 
Popplewell J.  noted also that the applicants had “slim”216 chances of success and could 
enjoy the access to clean environment in the parks adjacent to their properties. Further, 
Justice Ellias in Hereford Waste Watchers Ltd v Hereford City Council217 accepted that 
a limited company established for the purpose of instigating environmental judicial 
review would be granted the locus standi. 
Judicial review – time limits 
Judicial review resolves the problem of standing which is a hurdle in common law 
based nuisance challenges. Yet, given its preventive nature, the "leave to seek" judicial 
review procedure might create another hurdle namely the limited time within which the 
challenge must be lodged. Under Rule 54(5) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998218: 
“(1) The claim form must be filed – 
(a) promptly; and 
213 Ibid 122 
214 R v North Sommerset DC ex parte Garnett [1997] EWHC (Admin) 318 
215 See also R v North West Leicester District Council and East Midlands Airport Ltd ex parte Moses (14 
September 1999) CO/1684/99 
216 R v North Sommerset DC ex parte Garnett supra note 214 
217 Hereford Waste Watchers Ltd v Hereford City Council [2005] EWHC 191 (Admin) 
218 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 or CPR 
82 
 
                                                 
 
 
(b) in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first 
arose. 
(2) The time limit in this rule may not be extended by agreement between the 
parties. 
(3) This rule does not apply when any other enactment specifies a shorter time 
limit for making the claim for judicial review”. 
The above rule gives some discretion to the courts to extend the time limits above the 
three month period of time. Yet, prior to the Burkett case219 influenced by the Human 
Rights Act 1998 the courts established an informal rule that the application should be 
made within six weeks from the date when grounds for the application first arose.220 In 
Burkett  Lord Steyn prescribed that the three months limit could not be “contracted by a 
judicial policy decision”221. Moreover, Burkett provided certainty as to the ‘date when 
grounds for the application’ for judicial review arise. In the above Somerset case222 Mr 
Dixon applied for judicial review within three months from the date of the planning 
decision in July 2006. The defendant’s Counsel argued that the time should run from 
October 1995 when the Council “resolved to grant planning permission”223 subject to 
certain conditions. Lord Justice Sedley disagreed with the defendant’s advisers by 
noting that if Mr Dixon had applied for judicial review earlier his cases could have been 
“premature”224 and dismissed. Yet, in R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex 
parte Greenpeace Ltd225 Laws J. rejected the NGO’s application for judicial review of a 
1997 decision to grant a licence to oil companies to explore North Sea oil. In Laws J.’s 
219 R v Hammersmith London Borough Council ex parte Burkett [2003] Env LR 6 
220 R v Ceredigion County Council ex parte McKeown (1998) 2 PLR 1 
221 Burkett case supra note 219 
222 Supra note 212 
223 Ibid 115 
224 Ibid116 
225R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Greenpeace Ltd [1998] Env LR 413  
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view the application should have been lodged in 1995, when it was probable that the 
licence would be granted and “would have run no risk whatever of being declared 
theoretical or premature”226. Moreover, this case is a good example of why the time 
limit is important in the preventive judicial review as there were huge sums of money 
already invested in 1995 and 1996: 
“The oil companies are no less litigants of good faith than is Greenpeace. They 
have committed and are committing vast sums on the faith of the April 7, 1997 
decision, and did so also before that date, as applicants for the licences. It 
behoved Greenpeace, not of course to entertain the least subjective sympathy for 
their position, but to recognise that the court would require damage to their 
interests to be minimised so far as was consistent with the administration...”227 
Burkett case provided certainty by establishing that it should be the decision granting a 
permission from which the three month time limit should run228. 
Grounds for Judicial Review 
Donson and Lee229 recognised the primary limitation of judicial review in England and 
Wales which is focused on procedural rather than substantive impropriety230. judicial 
review aims at reviewing the way the decision was made and is not concerned with the 
facts of the matter231. In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil 
Service232 Lord Dipock summarised the grounds for judicial review which include 
226 Ibid 436 
227 Ibid 440 
228 Supra note 219 
229Supra note 198 
230 Donson and Lee, ‘Environmental Protection...’ supra note 198 
231 R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p. Holdings & Barnes Plc 
(Alcounbury case) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1389 
232 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374 
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”illegality”, “irrationality” and “procedural impropriety”233. The first two are referred to 
as substantive grounds whereas the third one falls under the procedural heading. 
Illegality means that “the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that 
regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it”234.The common 
example of illegality is unlawful sub-delegation, the powers exercised for a different 
purpose than that envisaged by the law or ignorance of relevant considerations into the 
decision making235. Irrationality is often known as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’236. 
In the words of Lord Dipock:  
 
“It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to 
the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”237 
 
Procedural impropriety follows the failure of the decision maker to follow the rules of 
the relevant legislative act or” failure to observe basic rules of natural justice.”238 The 
latter include bias, right to a fair hearing and the duty to give reasons. Procedural 
impropriety served as a ground in R. (on the application of Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry 239 where Greenpeace applied for a quashing order of 
the Secretary of State’s decision to commence a new nuclear build. The decision was 
announced in "The Energy Challenge Energy Review Report 2006"240 following a 
233 Ibid 410 
234 Ibid 
235 Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997 
236 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 
237 Supra note 232, p. 410 
238 Ibid 411 
239 [2007] EWHC 311 (Admin) 
240 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006’ (Cm. 6887) 
(The Stationery Office 2006) 
<http://www.tsoshop.co.uk/bookstore.asp?Action=Book&ProductId=9780101688727> accessed 1 June 
2011 
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White Paper241 which promised “the fullest public consultation"242 before reaching the 
decision. The government run a restricted, 12-week, consultation by way of issuing a 
consultation paper. The NGOs challenge the process by effectively arguing that the 
consultation did not amount to the ‘fullest public consultation’. In effect, the process 
was unfair because the government breached the legitimate expectations of the 
consultees. Further, following the implementation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights by way of the Human Rights Act 1998, the claimant can challenge a 
decision on the ground that it is “incompatible with a Convention right”.243 The crucial 
difference between ordinary judicial review and judicial review based upon the HRA 
was put forward by Baroness Hale in Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin' Ltd.244 
 
“The first, and most straightforward, question is who decides whether or not a 
claimant’s Convention rights have been infringed. The answer is that it is the 
court before which the issue is raised. The role of the court in human rights 
adjudication is quite different from the role of the court in an ordinary judicial 
review of administrative action. In human rights adjudication, the court is 
concerned with whether the human rights of the claimant have in fact been 
infringed, not with whether the administrative decision-maker properly took 
them into account. If it were otherwise, every policy decision taken before the 
Human Rights Act 1998 came into force but which engaged a convention right 
would be open to challenge, no matter how obviously compliant with the right in 
question it was.”245 
241 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Our Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon Economy’ (CM 
5761) (The Stationery Office 2003) 
<http://www.tsoshop.co.uk/bookstore.asp?FO=1159966&ProductID=9780101576123&Action=Book> 
accessed 2 June 2011 
242 Ibid 61 
243 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 6(1) 
244 Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin' Ltd [2007] UKHL 19 
245 Ibid 31 
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Supreme Court and usefulness of judicial review 
The House of Lords leant towards the public law to be regulating the issues of strict 
liability in relation to environmental risks: 
 
“[I]t is more appropriate for strict liability in respect of operations of high risk to 
be imposed by Parliament, than by the courts. If such liability is imposed by 
statute, the relevant activities can be identified, and those concerned can know 
where they stand. Furthermore, statute can where appropriate lay down precise 
criteria establishing the incidence and scope of such liability.”246 
 
Later in Hunter v Canary Wharf247 the Law Lords explicitly suggested that public law is 
better suited in regulating the nuisance conflicts: 
 
“In a case such as this, where the development is likely to have an impact upon 
many people over a large area, the planning system is, I think, a far more 
appropriate form of control, from the point of view of both the developer and the 
public, than enlarging the right to bring actions for nuisance at common law.”248 
 
Empirical research supports the House of Lords/Supreme Court’s reasoning since the 
majority of the cases are pursued by established NGOs, local community groups or 
alliances of local residents. Sheridan found that out of 110 judicial review applications 
246 Cambridge Water Co. Respondents v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1994] 2 A.C. 264, 305 
247 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] A.C. 655 
248 Ibid 710 
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between 1995 and 2001 there were only 42 brought by individuals.249   
Nevertheless, judicial review seems to be the appropriate avenue of challenge for 
environmental justice campaigners given its liberal approach to standing. The challenge 
by way of judicial review can also be publicly funded by Legal Aid, supported with the 
Protective Costs Orders and the Aarhus Convention provides that the challenge should 
not be prohibitively expensive. Given the economic situation of the environmental 
justice campaigners this avenue provides some relief. Yet, judicial review is by no 
means perfect as it is focused primarily on procedural impropriety and not generally 
useful in reviewing the merits of a case. In addition, environmental justice campaigners 
and especially those who consider taking the action for the first time may struggle in 
satisfying the three month time limit. 
Court order on costs and Protective Costs Orders 
NGOs and community groups involved in environmental litigation can apply for a 
permission to apply for judicial review, and if successful, start the proceedings. The 
administrative costs associated with the applications are not high. In 2008 the fees for 
the application for permission amounted to £30 and the fees for substantive proceedings 
amounted to £180250. Recently, the costs have been raised and amount to £60 and £215 
respectively251. The individuals and NGOs interested in protecting the environment 
through litigation should be able to meet these expenses. In particular, the fees for the 
permission stage are very low and allow the applicants to test the validity of their 
arguments. The most prohibitive barrier of access to courts is the principle whereby “the 
249 Sheridan M, ‘United Kingdom Report’ in N de Sadeleer, G Roller and M Dross (eds), Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters and the Role of NGOs: Empirical Findings and Legal Appraisal 
(Europa Law, Groningen, 2005) 
250 UNECE ‘Implementation Report submitted by the United Kingdom’(Third Meeting of the Parties to 
the Aarhus Convention 2008) 20 
<http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_ir_2008_GBR_e.pdf> 
accessed 1 May 2010 
251 The Civil Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2011 (2011 No. 586 (L. 2) at 1.7 and 1.9 
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general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the 
successful party”252 which is briefly referred to as ‘costs follow the event’253. The 
applicant is practically exposed in the event that the application is unsuccessful to (at 
least) a proportion254 of the winner’s costs and disbursements.255 The court may make 
another order and in issuing a decision it must: 
 
“have regard to all the circumstances, including- 
(a)the conduct of all the parties; 
(b)whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been 
wholly successful; and 
(c)any payment into court or admissible offer to settle made by a party which is 
drawn to the court’s attention.”256 
 
The court must also have regard to the relevant factors in deciding the amount of costs. 
This should include the assessment whether costs were “proportionately and reasonably 
incurred” or “were proportionate and reasonable in amount”.257 Protective Costs Orders 
(PCOs) assume great significance in protecting litigants from hardship that might be 
caused by the rule that ‘costs follow the event’ applying without variation in judicial 
review cases, notwithstanding that the defendant is a public body. A 1999 Child Poverty 
Action Group case258 laid down the essential principles underlying the making of such 
252 CPR, supra note 218 at 44.3(2) 
253 Dyson J in R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) [1999] 1 WLR 347 at 353 
254 It is occasionally possible for an unsuccessful claimant to persuade the court not to make an adverse 
costs order. For an example in the environmental context see R v Secretary of State for the Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs ex p Challenger (2001) Env LR 12 where Harrison J took the view that ‘their case 
was not only a genuine case but also that it did involve points which are potentially of some importance, 
albeit that I have held against them. They are also applicants of limited resources.’ 
255 S Chakrabati, J Stephens and C. Gallagher, 'Whose cost the public interest?' (2003) Public Law 697;  
R Clayton, 'Public interest litigation, costs and the role of legal aid' (2006) Public Law 429  
256 CPR, supra note 218, at 44.3(4) 
257 Ibid 44.5(1a) 
258 Supra note 253 
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orders, which the court saw as an exceptional route available only for public interest 
cases. Being designed to assist public interest cases, PCOs are a significant element of 
judicial review applications. The CPAG principles were modified in the later case of R 
(Corner House) v Department of Trade and Industry259, and in the light of that 
modification, the court must be satisfied that:  
(i) the issues raised are of general public importance;  
(ii) the public interest demands their resolution; 
(iii) the applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the case; 
(iv) bearing in mind the financial resources of the applicant and respondent, and 
the amount of costs involved, it is fair and just to make an order; 
(v) unless the order is made, the applicant will probably discontinue the 
proceedings, and will be acting reasonably in so doing.260 
 
The Court of Appeal in Corner House sought to clarify the availability of PCOs in 
public law litigation, which it distinguished from private law matters by the necessity 
for the courts to resolve and elucidate the law rather than merely resolve the dispute 
between the parties. In the words of their Lordships: 
 
 “This is a good example of the way in which PCOs can be harnessed in cases of 
 general public importance where it is in the public interest for the courts to 
 review the legality of novel acts by the executive in a context where it is 
 unreasonable to expect that anyone would be willing to bear the financial risks 
 inherent in a challenge.”261 
 
259 R (Corner House) v Department of Trade and Industry [2005] 1 WLR 2600 
260 Ibid 74(1) 
261 Ibid 52 
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This is an uneasy line to draw especially in the especially in the environmental arena. 
Even if one can recognise public interest cases at the margins, many judicial review 
cases, will involve at the same time a personal or local interest in the decision at hand, 
while maintaining that the manner in which the decision has been made is unreasonable 
or unlawful such that the public agency should be brought to account. Public law 
actions are neither uniformly altruistic nor brought by disinterested parties. Conversely 
a difficulty is also that in a judicial review application, the defendant is, almost by 
definition, a public authority asserting that administrative action is promoting the public 
good. The courts on more than one occasion have expressly referred to the diversion of 
public funds into litigation rather than other public benefit or welfare as a reason to be 
wary of PCOs. In Goodson v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire262 Moore Bick LJ stated 
that “a public authority’s resources are not unlimited and money spent on litigation is 
money that would otherwise be available for its ordinary operations”. The line of 
reasoning was later repeated in other cases in English courts263 and by one of the 
judges264 sitting in the European Court of Justice. 
 
In the CPAG case, Dyson J had established that the court should be satisfied that it “has 
a sufficient appreciation of the merits”265 after hearing a short argument, before a PCO 
should be granted but in Corner House the Court of Appeal expressed doubts, over the 
criteria “Dyson J's requirement that the court should have a sufficient appreciation of 
the merits of the claim after hearing short argument tends to preclude the making of a 
PCO in a case of any complexity”.266 It becomes clear from the following wording that 
262 Goodson v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire [2005] EWCA Civ 1172 
263 R (A & ors) (Disputed Children) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 2494 
(Admin) and R (A and others) (Disputed Children) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2007] EWHC 2494 (Admin) 
264 Sir Konrad Schiemann, ‘The influence of European Union Law on Access to Justice in Environmental 
Cases’ UKELA 2010 Garner Lecture, London, 18 November 2010 
265 CPAG, supra note 253 at 357 
266 Corner House supra note 259  at 71 
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‘sufficient merits’ test is higher that ‘arguable case’ or ‘real prospects of success’ which 
should become the minimum basis of granting a PCO in this respect: 
 
 “It commonly happens when a court has to take an important decision at an early 
 stage of proceedings that it must do no more than conclude that the applicant's 
 case has a real (as opposed to a fanciful) prospect of success, or that its case is 
 "properly arguable". To place the threshold any higher is to invite heavy and 
 time-consuming ancillary litigation of the type that disfigured the conduct of 
 civil litigation 25 years ago [...] we consider that no PCO should be granted 
 unless the judge considers that the application for judicial review has a real 
 prospect of success and that it is in the public interest to make the order.”267 
 
It was also suggested in Corner House that pro bono representation would likely 
improve the prospects of a PCO268 and this perhaps ought to be so at least in that it 
indicates the likely discontinuance of proceedings if exposure to costs from the other 
side is faced by an applicant with free legal representation. At first sight this seems 
reasonable; the pro bono representation acts as an endorsement of the importance of the 
case. But advocates may act on a pro bono basis out of sympathy with an entirely 
private matter. Equally a claimant bringing a case via a conditional fee arrangement will 
put no money into the bringing of the case and may be no less impecunious or deserving 
than one represented by pro bono lawyers. 
 
There is no one form of PCO “and the choice of the form of the order is an important 
aspect of the discretion exercised by the judge”269. An applicant may be protected from 
267 Ibid 73 
268 Ibid 74(2) 
269 Ibid 75, see also B Jaffey, ‘Protective Costs orders in judicial review’11 Judicial Review 171  
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costs entirely. The courts may rule that neither party can recover costs as happened in R 
(Refugee Legal Centre) v SSHD270 where the claimant had the benefit of pro bono 
advice. The Courts may also prescribe that a cap may be placed on the amount of costs 
to which the applicant is exposed. This was applied in Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament v Prime Minister,271 where a partial PCO capped costs of a challenge to 
the legality of the war with Iraq at £25,000. The presence of a PCO may mean that the 
applicant should not expect other than ‘modest’, competent representation272.  
Group Litigation Orders 
A number of the US environmental justice lawsuits have been based upon class-action 
litigation. Given the distributive nature of environmental equity, litigation addressing 
the grievances of a large group of people sharing common concerns is appropriate. 
Despite the availability of public funding and the requirements of Article 9(4) of the 
Aarhus Convention judicial review is highly expensive. Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice 
final report273 proposed a multi-party litigation (or Group Litigation Orders, hereafter 
GLOs) to foster access to justice in England and Wales. The report identified three main 
objectives of such a procedural avenue: 
“(a) provide access to justice where large numbers of people have been affected 
by another's conduct, but individual loss is so small that it makes an individual 
action economically unviable; 
(b) provide expeditious, effective and proportionate methods of resolving cases, 
270R (Refugee Legal Centre) v SSHD EWCA Civ 1296 
271 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 
272 King v Telegraph Group Ltd (Practice Note) [2005] 1 WLR 2282 
273 Lord Woolf, ‘Access to Justice - Final Report’ (Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the civil justice 
system in England and Wales) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm> accessed 1 
March 2011 
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where individual damages are large enough to justify individual action but 
where the number of claimants and the nature of the issues involved mean that 
the cases cannot be managed satisfactorily in accordance with normal procedure;  
(c) achieve a balance between the normal rights of claimants and defendants, to 
pursue and defend cases individually, and the interests of a group of parties to 
litigate the action as a whole in an effective manner.”274 
In Boake Allen Ltd v Revenue & Customs Commissioners275Lord Woolf emphasised the 
cost-reducing objective of the GLOs: 
“All litigants are entitled to be protected from incurring unnecessary costs. This 
is the objective of the GLO regime. Primarily, it seeks to achieve its objective, 
so far as this is possible, by reducing the number of steps litigants, who have a 
common interest, have to take individually to establish their rights and instead 
enables them to be taken collectively as part of a GLO Group. This means that 
irrespective of the number of individuals in the group each procedural step in the 
actions need only be taken once. This is of benefit not only to members of the 
group, but also those against whom proceedings are brought. In a system such as 
ours based on cost shifting this is of benefit to all parties to the proceedings.”276 
Despite the above objectives Lord Woolf noted also that the GLOs could lead to a 
contrary situation of mismanagement and increased costs “because of the sheer scale of 
the numbers involved”277. Such cases could require legitimate and illegitimate use of 
greater resources and expertise creating expensive ventures 
274 Ibid 17(1) 
275 Boake Allen Ltd v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2007] 1WLR 1386 
276 Ibid 31 
277 Lord Woolf, ‘Access to Justice...’ supra note 273 at 17(8) 
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The regime is governed by Rule 19 of the CPR where “[t]he court may make a GLO 
where there are or are likely to be a number of claims giving rise to the GLO issues”.278 
The GLO must contain the following features: 
“(a) contain directions about the establishment of a register (the ‘group register’) 
on which the claims managed under the GLO will be entered; 
(b) specify the GLO issues which will identify the claims to be managed as a 
group under the GLO; and 
(c) specify the court (the ‘management court’) which will manage the claims on 
the group register.”279 
The judgment is “binding on the parties to all other claims that are on the group register 
at the time the judgment is given or the order is made unless the court orders 
otherwise”280 and may be binding on the subsequent cases in the register. The Rule 
48(6)A concerns the apportionment of costs following the GLO. A person can be liable 
for ‘individual costs’ concerning their individual litigation on the register and ‘common 
costs’ which may include the following: 
“(i) costs incurred in relation to the GLO issues; 
(ii) individual costs incurred in a claim while it is proceeding as a test claim, and 
(iii) costs incurred by the lead solicitor in administering the group litigation”281 
Crucially, the claimants are liable severally for the equal proportion of ‘common costs’.  
278 CPR Rule 19.11(1) 
279 Ibid 19.11(2) 
280 Ibid 19.12(1) 
281 Ibid 48.6A(2) 
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GLOs have been rare: there had been only 75 such orders until July 2010.282 There have 
been a number of environmental cases concerning private283 and public284 nuisance, 
personal injury,285 private nuisance and negligence.286 Although most of the cases are 
based upon the common law, the claimants’ advisers in Austin & others v Miller Argent 
argued that the case carried a “public law elements”287 to rely on the PCO. Lord Justice 
Jackson did not approach the question whether the PCO would apply to public law 
litigation, dismissing the issue in the Austin case as “academic.”288 
Human Rights and Environmental justice 
Human Rights in the UK are protected amongst other things by Human Rights Act 1998 
which gives effect to The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (also known as the European Convention on Human Rights).  In 
1949 the UK as one of ten founding countries took part in the establishment of the 
Council of Europe and was engaged in drafting the ECHR, which came into force in 
1953. The Convention safeguards the fundamental and human rights which are enforced 
by the European Court of Human Rights sitting in Strasbourg (hereafter ECHR Court). 
It does not explicitly include the right to satisfactory environment and the ECHR organs 
were initially reluctant to consider the environmental claims289. In X and Y v Germany 
the ECHR Commission rejected the applicants’ concern over the use of adjacent 
marshland for military purposes by stating explicitly that “no right to nature 
282 Her Majesty’s Court Services, ‘Group Litigation Orders’ 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110110161730/http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/cms/150.htm> accessed 1 June 2011 
283 Austin & others v Miller Argent (South Wales) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 928,  
284 Anslow v Norton Aluminium Ltd (Queen's Bench Division, 26 May 2010), Corby Group Litigation v 
Corby District Council [2009] EWHC 1944 (TCC) 
285 AB v Ministry of Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 1317 (Atomic Veterans Group Litigation)  
286 Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28 (Mogden Group Litigation) 
287 Austin & others v Miller Argent supra note 283 at 57 
288 Ibid 64 
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preservation [was] as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention”290. In X v Iceland  the applicant wished to rely on the Article 8 of the 
Convention to keep his dog in his home. The Commission asserted that it could not 
accept: 
 
“that the protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention extends to 
relationships of the individual with his entire immediate surroundings, insofar as 
they do not involve human relationships and notwithstanding the desire of the 
individual to keep such relationship within the private sphere”291 
 
 Yet, with time, Court has been active in interpreting a number of Convention articles 
dynamically to include the right to healthy environment in line with the changing 
circumstances. The following paragraph will review the most notable cases for 
environmental justice in relation to the Article 2 (right to life), Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial) Article 8 (respect for family right) and Protocol I, Article 1.  
Article 8 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.” 
290 X and Y v Federal republic of Germany N° 7407/76 Decision of 13 May 1976 on the admissibility of 
the application,161 
291 X v Iceland N° 6825/74 Decision of 18 May 1976 on the admissibility of the application, 87 
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The Article 8 contributed to developing a substantive right to healthy environment 
which obliges the state to act or “refrain from action impacting on the environment” or 
to ensure that the non-state actors act in a way guaranteeing decent environmental 
surroundings.292  
 
Article 8 is an example of a qualified right and certain violations can be justified by the 
interest of the whole economy. The balancing exercise was performed, for example, in 
Buckley v United Kingdom293 and Hatton v United Kingdom294. The former case 
concerned a British Gypsy mother who lived with her three children in a caravan on 
land bought by her. She did not hold the necessary planning permission and made a 
retrospective application which was rejected on three grounds. Firstly, there was an 
alternative accommodation available; secondly, the nearby road would not 
accommodate two vehicles safely; and thirdly, her  
 
“use of the land would detract from the rural and open quality of the landscape, 
contrary to the aim of the local development plan which was to protect the 
countryside from all but essential development”295 
 
The Mother was subject to enforcement proceedings requiring the removal of her 
caravan. She opposed the enforcement notice by arguing, inter alia, that the alternative 
accommodation was not appropriate for the young children and her enforced move 
would be incompatible with the Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court did not agree with 
292 Margaret DeMerieux, ‘Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2001) 21(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies p. 
521, 527 
293 Buckley v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 101 
294 Hatton v United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (2003) 
295 Buckley v UK supra note 293 at 14 
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her by giving a wide margin of appreciation to the local authority which would apply in 
relation to other environmental planning cases:  
 
“It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of what would be the best 
policy in the planning sphere or the most appropriate individual measure in 
planning cases [...]  By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the 
vital forces of their countries, the national authorities are in principle better 
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions.  In so 
far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local factors is inherent 
in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the national authorities in 
principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.”296 
 
Hatton v UK was considered in two instances by the ECHR Court. The material facts 
concerned the applicants’ sleep deprivation caused by the noise produced by the landing 
aircrafts at Heathrow Airport at night. Specifically, the claimants opposed the quota 
system which allowed the operator to maintain either fewer noisier planes or more 
quieter aircrafts in operation.  The ECHR Court agreed at first instance with the 
applicants and ruled that the UK government failed to establish the appropriate balance 
between competing interests, where Heathrow operation was said to be beneficial for 
the whole British economy. The Grand Chamber reversed the ruling relying on the 
established wide margin of appreciation which governments are granted in relation to 
their human rights obligations. Thus, in the final ruling the economic incentives 
prevailed over the serious disturbances which the applicants experienced. 
 
296 Ibid 75 
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Lopez Ostra v Spain297 was the first case in which the ECHR Court declared the breach 
of the Article in question and laid foundations for a substantive test of ‘severe 
environmental pollution’ which had to be satisfied by the victims. Mrs Ostra lived in an 
industrial town near to a waste-treatment plant “12 metres away from a source of 
smells, noise and fumes”.298 The applicant subsequently moved away but did not lose 
the status of the victim and her application was admitted. The ECHR Court explicitly 
asserted that  
 
“severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent 
them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and 
family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health”299 
 
The ECHR Court whilst acknowledging that the public authorities were not directly 
responsible for the nuisance, highlighted that they had agreed to the construction and 
operation of the plant and were oblivious to its continuous nuisance. The Court 
contended that the state failed in its balancing exercise between the interests of the town 
and the family pronouncing the breach of the Article 8.  
 
In Guerra v Italy300 the proximity to the environmental hazard and its direct effect on 
the applicant's family was crucial in admitting the case. Guerra lived about one 
kilometre away from a factory which manufactured fertilisers and caprolactam and had 
a history of accidents. A report commissioned by the Manfredonia District Council 
established that the toxic gases released by the factory were directly channelled towards 
297 Lopez Ostra v Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994) 
298 Ibid 42 
299 Ibid 51 
300 Guerra v Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998) 
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the town.301 The Court declared a breach of Article 8, yet, it did so on the basis of 
procedural impropriety. The relevant authorities failed to provide adequate information 
on the risks posed by the factory pursuant to the relevant law including the Community 
Seveso I Directive302. 
 
In Fadeyeva v Russia303 the applicant lived in a flat 450 metres from a steel plant in an 
industrial town of Cherepovets. The authorities established a buffer zone around the 
plant which was supposed to separate the residents from the pollution. The government 
established programmes which required the resettlement of the residents from the buffer 
zone in which the morbidity rate was found above the average.304 The ECHR Court 
established the failure of the Russian state to implement the measures requiring the re-
housing of the population from the polluted area in the proximity of the plant. The State 
failed also in offering the effective solution for the family to move elsewhere and 
overall, failed to strike the right balance of the interests of the whole community against 
the interest of the applicant. It pronounced the breach of Article 8. 
 
The Court set the conditions of ‘severe environmental pollution’ to include: firstly, the 
direct effect posed by the environmental hazard on the victim’s home, family of private 
life; and, secondly, “a minimum level of severity”. The latter, more complex in practical 
analysis, should be considered on case-by-case basis and includes the intensity and 
duration of the nuisance and its health effect. The applicant should also be able to 
present the necessary evidence such as medical certificate. In Lopez Ostra case the test 
was satisfied given the close proximity to the hazard and the availability of the genuine 
301 Ibid 16 
302 Directive 82/501/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the major-accident hazards of 
certain industrial activities dangerous to the environment and the well-being of the local population 
303 Fadeyeva v Russia, 2005 IV 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 
304 Ibid 10-19 
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medical record. In Fadeyeva v Russia although the applicant failed to adduce material 
medical evidence, the court was prepared to accept the official documents confirming 
the above average concentration of pollutants which would inevitably contribute to the 
deterioration of their health.305 In Tatar v. Romania306 judgment the causality was less 
obvious since the Court could not establish a causal link between a disaster and a 
medical conditions of Tatar’s son. Here, the applicants lived in a proximity to a gold 
mine which operator had obtained a permission to use sodium cyanide. Following an 
accident in 2000 large amount of contaminated water permeated surrounding 
environment. The Court pronounced the breach of Article 8 due to the serious 
circumstances caused by the failure to take appropriate measures to assess the risk and 
protect the public. In another ruling, Leon and Agnieszka Kania v Poland307 the ECHR 
Court dismissed a claim based on the minimum level of severity. The applicants lived 
near a craftsmen’s cooperative causing severe nuisance yet they did not manage to 
present evidence that the noise exceeded permissible levels and necessary medical 
certificates which would prove the link between noise and their condition. Further, the 
Article 8 was also interpreted to be violated when public authorities failed to provide 
necessary information on potential environmental hazards.308 Similarly, in Furlepa v 
Poland309 the applicants failed to establish a minimum severity test. The Court was not 
convinced the pollution from a car repair garage adjacent to the applicants’ property 
exceeded the safe levels. In addition, Furlepa was not able to substantiate her claim by 
presenting convincing medical record proving the casual link between their 
deteriorating health and environmental hazard.  
 
305 Ibid 80-81 
306 Tatar v Romania [2009] ECHR 88 
307 Leon and Agnieszka Kania v Poland Judgment of 21 July 2009 Appl. No. 12605/03 
308 See for example Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357 and Roche v United Kingdom (2006) 42 
EHRR.599 
309 Furlepa v Poland, Decision as to the admissibility of Application no. 62101/00 
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Article 8 contains an implicit procedural aspect of adequate participation as elaborated 
in Taskin v Turkey.310 The ECHR Court pronounced that: 
 
“whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-
making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to 
afford due respect for the interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 
8.”311 
In addition: 
“the individuals concerned must also be able to appeal to the courts against any 
decision, act or omission where they consider that their interests or their 
comments have not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making 
process.”312 
 
Taskin is an important case as it extended the severity test to less tangible likely 
exposure to environmental dangers. The ECHR Court has recently confirmed this 
approach in Orlikowscy v Poland313. 
 
Article 2 
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. Deprivation of 
life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
310 Taskin v Turkey [2004] ECHR 
311 Ibid 118 
312 Ibid 
313 Orlikowscy v Poland [2011] (Application no. 7153/07) 
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(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” 
 
The Article imposes a positive obligation on the contracting Party which must engage 
certain activity safeguarding the right to life such as establishing the enforcing agencies. 
The positive obligation has also been associated with the right to healthy environment in 
the Öneryildiz v Turkey314 judgment. The case concerned a methane explosion near to 
slums inhabited by dwellers. An earlier report issued by the district council had alarmed 
the major of Istanbul about the probability of explosion. The fact that the latter did not 
take the necessary precautionary measures to prevent the incident, which killed 30 
people, served as a basis of litigation in the ECHR Court. The Court agreed and 
highlighted that the Turkish authorities failed to provide the dwellers with adequate 
information relating to potential risks posed by the landfill site. This approach in which 
access to information was a primary obligation of the government to satisfy the 
obligation under Article 2 in relation to the environment was confirmed in Budayeva v 
Russia315. Here, the Russian authorities had been warned about the increased risk of 
mudslides in Tyrnauz which eventually occurred and killed eight persons. The ECHR 
Court confirmed the breach of the right to information by the State reflected in the 
failure to implement the necessary emergency relief policies. The breach was also 
associated with the state’s failure to investigate the death of the applicant’s husband. 
314 Öneryildiz v Turkey [2004] ECHR 657 
315 Budayeva v Russia [2008] ECHR* 
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The First Protocol, Article 1 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in 
any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure 
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 
The right to healthy environment was also linked to the right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of one's possessions. This Article formed part of the argumentation by the applicants in 
the abovementioned Öneryildiz v Turkey316. The Court pronounced its breach even 
though the applicants did not have the right to occupy land on which they stayed. 
Notwithstanding the property lost during the explosion was sufficient to fall within the 
Article in question. In Antonetto v Italy317 the applicant lived in a house close to a newly 
erected multi-storey block of flats. Antonetto brought a successful challenge by way of 
judicial review, which ordered the demolition. The order was not executed and 
following the 10 year long struggle in the domestic context Antonetto resorted to the 
ECHR Court. The applicant’s property lost value due to restricted view and limited 
access to light. The Court pronounced the breach of the Article 1 of the First Protocol 
due to the authority’s failure to comply with the order.  
Article 6 (1) 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
316 Supra note 314 
317 Antonetto v. Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 10 
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against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. 
 
In L M and R v Switzerland318 a nurse, teacher and a pensioner resided in a proximity to 
a railway station accommodating trains transporting nuclear waste. They complained 
that “they have been denied access to court in respect of their complaints about the 
dangers emanating from the rail transports of dangerous radioactive materials”319. The 
ECHR Commission held that Article 6(1) embodied “the right to a court” subject to 
limitations, which “must not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a 
way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right would be impaired”320. In 
Zander v Sweden321 Article 6(1) applied to a situation involving perceived risk rather 
than a well grounded environmental hazard. The weight of perceived risk  was later 
undermined in Noel Narvii Tauira and Eighteen Others v France322 and in Balmer-
Schafroth and Others v Switzerland323. In the latter case the applicants opposed a 
decision to extend a licence for operating a nuclear facility situated 4-5 kilometres from 
their residency. Here the Article 6(1) was not applicable because the applicants failed to 
prove “that power station exposed them personally to a danger that was not only serious 
but also specific and, above all, imminent”324. De Merieux argued that it was difficult to 
see a difference between the above case and more liberal Zander v Sweden “unless it be 
that one involved a nuclear power station and nuclear policy”.325 Yet, the Court returned 
to the liberal approach in Taskin326 and Okyay and Others v Turkey.327 
318 L M and R v Switzerland 22 EHRR CD 130 
319 Ibid 130 
320 Ibid 132 
321 Zander v Sweden ECHR Sers. A, No. 279B (1993). 
322 Noel Narvii Tauira and Eighteen Others v France (1995) 3 IELR 774 
323 Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland (1998) 25 EHRR 598 
324 Ibid 40 
325 Margaret DeMerieux ‘Deriving Environmental...’ supra note 292 548 
326 Supra note 310 
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Relationship between human rights and environmental justice 
Despite the initial reluctance the ECHR Court has established a clear link between 
human rights and the environment. A question remains as to the extent to which human 
rights can contribute to achieving greater environmental justice. Poustie, for example, is 
very cautious by denoting that “[t]here may be a coincidence between infringements of 
Convention rights and environmental justice concerns”328. Indeed, the ECHR 
Convention does not provide a direct basis for considering the issues of environmental 
justice in a wider context that is beyond the rights of the victim. The focus on the victim 
constitutes a barrier to considering the broader interests at present time but also in the 
future in the context of intergenerational equity. Further, the threshold for pronouncing 
the infringement of the Convention articles in environmental context is very high. Cases 
under the Article 2 have involved the loss of life whereas the victims had to be exposed 
to ‘severe environmental pollution’ to obtain a remedy under the Article 8 of the 
Convention. This contrasts with the environmental justice advocates who highlight a 
more positive approach. They demand a fair share of a decent, healthy environment329. 
The ECHR approach is largely negative by rendering a tiny portion of the environment 
as the most polluted and toxic, and, in result,  inhabitable. There is therefore a tension 
between environmental justice and human rights regime under the ECHR. This tension 
could be defused by lowering the severity test under the Article 8. This article has a 
potential for highlighting the right of the family, and potentially wider community, to a 
decent and a healthy environment unlike the absolute right to life under the Article 2, 
which concentrates on the most extreme scenarios. Obviously, the victim’s rights under 
the Article 8 must be weighed against the economic or social interests of the wider 
community or even a country. The need to strike this balance may be negative and 
327 Okyay and Others v Turkey (2006) 43 EHRR 37 
328 Mar Poustie Report, supra note 13  p. 84 
329 See p. 61 
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positive in the context of environmental justice. On the one hand it is somewhat 
reminiscent of the ‘locality rule’ mentioned above in the context of private law in 
England and Wales. Thus the fact that some people must suffer greater exposure to 
environmental pollution becomes an imperative of the well balanced society. On the 
other hand, the need to strike the balance provides opportunities for recognising wider 
interests in the society and assessing the differences in terms of exposure. Certainly, a 
lower threshold under the Article 8 would constitute a more positive approach; when 
coupled with the need to strike the balance it would offer greater opportunities for 
striking a fair balance in the society. Then, however, one would have to consider the 
competency and capacity of the courts to make such wider-reaching judgments over. In 
more pragmatic terms, the suggested approach would surely strain the already limited 
ECHR resources. 
 
It seems very unlikely that the wider environmental justice community would be 
effective by solely relying on the human rights legal regime. Further, as Lee330 
highlighted, some environmentalists and scholars are disinterested in designating human 
rights frameworks as a driver for greater environmental equity. They would be 
interested in recognising natural objects as possessors of rights331. If such recognition 
came to fruition the nature would require representatives in the courts which could also 
include environmental justice representatives. The latter would probably try to invoke a 
nature’s intention to serve the society on equal basis leading to interesting debate over 
justice. 
 
330 Robert G. Lee ‘Resources, Rights, and Environmental Regulation’ (2005) 32(1) Journal of Law and 
Society 111 
331 Christopher D. Stone ‘Should Trees have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ 
(1972) Southern California Law Review 450 
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Human Rights Act 1998 
As mentioned above332Human Rights Act 1998 created an independent ground for 
judicial review. Lee conducted an analysis of the potential impact of the human rights 
regime on judicial review indicating that, save for standing, “consideration of human 
rights issues suggests a wider and more vigorous approach to judicial review”.333 In 
terms of the time limit the Burkett334 judgment, clarifying the position relating to time 
limits, was significantly influenced by the Human Rights Act 1008. The narrow 
approach to standing results from the long-standing principle335 that it is only victims 
who can start the proceedings; explicitly entrenched into the s7(3) of the Human Rights 
Act: 
“If the proceedings are brought on an application for judicial review, the 
applicant is to be taken to have a sufficient interest in relation to the unlawful act 
only if he is, or would be, a victim of that act.” 
It is very unlikely336 that the narrow approach based on the ‘victim test’ would replace 
the ‘sufficient interest test’ reviewed above337. Yet, in R. (on the application of 
Westminster City Council) v Mayor of London338 Maurice Kay J. refused the application 
by Westminster City Council to challenge a congestion charge in London because the 
latter was not the victim. The is significant in light of the Greenpeace (No2) liberal 
approach to locus standi of the representatives of individuals who may lack funds and 
expertise to bring individual challenges. The author agrees with Ligere: 
332 See p. 86 
333 Robert G Lee, ‘Judicial review and Judicial Developments after the Human Rights Act 1998: the 
Example of Environmental Law’ in Monika Pauknerová and others (eds),  Changes of Judicial Culture 
and Decision Making in Different Branches of Law (Univerzita Karlova v Prace 2007) 
334 Supra note 219 
335 Norris v Ireland (1989) 13 EHRR 186 
336 Lee, ‘Judicial review...’ supra note 333 
337 See p. 84 
338 R. (on the application of Westminster City Council) v Mayor of London [2002] EWHC 2440 (Admin) 
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“It seems somewhat regrettable that an entity, such as a local authority, which is 
likely to be financially well placed to represent the interests of the individuals it 
seeks to represent, lacks standing for HRA challenges, whereas the individuals 
in question, who often lack the necessary resources to pursue such challenges 
can, in principle, do so. Further, challenges by some NGOs may serve to 
emphasise certain causes more than other, equally, if not more, deserving 
interests”339. 
As Lee noted: 
“[i]t may be wiser, therefore, for in certain human rights cases and in situations 
where the recognition of a campaigning group is in doubt to field and individual 
clearly within the category of victim or with a sufficient interest in the matter in 
question”340. 
Such a strategy was pursued in R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment 
Agency341 where a homeless person challenged an Integrated Pollution Prevention 
Control permit issued to a cement company and authorising the use of tyre chips in 
addition to the conventional fuels. Mr Edward played no part in the formal consultation 
process preceding the grant of the permit and the Environment Agency argued that he 
lacked the sufficient interest. Yet, Keith J. found that he enjoyed locus standi as he 
would be affected by the decision. 
The narrow approach to standing may also result in limiting the right to participation 
and appeal, mentioned above342, to the victim. Another issue of appeal arose in R. v 
339 Edite Ligere, ‘Locus standi and the public interest: a hotchpotch of legal principles’ (2005) Journal of 
Planning & Environment Law 292 296 
340 Lee, ‘Judicial review...’ supra note 109, 46 
341 R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2004] 3 All ER 21 
342 See p. 103; see also Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights. A Reassessment’ (2007) 18 
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Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p. Holdings & 
Barnes Plc (Alcounbury case)343 relating to the decision-making powers of the 
Secretary of State in planning issues. The case was an appeal from the Divisional Court 
which found that the Secretary of State, who is also engaged in formulating the planning 
policy, “cannot be both policy maker and decision taker”.344This would contravene the 
ECHR Article 6’ s requirement of an access to “an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law”. In the words of their Lordships: 
“[P]arliament, democratically elected, has entrusted the making of planning 
decisions to local authorities and to the Secretary of State with a general power 
of supervision and control in the latter. Thereby it is intended that some overall 
coherence and uniformity in national planning can be achieved in the public 
interest and that major decisions can be taken by a minister answerable to 
Parliament. Planning matters are essentially matters of policy and expediency, 
not of law.”345 
The Lordships did not find the contravention of the ECHR as the latter required the 
separation of the judiciary from the executive and not from the administration. The 
Secretary of State’s position ensures the uniformity of the planning system which is 
established for the public benefit. Crucially, judicial review allows the review of the 
Secretary of State’s decision thus ensures the lawfulness of the system.  
Further the HRA has sparked a discussion concerning the extension of the grounds of 
judicial review, where the Convention rights are at stake, so as to include 
Fordham Environmental Law Review 471 and C Hilson, ‘Risk and the European convention on human 
rights: Towards a new approach’ in The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Hart 
Publishing 2009) 
343 Alcounbury case supra note 231 
344 R. (on the application of Holding & Barnes Plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions [2001] H.R.L.R. 2 at 86 
345 Alcounbury case supra note 231 at 159 
111 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
‘proportionality’, which could replace ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. Proportionality 
was defined in Privy Council in De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing:346 
"whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective 
are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective."347 
In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department348Lord Steyn noted that 
“intensity of review is somewhat greater under the proportionality approach”349due to 
the three main reasons. Firstly, the court would have to “assess the balance which the 
decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or 
reasonable decisions”. Secondly, the test would require the court’s attention to “the 
relative weight accorded to interests and considerations” and, thirdly, the test would 
allow assessing the necessity of the human rights limitation and whether “the 
interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.”350 The 
proportionality test would not shift judicial review to “merits review”.351 
In International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Roth)352 158 Laws L.J. suggested that the application of proportionality should include 
deference. Deference concerns the weight that the courts should distribute to particular 
laws, principles or law-makers in arriving at its decision. Deference was suggested to 
346 Privy Council in De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 
347 Ibid 80 
348 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 [2001] 2 AC 532 
349 Ibid 27 
350 Ibid 
351 Ibid 28 
352 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Roth) [2002] 
EWCA Civ 158 
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include the following four principles. Firstly, greater deference should “be paid to an 
Act of Parliament than to a decision of the executive or subordinate measure”.353 
Secondly, there should be “more scope for deference "where the Convention itself 
requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms which are 
unqualified"”.354 Thirdly, greater deference should be due to  
“the democratic powers where the subject-matter in hand is peculiarly within 
their constitutional responsibility, and less when it lies more particularly within 
the constitutional responsibility of the courts”355;  
and fourthly, 
“greater or lesser deference will be due according to whether the subject matter 
lies more readily within the actual or potential expertise of the democratic 
powers or the courts.”356 
Yet, as Gordon357 argues the Baroness Hale interpretation above 358 of judicial review in 
context of human rights makes the deference categorisation redundant: 
“It must follow from this that the weight to be placed by the court on any aspect 
of the evidence before it, derives not from any mesmeric force of an Act of 
Parliament or other supposed democratic imperative but, rather, through – and 
only through – the ordinary process of adjudication that is itself part of the 
courts’ own constitutional function. No hierarchy that derives from 
353 Ibid 83 
354 Ibid 84 
355 Ibid 85 
356 Ibid 87 
357 Richard Gordon,  ‘Two Dogmas of Proportionality’ (2011) 16(3) Judicial Review 182 
358 See p.86 
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proportionality is involved in this”359. 
The principle of proportionality received support in Alconbury360 case and there have 
not yet been a clear indication from the House of Lords that the test would be accepted.  
Polycentricity in litigation  
The previous Chapter argued that polycentricity attached to the substantive and 
procedural aspect of environmental justice. The former stems from the heterogeneity of 
environmental justice parties claiming access to better environment and the fact that the 
substance of justice is often contested. The latter stems from the variety of parties using 
procedural rights to achieve their goals. Moreover, polycentricity in procedural 
environmental justice lies on the negotiating table where the environmental justice 
claimants themselves agree on their priorities and resolve the doubts over the degree of 
environmental risks. The question is whether these aspects are reflected in litigation.  
Firstly, in terms of substantive polycentricity, litigation involves two clearly opposing 
parties thus it is difficult to identify the variety of interests involved by analysing the 
material facts of the cases. Further, litigation often follows a complex negotiating 
process resulting in one particular person or group taking action. Moreover, there are 
purely environmental justice cases involving one person or family or the whole 
community who suffered injustice. These cases flag the problems of a given party and 
conceal wider interests.  Further, the difficulties in identifying the true polycentricity in 
environmental cases stem from the lack of wider public consultation on the expert 
findings concerning the substance of litigation.   
Many environmental challenges concern complex issues which raise questions about 
359 Ibid, 188 
360 supra note 231 
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“the knowledge base itself”361.  According to Fisk, science includes the already known 
and what remains to be known and requires a procedural separation between science 
assessment and risk assessment: 
“This means that the completed assessment does not aim to eliminate 
uncertainties, and that a second step of risk assessment is required to make a 
decision. This procedural separation then leaves the task of devising a science 
assessment process that minimises overestimation of what we know and 
underestimation of what is uncertain.”362 
The bias in assessments in litigation can result from the inclusion of the evidence from 
one expert. Even the peer review process may not eliminate the bias due to “disciplinary 
paradigm bias”363. The bias influences the outcome of legal challenges where the “lack 
of evidence only reflects lack of power in the investigation techniques”.364 Thus: 
“If a statistical analysis fails to find a 'statistically significant' correlation 
between exposure to a chemical and a rare disease this may simply mean that the 
sample is too small to detect the effect in the presence of random confounding 
factors”365. 
Yet, Fisk argues that the absence of evidence to support a conclusion is often 
“equivalent to the presence of evidence that refutes it”366. Yet, the sample collected in 
the field may not fully mirror the actual situation and there is a need to share the interim 
findings of the assessors with the wider public to capture comments. The process of 
361 David Frisk, ‘Environmental Science and Environmental Law” (1998) 10(1) Journal of Environmental 
Law  33 
362 Ibid 3 
363 Ibid 5 
364 Ibid 
365 Ibid 
366 Ibid  
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public consultation should complement the peer review process.  
Secondly, it is also difficult to identify the procedural polycentricity by analysing 
environmental cases. The affected parties will most likely rely on available participation 
in administrative process to negotiate the contested substance. An example would be the 
Milner case367 concerning the dispute over fluoridation, which was said to be 
polycentric in the previous Chapter368. The issue came up before the courts in the UK, 
where only 10 percent of the population benefits from the water fluoridation. In the 
South Central Strategic Health Authority (hereafter SHA) decided, following public 
consultation, that fluoride should be artificially added to water in and around 
Southampton affecting approximately 195,000 citizens. The area was said to have 
incidents of tooth decay twice as average level in the UK. Ms Milner alongside a large 
portion of the local public opposed the project and filed a challenge, as a sole claimant, 
to the High Court. She emphasised that her challenge did not relate the facts369 but the 
sole legality of the decision and specifically that: 
 “the SHA unlawfully failed to have regard to (let alone act in accordance with 
other than for a good and stated reason) the applicable government policy 
(which was that no new fluoridation scheme should be introduced unless it can 
be shown that the local population is in favour)”370. 
The majority of the population opposed the fluoridation reflected in the consultation and 
accompanying statistical research and it was submitted that SCSHA breached the Water 
Fluoridation (Consultation) (England) Regulations 2005. Regulation 5 when it was 
debated in the Parliament closely resembled the following words: 
367 Milner v South Central Strategic Health Authority [2011] EWHC 218 (Admin) 
368 See p. 63 
369 Ibid 3 
370 Ibid 13 
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 “A Strategic Health Authority shall not proceed with any step regarding 
 fluoridation arrangements that falls within section 89(2) of the Act unless the 
 representations made by individuals affected and bodies with an interest are 
 predominantly in support of it.”371 
whereas the final regulation took the following wording: 
“A Strategic Health Authority shall not proceed with any step regarding 
fluoridation arrangements that falls within section 89(2) of the Act unless, 
having regard to the extent of support for the proposal and the cogency of the 
arguments advanced, the Authority are satisfied that the health arguments in 
favour of proceeding with the proposal outweigh all arguments against 
proceeding.”372 
It is therefore clear that the draft regulation placed the decision-making responsibility on 
the public whereas the law finally adopted placed this responsibility on the SHA 
provided that the latter could present enough arguments in favour of fluoridation. The 
arguments would also have to outweigh the public opposition: 
“Clearly, the greater the weight of opposition to the proposal (as well as the 
weight of all arguments against proceeding), the greater the weight of the health 
arguments in favour of proceeding will need to be in order to prevail. That 
overall judgment has to be made by the SHA, but there is no rule or policy that 
they can only proceed if the balance of local public opinion is in favour.”373 
This reasoning was supported by the judge who was satisfied with the balance of 
arguments and ruled that the SHA did not err in its decision to proceed with the fluoride 
371 Ibid 22 
372 Regulation 5, Water Fluoridation (Consultation) (England) Regulations 2005 
373 Milner case,  62 
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enrichment. The case shows that the substance of environmental justice can be disputed 
and objected to by those who are supposedly deprived of it. It is impossible to 
determine whether fluoridation is an environmental good or bad and the balancing 
exercise becomes crucial. environmental justice is served when the public and 
authorities are engaged into the exchange of information and arguments to determine 
what would be the best in given circumstances. In this instance, the British Dental 
Association welcomed the ruling, which is likely to lead to fluoridation in other parts of 
the UK.374 
Polycentricity in litigation – a need for socio-legal research 
Given the above deliberations there are two avenues which can be taken to measure 
polycentricity in litigation. Firstly, it is possible to conduct documentary analysis of 
available cases and capture data on the variety of interests. This analysis would be 
limited given the scarcity of information in legal cases themselves. Secondly, it is 
possible to capture the geographical location of the particular environmental problem 
and/or the geographical origins of the claimants to assess the multitude of the interests. 
Further, it is possible to conduct analysis of various interests involved in a number of 
cases through statistical research which will be performed in this thesis.  
  
374 Robert G Lee, ‘Fluoride Challenge Fails’ (2011) 20(2) Environmental Law Monthly 11 
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Chapter 3 Aarhus Convention 
 
This Chapter will review the evolution, principles and the pillars of the Aarhus 
Convention and its implementation in the UK. It will give a short overview of the 
process which led to signing the Convention and a particular attention will be paid to 
the principles found in the preamble. Each pillar will be reviewed in detail. The author 
will show that through its principles and structure the Convention is an instrument, 
which can support the attainment of environmental justice. However, it is neither 
explicitly nor implicitly restricted to environmental justice claims. It may as well serve 
the purely environmental objectives as well as serve those who oppose the 
environmental protection in favour of economic development. The Chapter will also 
provide a short overview of the implementation of each pillar in the UK. The 
Convention is effective in the UK through a number of EU directives. The compliance 
is also satisfied through a number of soft law provisions such as an expanded 
availability of information regarding each pillar in the country. Given the overall 
objectives of the thesis particular attention will be paid to the implementation of the 
third pillar.  
Environment for Europe process as a catalyst for the Aarhus Convention 
This section focuses on the Environment for Europe (EfU) process, though, it is widely 
recognised375 that the origins of the Aarhus Convention can be traced back to the 
375 Casey- Lefkowitz S, Stec S and Jendroska J, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide 
(United Nations 2000); Jeremy Wates, (Secretary to the Aarhus Convention) ‘The Aarhus Convention: A 
New International Framework Regulating Public Access to Environmental Information’ (discussion 
paper) presented at: INFOTERRA 2000 – Global Conference on Access to Environmental Information, 
Dublin, 11-15 September 2000  <http://www.unep.org/infoterra/infoterra2000/Wates-rev.pdf> accessed 
28 March 2009 
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Principle 10376 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 
"Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be 
provided."377 
 
The EfU process was created by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 
a subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council. The UNECE itself was 
established in 1947 with the view to promoting “pan-European economic 
integration”378. It consists of 56 Member States, which include European, Asian states 
as well as The United States of America and Canada.379 
The EfU process commenced with a conference that took place at Dobris Castle, near 
Prague in Czechoslovakia380 in 1991. This was followed by five additional ministerial 
conferences: Lucerne (Switzerland) in 1993; Sofia (Bulgaria) 1995; Aarhus (Denmark) 
in 1998; Kiev (Ukraine) in 2003; and Belgrade (Serbia) in 2007.381 Whereas the first 
376 It should be also recognised that the Principle 22 supports participation of indigenous people in 
achieving sustainable development by recognising their attachment to land, local knowledge and 
traditions. Interestingly, the Aarhus Convention does not mention ‘indigenous people’ though they would 
fall under the umbrella of the ‘public’ 
377 ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ adopted during the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3 to 14 June 1992, Principle 10 
378 UNECE ,‘About UNECE’ <http://www.unece.org/about/about.htm> accessed 28 March 2009 
379 Ibid 
380 Czechoslovakia split into two sovereign states, Czech and Slovak Republics  on 1 January 1993 
381 UNECE, ‘”Environment for Europe” Process’  <http://www.unece.org/env/europe/> accessed 28 
March 2009 
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conference aimed at analysing the current environmental situation in Europe and 
discussing the potential ways of strategic cooperation, the following three conferences 
were of great importance for the development of the Convention, including the 
portentous Aarhus Conference. 
In Lucerne the participants recognised public participation as one of the crucial 
components of the long term strategic environmental process. The Ministers concluded: 
(1) that UNECE should work on proposals concerning “legal, regulatory and 
administrative mechanisms to encourage public participation in environmental decision 
making”382, (2) that UNECE should pay particular attention to elaborating the ways of 
promoting participation in a cost-efficient manner as well as providing training and 
education for the public in order to increase their skills of understanding environmental 
information and (3) that public education should benefit from the support of the 
‘informal sector’.383 Following the conference, senior advisers set up a task force384, 
which aimed at realising the above obligations. The established ‘Guidelines on Access 
to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental Decision-
Making’ were subsequently endorsed by ministers at the Sofia conference385. 
Interestingly, the guidelines consisted of expanded recommendations for developing the 
future informational and participatory pillars of the Convention. This cannot be said in 
relation to the third pillar since the guidelines recommended only that: 
 
“The public should have access to administrative and judicial proceedings, as 
382 Declaration by the Ministers of the Environment of the region of the united Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) and the Member of the Commission of the European Communities 
responsible for the Environment, Lucerne 28-30 April 1993 
<http://www.unece.org/env/efe/history%20of%20EfE/Luzern.E.pdf> accessed 12 April 2009, art. 22(2) 
383 Ibid 
384 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit. 
385 Declaration by the Ministers of Environment of the region of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) 25 October 1995, Sofia (Sofia Declaration) 
<http://www.unece.org/env/efe/history%20of%20EfE/Sofia.E.pdf> accessed 12 April 2009, art. 42 
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appropriate. Suitable legal guarantees should ensure that proceedings are fair, 
open, transparent and equitable. It is desirable that proceedings are not 
prohibitively expensive”  
and that 
“It is desirable that standing should be given a wide interpretation in 
proceedings involving environmental issues.”386 
 
As a result the Ministers in Sofia recommended that UNECE should work on “effective 
public access to judicial and administrative remedies for environmental harm”387. The 
Ministers recommended developing “a regional Convention on Public Participation”388 
and allowed NGOs to contribute to its creation. 
 
The Convention’s drafting process took place between 1996 and 1998 and involved 
careful considerations of the wording, various proposals of all participants, some of 
which have been accepted.389 Crucially, the drafting sessions established the third pillar 
of the Convention, initially, by a tentative assertion that “the article” concerning access 
to justice would form an essential part of the agreement.390 Later, during the second 
session in November 1996, the working group agreed that the Convention “should 
include a third substantial part on access to justice”.391 Substantial discussions followed, 
386 UNECE, ‘Guidelines on Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making’ (Sofia Guidelines), 
Geneva 1996 ) < http://www.unece.org/env/documents/1996/Sofia_Guidelines_1996.pdf> accessed 12 
April 2009, art. 25, 26 
387 Sofia Declaration, art. 41 
388 Ibid, art. 47 
389 The whole process of drafting has been transcribed including the discussions and proposals and is 
available from the sessions’ reports: UNECE ‘Reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group for the preparation 
of a draft convention  on access to environmental information and public participation in environmental 
decision-making’ < httphttp://www.unece.org/env/pp/adwg.htm> accessed 12 April 2009 
390 Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making (Aarhus Working Group) ‘Report of the First 
Session’ (UNECE, Committee on Environmental Policy) 
<http://www.unece.org/env/documents/1996/cep/ac.3/cep.ac.3.2.e.pdf> accessed 12 April 2009, art 11 
391 Aarhus Working Group, ‘Report of the Second Session’ (UNECE, Committee on Environmental 
Policy) < http://www.unece.org/env/documents/1996/cep/ac.3/cep.ac.3.4.e.pdf> accessed 12 April 2009, 
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both formal and informal, in the subsequent session. Concluding negotiation sessions 
“involved an unprecedented level of participation on the part of NGOs”392 and resulted 
in the adoption of the Aarhus Convention in Denmark in 1998 by 35 states including the 
European Union393. As of September 2012 there are 46 parties to the Convention.394 
 
To sum up, the Convention’s roots can be traced back to the Rio Declaration and 
Lucerne and Sofia conferences within the EfU process. It must be stressed however that 
the initial focus was on the first two pillars with considerably extensive guidelines and 
recommendations in the early 90s. Access to justice was seen as an underpinning article 
that was supposed to give some credibility to the Convention. The idea concerning the 
third pillar was formally considered and generated during the middle stage of the EfU 
process and the initial stage of drafting the Convention. This helps to shed some light on 
the present challenges with the third pillar of the Convention.  
Aarhus Convention principles 
The principles of the Aarhus Convention are non-binding obligations that can be found 
in the preamble and the first articles concerning the objective (Article 1), definitions 
(Article 2) and the general provisions (Article 3) of the Treaty. They are very useful in 
terms of placing the agreement in a wider socio-political context and can serve as 
background for interpretation of the specific procedural elements entrenched into the 
three pillars. 
art 6 
392 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska ,‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p.2 
393 UNECE, ‘”Environment for Europe” Process: History of the process: from Dobris to Belgrade’ 
<http://www.unece.org/env/efe/history%20of%20EfE/fromDobtoBelg.htm> accessed 12 April 2009 
394 UNECE Aarhus Convention, 'Status of Ratification" (September 2012) 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html> accessed 26 September 2012 
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Floor, not a ceiling 
The Convention sets the minimum standards that should be achieved by all Signatories 
and countries can preserve existing measures extending beyond those in the Convention 
or provide broader rights under the three pillars395. The Convention leaves considerable 
discretion to the national legal systems to establish certain measures and is flexible 
enough in order to accommodate most of the distinct features found in different legal 
traditions396. Whereas the states must achieve the minimum standards many strive to go 
beyond the that and share their best practice through a network of bodies and platforms 
for exchange of information. 
Principle of sustainable development397 
The concept of sustainable development arose from the attention to the harmful 
environmental impact associated with traditional development and ways of producing 
growth and wealth. There are two main and broad definitions of the concept, one which 
focuses on the intergenerational and intra-generational equity and second which 
highlights three pillars of development: social, economic and environmental. While 
there are multitude of variations of the principle of sustainable development the 
paragraphs below will refer to those two broad definitions.  
395 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stecn and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit. 5 
396 As for example art. 9(2) 
397 It has been suggested that sustainable development is an objective. It was recognised as an objective 
by the Welsh Government (Welsh Government, A Sustainable Wales: Better Decisions for a Better 
Future (WG, 2012)). However, sustainable development has been widely recognised in international law 
as a principle. See for example: Christina Voigt Sustainable Development as a Principle of International 
Law : 
Resolving Conflicts Between Climate Measures and WTO Law (BRILL 2009), Alan E. Boyle, David 
Freestone (eds.) International Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (OUP 1999),  Victoria Jenkins, ‘Placing Sustainable Development at the Heart of Government 
in the UK: the Role of Law in the Evolution of Sustainable Development as the Central Organising 
Principle of Government’ (2002) 22(4) Legal Studies 578. 
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Intergenerational equity 
This definition of sustainable development, which received “a quasi official status”398, 
was coined by the Brundland Report399: 
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
It contains within it two key concepts: 
• the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's 
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and 
• the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future 
needs”400 
The Convention mentions future generations in the preamble and in Article 1. Due to 
the importance of the latter (which, unlike the preamble, forms part of the Convention) 
it is worth citing the whole Article: 
 
“In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present 
and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health 
and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, 
public participation in decision making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention” 
 
The principle concerning the right to healthy environment is considered below; for now, 
398 Magraw Barstow D and Hawke D L, ‘Sustainable Development’ in Bodansky D, Brunnee J and Hey 
E, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 
399 Brundtland H G and others, ‘ Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: 
Our Common Future’ (OUP 1987) 
400 Ibid 43 
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it suffices to highlight that the Convention puts both present and future generations at 
the same level. However, it is difficult to establish how this objective can be realised, 
barring the fact that the Convention might exist and serve the same rights to future 
generations. In addition, the concept of future generations itself has not been grounded 
in any viable theoretical construct that would explain why and how such duties are 
accountable. Some argue that, according to a ‘future person paradox’, the future 
generations do not exist.401On the other hand, the intergenerational equity principle 
could be underpinned by various theories. According to a chain of love theory402 our 
concerns about a well-being of future generations are driven by love for our children 
and their descendants. This could well underpin participation of local groups or 
indigenous people concerned with both their well being as well as that of their 
descendants. Another theory that could flesh out the concept of intergenerational equity 
is the restraint principle according to which: 
 
“no goods shall be destroyed unless unavoidable and unless they are replaced by 
perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they should be 
replaced by equivalent goods resembling the original as closely as possible; and 
if that is also impossible, a proper compensation should be provided”403 
 
This principle, as Beekman argues404could serve both present and future generations. 
This could also work well through public participation allowing participants to negotiate 
for some sort of compensation if their interest is affected.  Members of the present 
generation would participate in decision-making in order to fight for the same 
401 Carter A,  ‘Can We Harm Future People?’ (2001) 10 Environmental Values 429–54 
402Passmore J, Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions 
(Duckworth 1980) 
403 Wissenburg M, Green Liberalism. The Free and the Green Society (UCL Press 1998) 123 
404 Beekman V, ‘Sustainable Development and Future Generations’ (2004)  17 Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 3–22 
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possibilities for posterity; however, they may be better prepared to accept that there are 
some unavoidable decisions. 
 
Moreover, the Convention mentions future generations in the ‘objective’ article without 
explicit reference to disadvantaged and poor people. The intra-generational equity 
principle is part of the Brundland definition of sustainable development and has not 
found any reference in the Convention. Crucially, the research shows that economically 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups are more likely to live in proximity to 
environmental hazards.405 The Aarhus Convention does not make an attempt to address 
this issue, except that it puts much emphasis on the participation of NGOs, which may 
be insufficient.406 
Three pillars of sustainable development 
The alternative definition of sustainable development can be traced back to the 
Johannesburg Declaration,407 which highlights “pillars of sustainable development - 
economic development, social development and environmental protection - at the local, 
national, regional and global levels”.408 
The social pillar of sustainable development is concerned with equality and justice and 
is well covered by both the Brundland Report and the Johannesburg Declaration. 
Shortly, the aim is to decrease the gap between haves and have-nots within countries 
and between countries with the ambitious goal of ending the poverty. The economic 
pillar recognises a link between environmental degradation and economic growth and is 
405 Schlosberg D,  Defining Environmental Justice. Theories, Movements, and Nature (OUP 2007); 
Layfield D, ‘New Politics or Environmental Class Struggle?’ (2008) 17 (1) Environmental Politics, 3-19 
406 Lee M and Abott C, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation Under the Aarhus Convention’ (2003) 
66(1) The Modern Law Review 80-108 
407 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, ‘Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development’ (A/CONF.199/20 , 4 September 2002) < http://www.un-documents.net/jburgdec.htm> 
accessed 12 April 2009 
408 Ibid 5 
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preoccupied with “establishing the possibility of environmentally-benign economic 
growth, and economically beneficial environmental protection.”409 As a simple 
illustration, such growth can take place by means of economic modernisation, where 
industry makes effort to compete on the market by producing/selling environmentally-
friendly products. The third pillar is concerned with environmental protection and with 
balancing this with social cohesion and equality and economic growth. 
The Convention makes a reference to the second and the third pillar of sustainable 
development; it is set against the need to “protect, preserve and improve the state of the 
environment and to ensure sustainable and environmentally sound development”.410 
However, as mentioned above, the Convention does not refer to the problems of social 
inequality, injustice and the gap between the rich and the poor. It mentions only that 
“citizens may need assistance in order to exercise their rights”. 411 In addition, Article 3 
requires parties to: 
 
“promote environmental education and environmental awareness among the 
public, especially on how to obtain access to information, to participate in 
decision-making and to obtain access to justice in environmental matters”412 
 
This is insufficient because it ignores the divisions among citizens. We may suppose 
that both economically advantaged and disadvantaged might initially lack knowledge as 
to how they can obtain access to information or participation. However, once this basic 
requirement has been satisfied it might appear that the latter group still needs assistance 
in order to understand the information, and perhaps financial support in order to make a 
409 Lee M,  EU Environnemental Law. Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Hart Publishing 2005) 
35 
410 Aarhus Convention, Preamble 
411 Ibid 
412 Ibid, art. 3(3) 
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meaningful contribution to participatory processes or in order to be able to access 
justice.  
The right to healthy environment  
The Convention, as mentioned above, highlights the need to protect the environment. 
Nevertheless, there has been a long-standing insistence that there should be recognition 
of a human right to the healthy and decent environment.413The emergence of such a 
right could offer another tool to disadvantaged citizens with which to pursue justice in 
the event of shortfalls in legislation.414 The Convention makes direct reference to the 
human right to healthy environment in the Objectives of the Convention in Article 1 
above. However, the right itself does not exist at the international level despite the fact 
that it has been recognised at national level in many countries.415 The Convention’s 
Implementation Guide argues that Article 1 “is the clearest statement in international 
law to date of a fundamental right to a healthy environment”,416 and that though “the 
Convention does not expressly state that the right exists, it does refer to it as an accepted 
fact”.417 As a result there is an assumption that the Convention can contribute to 
achieving the state of decent environment for every person through the procedural 
guarantees of access to information, participation and access to justice. 418However, this 
is not straightforward, as Lee and Abbott argue, because there is no certainty that the 
public is always capable of putting the environmental concerns over their self-interest or 
short term economic benefits. In addition, there are certain areas in the field of 
environmental protection where particular tools, such as wind farms, are said to benefit 
413 P Gormley, Human Rights and Environment: The Need for International Co-Operation (A. W. 
Sijthoff, Leyden, 1976) 
414 Ole W Pedersen ‘European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time 
Coming?’ (2008) 21(1)  Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 73 
415 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit. 
416 Ibid 29 
417 Ibid 
418 Penderson, ‘Environmental Human...’, op. cit.  
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the environment. Yet, there are well acclaimed instances, where the public opposes such 
developments arguing that they could be harmful for the existing fauna and flora and 
can impede their quality of life.  
The public participation principle 
This principle is one of the most important principles in environmental law,419 and the 
Convention itself forms part of environmental law. Although the Treaty provides 
procedural rights of participation there is a need to look at the benefits of participation 
acknowledged by the Convention. Thus the preamble recognises that: 
 
“in the field of the environment, improved access to information and public 
participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of 
decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the 
public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to 
take due account of such concerns”420 
 
First of all, the Convention refers to one of the most important reasons for public 
participation: the quality of decisions and their implementation. The former goes back 
to a thriving debate on extent to which the public can improve decision making by 
providing local knowledge and opinion. It is argued that the public perspective can 
complement the technical and highly specialised input of the decision-makers.421 Even 
grassroots' opinion (which is not explicitly recognised in the Convention) is capable of 
environmental innovation422. The latter recognises data from research423 that the 
419 S Bell and D McGillvray, Environmental Law (OUP 2008) 
420 Aarhus Convention, Preamble 
421 F Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment. The Politics of Local Knowledge (Duke University 
Press 2000) 
422 G Seyfang and A Smith, ‘Grassroots innovations for sustainable development: Towards a new 
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inclusion of the public leads to the long-term viability of environmental projects.  In 
addition, participation enhances citizens’ environmental awareness and the possibilities 
for expressing concerns that might contribute to ecological citizenship.424 Crucially, the 
Convention does not aim at delegating power to citizens; it does not even mention that 
the public should share the decision-making with public authorities through some kind 
of partnership. It mentions modestly that that authorities should take due account of the 
public’s concerns. 
Principle of transparency 
The improved rights to participation and access to information, and justice contribute to 
achieving increased transparency. Not only does the Convention aim at increasing 
transparency in environmental decision-making (including highlighted decision-making 
concerning the genetically modified organisms) but it also recognises: 
 
“the desirability of transparency in all branches of government and inviting 
legislative bodies to implement the principles of this Convention in their 
proceedings” 
 
The Convention therefore has an ambition beyond environmental matters as an example 
that could be employed by other branches of government. This also expresses the 
Convention’s contribution to wider democratisation in the region, an important goal 
bearing in mind that part of the signatories are the newly democratic states. This is an 
ambitious goal; however the citizens might be confused by the exclusions from the right 
research and policy agenda’ (2007) 16(4) Environmental Politics 584-603 
423 E.L.I. Research Report (1997) ‘Transparency and Responsiveness: Building a Participatory Process for 
Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Climate Change Convention’ Environmental Law Institute: 
Washington <http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=412> accessed 6 July 2008 
424 Dobson A, Citizenship and the Environment (OUP 2003) 
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of access to information that can be found in the later text of the Treaty. Thus Aarhus 
Convention adheres to the principle of balanced transparency, which presumes that 
some sensitive information and avenues of participation can be refused in order to 
protect state security or corporate confidentiality.425 
In addition, the Convention does not refer directly to corporate transparency or 
responsibility despite the fact that some of its provisions place obligations on the private 
sector.  
 
The Aarhus Pillars 
Having considered the background of the Convention in terms of its development and 
principles we will now consider the substantive text, under which the procedural rights 
are provided. All three pillars are considered in subsequent paragraphs. 
Informational pillar 
This pillar consists of two articles that mirror two forms of access to information: 
passive and active. Article 4 is titled ‘Access to Environmental Information’ and the 
Article 5 is titled “Collection and Dissemination of Environmental Information”. Let us 
consider both of them in separate subparagraphs. 
Passive access to information 
Article 4 requires public authorities to respond to the public’s requests for 
environmental information without requiring applicants to state their interest. The 
public is widely defined and includes natural and legal person(s), their associations, 
425 Fenster M, (2005-2006) ‘The Opacity of Transparency’ 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885 
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groups or organisations in accordance with the national legislation.426 In addition, the 
public cannot be discriminated on grounds of their “citizenship, nationality or domicile 
and, in the case of a legal person, without discrimination as to where it has its registered 
seat or an effective centre of its activities”.427  Environmental information is also widely 
defined and might concern the elements of environment itself, as well as other factors 
such as governmental plans and policies, human health and the state of cultural sites.428 
In other words the public, regardless of their location and interests, can submit a request 
to any public authority for information directly or indirectly linked to environment or 
human health. Information should be provided in the form requested with a possibility 
of imposing reasonable charges unless the information is already obtainable or it would 
be unreasonable to produce it in the form requested. It might be a case that information 
is ready to be viewed from a library located very far from the residence of the applicant. 
In this case the mere information about the existence of the data and refusal to produce 
and send copies “would probably not be a satisfactory response”429. Moreover, the 
authorities should disclose “copies of the actual documentation”,430 thus allowing the 
public to appreciate the context of the information rather than reviewing mere 
summaries. The public is still allowed to view the originals of the documents if they so 
request. 
 
Public authorities are obliged to respond to requests for information as soon as possible; 
within one month at the latest. This period of time may be extended for up to two 
months if needed, but the public should be informed of the reasons for the extension.431 
 
426 Aarhus Convention, art. 2(4) 
427 Ibid, art. 3(9) 
428 Ibid, art. 2(3) 
429 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 55 
430 Aarhus Convention, art. 4(1) 
431 Ibid, art. 4(2) 
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The disclosure of information may be refused in certain circumstances, as shown in the 
Table 1 below. All grounds for refusals should be interpreted in a “restrictive way”,432 
which assumes that the public authority cannot simply reject the release of information 
by mere reference to one of the exceptions. They should go through a process, whereby 
they assess the interests of the parties and decide whether the release could lead to 
“actual harm to the relevant interest”.433  Additionally, the grounds for refusal must be 
weighed against the “public interest served by disclosure”434 and state of environment, 
especially when the information concerns emissions. Let us look at the problem of the 
public interest since this will have implications for the two remaining pillars of the 
Convention. 
 
The Convention does not define ‘the public interest served by disclosure’, thus these are 
the Parties that should decide “how and when the public interest will be taken into 
account, in conformity with the principles and objective of the Convention”.435 The 
Implementation Guide refers to the Sofia Guidelines (described above), which Parties 
could take into account; according to this: 
 
 “grounds for refusal are to be interpreted in a restrictive way with the public 
 interest served by disclosure weighed against the interests of non-disclosure in 
 each case”436 
 
432 Ibid, art. 4(4h) 
433 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 62 
434 Aarhus Convention, art. 4(4h) 
435 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 62 
436 Sofia Guidelines, op.cit. p. 6 
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The above instruction, the balancing process, puts an enormous pressure on public 
authorities. The officials might face problems of time resources let alone the limited 
intellectual capabilities to perform the balancing process, which might demand 
knowledge of various theoretical concepts. They will also have to make such decisions 
in the matters concerning the participatory pillar since there is a requirement to disclose 
information in order to allow the genuine participation of the public. As a result, there is 
an absolute need to have a strong and working third pillar, which will allow judges to 
decide whether the balancing process performed by the bureaucratic machine was 
proper and just. The Implementation Guide highlights that Parties should issue 
“substantial guidance on balancing so as to limit arbitrary distinctions and promote 
uniformity.”437 
 
The refusal should be communicated within the same timeframes and the public should 
be informed of the rationale behind the rejection. 
437 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 62 
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Table 1 Environmental information disclosure exceptions under the Article 4 
Environmental information disclosure exceptions 
Internal reasons External reasons: if information could have 
adverse effect on: 
 information is not held by the 
relevant authority (but the public authority 
should direct to the relevant authorities) 
 the confidentiality of public authorities’ 
proceedings 
 Request is formulated to generally 
or “manifestly unreasonable” 
 international relations and national 
defence or security  
 Information is being completed or 
relates to internal communication 
 course of justice as persons’ right to fair 
trial 
  corporate and industrial confidentiality 
 intellectual property rights 
 The confidentiality of personal 
information 
 interests of third parties that voluntarily 
provided information 
 Environment that information relates to 
as for example ecological reserve 
Source: (UNECE 1998, Article 4) 
 
Active access to information 
Article 5 requires public authorities to collect, possess and disseminate specific 
information to citizens. First of all the authorities should possess and update information 
that is relevant to their functions438. This obligation forces the officials to establish 
workable systems whereby information flows continuously and can be properly 
archived from various sources such as researchers, private operators or monitoring 
agencies439. Moreover, the authorities are obliged to establish mandatory systems in 
438 Aarhus Convention, art. 5(1a) 
439 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 68 
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order to achieve “an adequate flow of information to public authorities about proposed 
and existing activities which may significantly affect the environment”.440The Parties 
may satisfy this by imposing requirements on public and private organisations as well as 
cooperating with research bodies. Furthermore, the dissemination of information must 
be immediate and directed towards public concerned in the event of serious or imminent 
threat to human health or environment.441 It implies that the threat does not have to 
occur but there must be some anticipation of a threat in order to trigger the process of 
dissemination. There is also no distinction between threats caused by human activities 
or natural causes. The rapid dissemination in such situations is essential in order to 
prevent the potential loss of lives or mitigate the harm and can include reports of 
research and predictions.  
According to Article 5(2) public authorities must ensure that their information is 
released in a transparent manner and made ‘effectively accessible’. They should do this 
by informing the public about the type of information they possess and about basic 
procedures for granting the access. Not only does this involve the dissemination of 
environmental information but also the information about the means of access. Of 
course this requirement can be seen as a push to make public authorities effective 
‘educators’ of the public. Public authorities should have identified relevant points of 
contact holding publicly accessible files, registers without imposing any charge and 
oblige officials to provide support to citizens. Thus, information should be disseminated 
in a ‘user-friendly manner’ allowing people to be granted access to libraries through the 
convenient location, office hours or the availability of specific office equipment.   
Furthermore, the Convention requires the Parties to ensure that information becomes 
‘progressively’ available electronically through public telecommunication networks.  
This information should include environmental reports, legislation, plans, policies and 
440 Aarhus Convention, art. 5(1b) 
441 Ibid, art. 5(1c) 
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programmes related to the environment.442 The Parties should publish reports 
concerning the state of the environment every three-four years. 
Whereas Article 5(1) requires Parties to establish mandatory systems to ensure that 
information flows continuously from (inter alia) private sector to public authorities, 
Article 5(6) places an obligation on the Parties to encourage the operators to 
disseminate information to the citizens. This relates especially to those operators whose 
“activities have a significant impact on the environment”443 and may be achieved 
through various voluntary schemes such as eco-labelling or eco-auditing or “by other 
means”.444 This Article is very important because it may encourage the establishment of 
a relationship between the applicants and local citizens. As a result, it is addressed to 
both the public and the private sector. Earlier research445 has shown that the public is 
often inclined to send their requests directly to the operators alongside their requests 
submitted to the public authorities. This is understandable since the process of obtaining 
information could significantly be shortened. Nevertheless, the Convention mentions 
schemes that are traditionally associated with the consumer market. As a result the 
operator might obtain an eco-label that they can put on their products sold far away 
from the place of production and the local public that could be affected by that 
production. The information that can be useful for consumers might not satisfy the local 
citizens. The Convention ignores the need for the establishment of healthy and decent 
relationships at a local level between citizens and the (private) operators. Such 
cooperation could be achieved through those ‘other means’ that could be explicitly 
mentioned. They could involve liaison committees, where citizens could be regularly 
updated on the actual environmental policy by an operator rather than expecting citizens 
442 Ibid, art. 5(3) 
443 Ibid, art. 5(6) 
444 Ibid 
445  Radoslaw Stech, ‘Environmental Information, Participation and Citizen Activity: Case Studies from 
Poland and the UK’ in Sivaram Vemuri (ed),  Connected Accountabilities: Environmental justice and 
Global Citizenship (Inter-Disciplinary Press 2010) 
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to seek information through the channels adequate for the consumers. The wording and 
aim of Article 5(6) is especially weak when we look at Article 5(8) which requires 
Parties to: 
 
“develop mechanisms with a view to ensuring that sufficient product 
information is made available to the public in a manner which enables 
consumers to make informed environmental choices”446 
 
It is surprising that the above Article does not mention eco-labelling or any other 
voluntary mechanisms that could be employed by private sector in order to help 
consumers to make the best environmental choices. It is therefore clear that the Article 
5(6) has some ambition to encourage the establishment of a good relationship between 
the public and the private sector. However, it mentions instruments that are more 
appropriate for the Article 5(8), thereby, ignoring the needs of the local public that 
might be affected directly by the activity of a given operator.  This reasoning is 
somewhat supported by the manner in which the Parties report on the implementation of 
the above articles to the Aarhus Convention Secretariat. Germany for example reports 
on both articles in conjunction by listing certain voluntary mechanisms that are in place 
in that country. Many other countries mention only eco-labelling and EMAS as means 
of implementing the Article 5(6).447  
Article 5(9) expresses a need to establish, progressively, pollution inventories and 
registers, which should be based upon common methodology and accessible 
electronically. Finally, the requirement to disseminate information to the public is 
subject to the same exceptions as are found in Article 4(3) and Article 4(4). However, as 
the Implementation Guide highlights, the exceptions should not be applied in the face of 
446 Aarhus Convention, art. 5(8) 
447 http://www.unece.org/env/pp/mop3/mop3.docII.htm 
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imminent threats.   
 
In summary, the informational pillar offers citizens a comprehensive procedural right of 
access to information concerning environmental matters. The provisions regulating the 
public authorities’ obligations might be challenging especially for those states 
contending with the limited financial resources. In addition, the pillar requires more 
than just a mere investment in public registers or electronic means of providing 
information. It necessitates additionally the ‘user-friendliness’ of the officials that are 
supposed to be open and ready to provide assistance as well as to educate the public on 
how to gain access. The most problematic issue concerns the exceptions and the 
potential mistakes that could be made by the officials. It might be the case that the 
balancing process in some difficult cases could only be performed by the judiciary. In 
terms of the operators including the private sector, the Convention lacks the same 
robustness even though there is only a need to encourage (rather than oblige) the 
operators to disseminate environmental information to the public. The pillar pays more 
attention to the state of consumer knowledge rather than that of local communities 
whose wellbeing might be affected by the corporate activity. 
The Participatory pillar 
“The majority of scholars, along with international and European Institutions as the 
UNECE and the European Union agree that participation is significant. In general, 
participation is an important factor in achieving environmental justice448. Specifically, 
institutions accept the need for participation, though there is a major debate over the 
extent to which citizens should be granted participatory rights, especially in the context 
448 See Chapter 1 
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of European regulatory scheme449.  On the one hand, participation can be aimed solely 
at producing substantive results. In order to achieve this, an interaction between 
decision-makers and the public could stop at the minimal degree of consultation. Still, 
participation can take a more deliberative approach that includes “the emphases on 
reflection, discussion, communication and attempted persuasion”450 and can be aimed at 
either legitimization of political decisions or solving environmental problems., there are 
a number of benefits of participation. Firstly, on the one hand citizens tend to disagree 
with decisions and projects when they are not part of the process and lack understanding 
as to goals, methods or timing of proposed change. The outcome of not involving 
citizens can inhibit the developments451.  On the other hand, decisions are more likely to 
be accepted by citizens if the latter have been offered a possibility of providing their 
input452. Secondly, citizens’ knowledge can have complementary, if not the same, value 
to experts’ knowledge, given the complexity of environmental cases453. Moreover, 
Barkenbus stresses the importance of citizens’ experience with local issues, which 
should be taken into account, alongside expertise in decision-making processes454. 
Local knowledge can also contribute to well designed projects and to the “long-term 
viability of a project”455 and it appears that a discontinuation of participation in a 
number of World Bank’s projects contributed to failure. Thirdly, participation can be 
449John S Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth (Oxford University Press 1997); Jenny Steele, ‘Participation 
and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-Solving Approach’ (2001) 21(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies  415 
450 Steele, 'Participation and Deliberation...' Ibid, p. 428 
451 Desmond M Connor, ‘Preventing and Resolving Public Controversy’ (Public Affairs and Forest 
Management Conference, Toronto 1985) (Revised 1994) 
<http://www.islandnet.com/~connor/preventing.html> accessed 3 July 2010 
452 Frank Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment. The Politics of Local Knowledge (Duke 
University Press 2000) 
453 Alan Irwin,  Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development (Routledge 
1995) 
454 Jack Barkenbus, ‘Expertise and the Policy Cycle’ Energy' (Environment and Resource Center, The 
University of Tennessee 1998) < http://www.gdrc.org/decision/policy-cycle.pdf > accessed 3 July 2010 
455 Environmental Law Institute (1997 ‘Transparency and Responsiveness: Building a Participatory 
Process for Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Climate Change Convention’ (Environmental Law 
Institute, Washington 2997) <http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=412> accessed 6 July 2010, 
p. 8 
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complementary to official and sometimes scarce avenues of inspection or research on 
particular issues456. Fourthly, it can additionally enhance citizens’ awareness of 
environmental matters, thus performing an educational role.”457 
The participatory pillar consists of three articles: Article 6 is entitled ‘Public 
Participation on Specific Activities’; Article 7 covers ‘Public Participation Concerning 
Plans, Programmes and Policies Relating to the Environment’ and Article 8 concerns 
‘Public Participation During the Preparation of Executive Regulations and/or Generally 
Applicable Legally Binding Normative Instruments’. These elements of the second 
pillar will be considered and analysed in the subsequent subparagraphs. 
Participation on Specific Activities  
Article 6 provides opportunities to engage in decision-making processes concerning 
specific activities that are listed in the Annex 1 to the Convention. Without reviewing 
that list here, it is sufficient to mention that the content of the Annex is extensive and 
includes inter alia the energy sector, chemical and mineral industries and waste 
management. Interestingly, according to the Annex these activities are exempt from the 
provisions of Article 6 if they are undertaken “exclusively or mainly for research, 
development and testing of new methods or products for less than two years unless they 
would be likely to cause a significant adverse effect on environment or health”.458 It is 
debatable how the threshold of the ‘significant adverse effect on environment or health’ 
could be applied in such cases, which aim at testing new methodologies. Moreover, the 
Implementation Guide highlights the fact that the Annex 1 consists of activities that 
“may have a significant impact”459 making it even more difficult to determine when the 
456 Ibid 
457 Ibid 
458 Aarhus Convention, Annex 1, art. 22 
459 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 93 
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research activities can be exempt from public participation.  
 
In addition, activities that are not listed in the Annex can also be open to public 
participation provided that they may pose a significant environmental impact. The states 
are allowed discretion to determine whether such unlisted activities can be subject to the 
provisions of this article.460 On the other hand, the specific activities can be exempt 
from public participation if they serve national defence purposes: “if that Party deems 
that such application would have an adverse effect on these purposes”461. 
The minimum standards that should be met in order to inform the public concerned of 
the coming decision-making process are considered below. These are written in a 
passive voice, thus, the Parties can place the obligation of informing the public 
concerned about the decision-making process on different actors, either public 
authorities or operators and applicants. It appears that some countries, such as 
Sweden462, require applicants to inform the public concerned. The public concerned 
differs from the ‘public’ and encapsulates: 
 
“the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the 
environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-
governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting 
any requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest”463 
 
It is clear that the aforementioned definition favours those members of the public likely 
to be located closely to the site of the proposed development and environmental NGOs 
regardless of their interests and residence. This has received some criticism from the 
460 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(1b) 
461 Ibid, art. 6(1c) 
462 Swedish Environmental Code 1998, Chapter 6, Section 4 
463 Ibid, art. 2(5) 
143 
 
                                                 
 
 
academia and grassroots’ activists since it might highlight the privileged position of 
large and well resourced NGOs, whose aims do not have to be in accordance with the 
needs of the disadvantaged public.464Additionally, some public authorities, having their 
representatives in the EU Committee of the Regions, issued their concerns over the 
emphasis put on NGOs engagement by stating that: 
 
“...in practice it is likely to increase the extent to which environmental interest 
and pressure groups are able to delay the implementation of necessary 
development projects, even where every effort has been made to avoid, 
minimise, mitigate or compensate for environmental impacts of that 
development”465 
 
The above concern has recently been confirmed by Poland, where environmental NGOs 
used their privileged position to delay or block developments466. This may impede the 
general public participation and minimise attention being placed upon the distinct input 
of local people.  
 
The public concerned should be given specific information concerning the decision-
making process “early in an environmental decision-making procedure, and in an 
adequate, timely and effective manner”.467 The information should consist of, inter alia, 
the specific activity, the nature of possible decisions or outline of decisions, the 
authority responsible for taking the decision, the underpinning procedure and “the fact 
464 Lee and Abott, ‘The Usual Suspects?...’ supra note 406 
465 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 14 June 2001 on the Proposal from the Commission for a 
Directive providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes 
relating to the environment and amending Council Directives 85/337/EC and 96/61/EC (COM(2000) 839 
final - 2000/0331 (COD)), art. 1.5 
466 http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_ir_2008_POL_e.pdf 
467 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(2) 
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that the activity is subject to a national or transboundary environmental impact 
assessment procedure”.468 
 
The participatory process must “include reasonable time-frames for the different 
phases”469allowing the public to make sufficient preparatory work in order to participate 
effectively. The Implementation Guide notes that the ‘reasonable time-frames’ should 
also take into account the fact that the public concerned may wish to submit a request 
for information under the Article 4 of the Convention during the decision-making 
procedure. As a result, the additional time for public authorities to respond to such 
request (which may amount to 30 days or more) should not undermine the effective 
participation.470 In addition, the States are required to “provide for early public 
participation, when all options are open and effective public participation can take 
place”.471 This means that the public authority responsible for taking the decision might 
have some idea as to the possible outcomes, but should be at the stage of collecting 
(additional) information and must be ready to consider public concern’s opinions and 
concerns and change its preliminary position. Moreover, complex environmental 
decisions-making may require public authorities to take a number of decisions having 
significant impact on the environment at various stages. Effective participation means 
that the public concerned should be consulted at all such stages.472 
 
The next paragraph of Article 6 addresses directly prospective applicants, including the 
private sector: 
“Each Party should, where appropriate, encourage prospective applicants to 
468 Ibid, art. 6(2e) 
469 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(3) 
470 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 102 
471 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(4) 
472 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 102 
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identify the public concerned, to enter into discussions, and to provide 
information regarding the objectives of their application before applying for a 
permit”473 
 
This paragraph concerns the time-frame before the commencement of the decision-
making process. It differs from the earlier paragraphs, which require engagement of the 
public concerned early in the decision-making process. Therefore, the parties may wish 
to encourage the prospective applicants for the permit to identify the public concerned 
and establish with them some relationship. The developers should not restrict their 
communication to ‘selected’ members of the public but rather identify and discuss with 
all members of the public concerned474. It might be a case that prospective applicants 
try to identify certain members of the public in order to placate them before the entering 
the regulated stage of the decision-making process. Thus, this Article encourages states 
to regulate this preliminary stage by issuing some guidance or through another form.  
The above Article carries an advisory character (through such words as ‘should’, and 
‘where appropriate’, ‘encourage’), therefore allowing Parties not to comply with this 
provision. This stems from a recognition, as the Implementation Guide highlights, that 
the prospective applicants may use such a process for “propaganda purposes to 
influence the public concerned, even going so far as to lobby a subset of the public 
during 'consultations'”.475 
 
The above assertion is somewhat problematic. First of all, it is uncertain that the 
operators might wish to resort to sophisticated avenues of influencing the public 
concerned during the actual decision-making procedure. They might still to choose to 
473 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(5) 
474 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 103 
475 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 103 
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use language for propaganda purposes and emphasis the ‘benefits’ of their projects and 
downplay the negative sides. Secondly, Article 6(5) may contradict Article 5(6) 
described above. The latter requires parties to encourage operators to communicate the 
impact of their environmental activities to the public whereas the former requires parties 
to consider whether or not they want to encourage operators to communicate the 
objectives of their prospective application to the public concerned. However, logically, 
the operators may just want to use the latter Article to inform whomsoever they want 
(from the public rather than the public concerned) about their environmental activities 
including vague future activities. The operators might even not deliberately raise issues 
concerning the objective of the future applications but simply respond to the public’s 
questions asking about the future activities. 
 
In practice, the advisory character of Article 6(5) lost its weight when the EU decided 
not to incorporate it into the Directive implementing the Article 6 of the Convention. As 
a result the Convention could be more decisive as to the operators’ communication with 
the public or the public concerned before applying for a permit. The parties could be 
obliged to issue some guidelines as to how the operators could identify the public 
concerned and adhere to the rules of objective discussion.  
 
According to the following paragraph, the Convention requires competent public 
authorities to provide, free of charge, access to information concerning the decision-
making matters to the public concerned. This paragraph makes a direct connection with 
the informational pillar and recognises the fact that genuine and effective participation 
cannot take place without access to information. The public concerned should be 
provided with, at least, a description of the site including: the amount of expected 
emissions; a depiction of the significant impact that the proposed activity can pose to 
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the environment; non-technical summaries and the like. The obligation to provide such 
information is of course subject to exceptions entrenched into the informational pillar. 
The next paragraph concerns the decision-making procedures and grants both the public 
concerned and the whole public the possibility of issuing comments, opinions or 
analyses in writing or orally during public meetings with the applicant476.  
The remaining articles concern the actual decision and post-decision process. Thus: 
 
“Each Party shall ensure that in the decision due account is taken of the outcome 
of the public participation”.477 
 
The substance of the participation concerns the degree of information that has been 
taken into account by decision-makers. There are various ways of engaging citizens into 
the process; however, according to the classical understanding of participation, there is 
always a question regarding the extent to which peoples’ concerns influence the actual 
decision478. It appears that the Aarhus Convention places little emphasis on the 
substance highlighting only that ‘due account’ of the participation should be taken into 
account. The Implementation Guide accepts that “standards for taking into account the 
outcome of public participation are in development in the countries of the UN/ECE 
region”.479In many states, the due account means that the public authority includes a 
discussion as to how the outcome of the public engagement was scrutinised. It can also 
mean that the public authority documents the substance of the concerns and includes 
them in the motivation of the decision. However, it might also be “facilitated by certain 
logistical measures, such as the registration of written comments and recording of 
476 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(7) 
477 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(8) 
478 Sherry R Arnstein,  ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) in R T LeGates and  F Stout (eds),  The 
City Reader (Routledge 2003) 245 
479 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 109  
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public hearings”480. It is therefore up to the states and not the Convention to establish 
the meaning of the ‘due account’. It seems that states or public authorities can decide to 
placate the public or engage them substantially into shared decision-making process.  
Article 6 strengthens the obligation of the public authorities to take ‘due account’ of the 
consultation’s outcome by granting the public right to “be promptly informed of the 
decision” and given “the text of the decision along with the reasons and considerations 
on which the decision is based”.481 The public is due to be given the text of the decision, 
which must include reasons on which the decision was based. Whereas the 
Implementation Guide notes that “the decision-maker can show that it examined the 
evidence presented by the participants and considered their arguments on any relevant 
question of law”,482 the Convention fails to make this obligatory. This Article infuses 
more confusion as to the meaning of the ‘due account’ in the Convention and, whereas 
some countries can provide for more detailed provisions concerning this matter, others 
may apply a minimalistic approach.  
 
Moreover, Article 7 also requires public authorities to take ‘due account’ of the outcome 
of public participation concerning plans and programmes relating to the environment.483 
However, it fails to reinforce this concept by a requirement of informing the public of 
the rationale behind the decision, which could include some reflection on peoples’ 
concerns. As a result the Convention fails to establish a meaningful requirement and 
floor regarding the ‘due account’. 
 
The next paragraph concerns the problem of the application of the Article 6 to the 
reconsiderations or updates in relation to ‘the operating conditions’ of the activities 
480 Ibid 
481 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(9) 
482 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 110 
483 For discussion of the Article 7 see below 
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listed in the Annex 1. The paragraphs 2-9 must be applied “mutatis mutandis, and where 
appropriate.”484 
 
Public Participation Concerning Plans, Programmes and Policies Relating to the 
Environment 
 Article 7 consists of one extended paragraph and distinguishes between plans and 
programmes on the one hand and policies on the other. As regards the former: 
“Each Party shall make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to 
participate during the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment, 
within a transparent and fair framework, having provided the necessary information to 
the public. Within this framework, article 6, paragraphs 3, 4 and 8, shall be applied.”485 
By making the reference to Article 6 the public should be granted reasonable time-
frames, opportunities for early engagement and information in order to ensure effective 
participation. In addition, their opinions should be given ‘due account’ by public 
authorities.  
 
As to the latter, the Convention states only that the parties “shall endeavour to provide 
opportunities for public participation in the preparation of policies relating to the 
environment”486 and makes neither explicit nor direct reference to the Article 6. The 
‘policies’ are not defined and, as the Implementation Guide explains, the Convention 
makes the distinction between plans, programmes and policies because the latter are 
“typically less concrete”487 than the former and require a more thorough and profound 
understanding of the legalities and political context of a particular place”, which 
484 Aarhus Convention, art. 6(10) 
485 Aarhus Convention, art. 7 
486 Ibid 
487 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 118 
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includes “history and culture and entire legal frameworks that extend beyond the finite 
area in which they are developed.”488 
Public Participation during the Preparation of Executive Regulations and/or 
Generally Applicable Legally Binding Normative Instruments (hereafter executive 
regulations) 
 
Article 8 carries a broad definition of the executive regulations in order to prevent any 
narrowing by the States, who use various terminologies for different forms of normative 
acts.489 The Article consists of one paragraph with a number of specific provisions but 
does not make any reference to the provisions of the Article 6. Thus, the parties should 
endeavour to “promote effective public participation at an appropriate stage, and while 
options are still open, during the preparation by public authorities of executive 
regulations...”,490 which may pose an environmental impact. Participation should occur 
within ‘time-frames’ and the public should be given access to draft executive 
regulations, a possibility to comment directly or through their “consultative 
representative bodies” and the outcome of the engagement “shall be taken into account 
as far as possible.”491 The phrase ‘as far as possible’ is definitely less rigid than the ‘due 
account”, which is entrenched into Articles 6 and 7. This stems from the fact that the 
developments of specific activities covered by Article 6 affect interests of specific 
individuals or groups.492 
 
Summary 
488 Ibid 
489 Ibid 120 
490 Aarhus Convention, art. 8  
491 Ibid 
492 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 109 
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The participatory pillar offers good and expanded procedural right of involving the 
public concerned into participation in decision-making in environmental matters. The 
whole pillar is incomplete, however, due to its limitations concerning the public 
engagement regarding the legislative process. In addition, the pillar is controversial 
because it provides greater rights to the NGOs and leaves the issue of defining the ‘due 
account’ of the outcome of the consultation to the discretion of the parties.  
Access to Justice 
The third pillar of the Convention is entrenched into Article 9, which consists of five 
paragraphs. The general implementation requirements include: the availability of 
impartial courts and review bodies; rules regarding standing; accessibility of remedies 
such as injunctive relief; and, of course, the availability of the assistance mechanism 
and information to citizens concerning the procedures under this pillar493. Let us 
consider the specific provisions below. 
 
The first paragraph provides the public with the right to seek review of information, 
which was refused, incompletely answered or dealt with inadequately with the 
provisions of the Article 4. This can include any provisions that were broken including 
the timing, the form in which the information was provided and the grounds for refusal. 
The review procedure should be held “before a court of law or another independent and 
impartial body established by law”.494 The final decisions reached during the review 
process are binding on the public authorities. Crucially: 
 
“In the circumstances where a Party provides for such a review by a court of 
law, it shall ensure that such a person also has access to an expeditious 
493 Ibid 124 
494 Aarhus Convention, art. 9(1) 
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procedure established by law that is free of charge or inexpensive for 
reconsideration by a public authority or review by an independent and impartial 
body other than a court of law.”495 
 
Apart from the access to courts, citizens’ appeals can be subject to ‘reconsiderations’ by 
a public authority within the administrative process. This may be speedy and citizens 
could, as in Poland, resort to the court if the appeal by higher administrative body if 
deemed necessary.496 The idea of the ‘independent and impartial body established by 
law’ was developed by the ECHR497 and can include quasi-judicial bodies as long as 
they are impartial and free from governmental or political influence. This can also 
include the institution of ombudsman known well in many European countries498.  
 
The second paragraph allows the members of the public concerned to “challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission subject to the 
provisions of article 6 and, where so provided for under national law...”499 either in the 
court or other impartial and independent body.   
 
As to the standing, the above provision regards the ‘public concerned’ and some 
provisions of Article 6 (paragraphs 3, 6 and 7) concern ‘the public’. The latter, for 
example, can submit their opinions in writing or orally during the public hearings.  By 
doing this they gain the status of the public concerned and such persons are also granted 
access to justice under Article 9(2). In addition, the persons wishing to file for review 
must prove that they have a sufficient interest or maintain an impairment of a right. The 
495 Ibid 
496 Ibid 
497 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 1950, art. 6 
mentions an independent and impartial tribunal established by law 
498 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 127 
499 Aarhus Convention, art. 9(2) 
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former encapsulates NGOs promoting environmental protection because, by definition, 
such organisations are “deemed to have an interest”.500 It can also include other 
members of the public concerned (or the public, who were granted the status of the 
public concerned) in accordance with the national law and “consistently with the 
objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice within the scope of this 
Convention”.501 The status of the sufficient interest enabling the standing can also be 
granted if a person’s right was impaired and can be applied in legal systems, where such 
a requirement already exist. Furthermore, the access to court or other judicial body must 
not be prevented by a preliminary challenge in the administrative authority.  
The third paragraph grants additional rights, without prejudice to the two above sections 
and in line with national law, namely members of the public have: 
 
 “access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions 
by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its 
national law relating to the environment”502 
 
The first two paragraphs give the right to redress the harm, whereas that above grants 
citizens (upon requirements of the national law) the right to enforce the law, either 
directly or indirectly. The former is performed by standing in the court and the latter by 
issuing complaints through various mechanisms as citizens’ petition or complaints. 503 
Fourthly, the procedures under the three above paragraphs must provide “adequate and 
effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, 
timely and not prohibitively expensive.”504 
500 Ibid, art. 2 
501 Ibid, art. 9(2) 
502 Aarhus Convention, art. 9(3) 
503 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 130 
504 Aarhus Convention, art. 9(4) 
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The above reflects the aim of the judicial or administrative mechanism to remedy the 
situation that provided ground for the challenge. This should be adequate, therefore 
allowing the plaintiff to receive compensation if the irreversible damage occurred. If the 
harm is reversible, or can be lessened, the court may issue an order, injunctive relief, 
forcing the defendant to stop their activity or undertake certain action. The remedies 
must also be effective; therefore, ‘enforceable’ and the states “should try to eliminate 
any potential barriers to the enforcement of injunctions and other 
remedies”.505Decisions should be given in writing and be publically available. 
Crucially, the ability to receive a remedy under the Convention should not be restricted 
by the costs associated with, inter alia, court, expert, transport fees.  
 
The final paragraph of the pillar concerns the barriers to access to justice; the States 
should endeavour to provide information and assistance regarding the procedures 
including the ‘removal or reduction’ of the financial barriers. 
Summary 
Article 3 aims at safeguarding the provisions granted by the first two pillars of the 
Convention. It relies on the Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and Sofia Guidelines, 
which focused on the availability of the administrative and judicial proceeding with no 
detailed ambitions of eliminating the various barriers which people and NGOs face 
before filing cases. Article 9 consists of such extended details and its ultimate goal goes 
beyond being a mere safeguard mechanism. It has become a substantial part of the 
Convention; a true pillar on access to justice. 
 
505 Casey- Lefkowitz, Stec and Jendroska, ‘The Aarhus Convention...’, op cit., p. 133 
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The first paragraph provides an efficient safeguard for Article 4. Any person whose 
request for information has been violated can challenge the decision of the public 
authority. This further reinforces the strong and comprehensive informational pillar. In 
addition, despite the ambiguous wording, this paragraphs aims at allowing citizens to 
seek justice by resort to alternative mechanisms, namely judicial and administrative. Of 
course, this might not be novel in some countries such as the UK, where little change is 
needed in order to implement this provision.506 
 
The second paragraph provides broad access to justice for those dissatisfied with the 
procedural and substantive legality of decisions taken under Article 6. The ability to 
challenge the procedural issues can directly enforce the features of public participation 
provided by the Convention, whereas the substantive challenge is less clear. It may refer 
to traditional mechanisms in the English law such as ultra vires and Wednesbury 
unreasonableness but may also concern the appeal on the merits507. However, on closer 
reading, the Aarhus Convention substantive ground in the Article 9(2) is qualified by 
the word ‘legality’. This implies that there must be an error of law that the applicant 
must identify rather than the mere reference to the merits of administrative decisions.   
Still, the substantive may especially pose problems in the UK. There is some concern 
over the general preparedness of judges to deal with environmental cases, which may be 
associated with the poor understanding or lack of sympathy to such concepts as 
‘sustainable development’ or ‘precautionary principle’. In addition, many cases are 
currently filed in order to review merits and courts seem to be reluctant to handle 
them.508 McAllister argues convincingly that the broad access to justice is “diluted in 
506 Lee and Abott, ‘The Usual Suspects?...’ op. cit., p. 91 
507 Ibid 103 
 508 Carol Hatton, Pamela Castle, and Martyn Day, ‘The environment and the law - does our legal 
system deliver access to justice? A review’ (2004) 6(4) Environmental Law Review 240 
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strength”509 due to the limitations inherent to the difficult interpretation of the 
‘sufficient interest’. This hits the members of the public in particular since 
environmental NGOs are automatically granted such a status.  
 
The following paragraphs allow the public to enforce the law and obtain remedies if 
their rights have been violated. Additionally, the pillar emphasises the problem of 
barriers preventing access to justice. The latter is of great importance in countries, such 
as the UK, where the barriers are especially apparent.    
509 Sean T McAllister, ‘The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ (1998) 10 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 187, 199 
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Implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the UK 
The implementation of the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention required multitude of 
alterations of the existing legal mechanisms in the UK and an establishment of new 
instruments. Much of the implementation was carried out through the transposition of 
the European Union legislation. This stems from two major reasons: firstly, much of the 
UK environmental law has originated from the EU law; secondly, the EU has approved 
and transposed the Aarhus Convention “on behalf of the European Community”510. The 
purpose of part of the thesis is to sketch the implementation of the first two pillars and 
provide a wider description of the issues relating to the transposition of the third pillar.   
The informational and participatory pillars 
The first pillar has been implemented primarily through the Environmental Information 
Regulations 2004, which came into force on 1st January 2005. The Regulations give 
effect to the EU Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information.511 
The above provisions are supported by the existing regulations concerning the 
Environmental Impact Assessment512 and the Strategic Environmental Assessment513. 
The second pillar’s implementation results predominantly from the EU Directive514, 
which amended the EU Environmental Impact Assessment and IPPC directives.  
510 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters 
511 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public 
access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC 
512 The Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 
513 The Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 
514 Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for 
public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the 
environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 
85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC 
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Access to justice pillar 
The EU intends to implement the third pillar by way of a single directive, which is at 
the draft stage515. The implementation is to some extent effective through the above 
mentioned directives relating to access to information and public participation. Thus, 
Directive 2003/4/EC516, like Aarhus’s Article 9(1) provides for a review procedure 
administratively or “by an independent and impartial body established by law”517. 
Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention was implemented through the Directive 
2003/35/EC518 which amended the IPPC Directive and Environmental Assessment 
Directive. The former states that the public with sufficient interest 
 
“have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent 
and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural 
legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation 
provisions of this Directive.”519 
 
The latter Environmental Impact Assessment Directive uses similar language in 
implementing Article 9(2) of the Convention.  
 
 The above implementation measures provide the right to access to justice for members 
of the public with sufficient interest. The author reviewed in Chapter 1520 the UK's 
approach to standing in public law cases. The study underpinning the EU draft Directive 
on access to justice confirmed the generous and liberal approach to standing in the UK: 
515 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in environmental matters 
COM/2003/0624 final 
516Supra note 511 
517 Directive 2003/4/EC Art 6(1) 
518 Supra note 514 
519 Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning 
integrated pollution prevention and control, Art 16 
520 See p. 80 
159 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
“A special situation exists in the UK in comparison with continental law 
systems. Whilst the situation in the UK resembles that requiring that a 
“sufficient interest” be demonstrated before an environmental association may 
have standing before the courts, the fact that this is a common law system means 
that case law has a major role. Through developments in the case law the 
position regarding standing for NGOs has recently been considerably expanded. 
In the case of well-established environmental associations, standing is 
sometimes taken for granted and not questioned further by the courts. In this 
regard, the approach in the UK could be categorised as extensive, even though it 
is far from representing an actio popularis.”521 
 
The study indicated that costs constituted a single barrier to justice in the country 
echoing the national discussion. The next paragraph will review the issue of costs 
which, at the time of writing this thesis, is claimed to be satisfied by the PCO522 
instrument available in the courts. The issue has recently been well documented and 
summarised523 and we will take a chronological approach in this summary. 
Cost capping was an issue in R (Buglife, the Invertebrate Conservation Trust) v 
Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corporation524. There the NGO challenged 
521Nicolas de Sadeleer, Gerhard Roller and Miriam Dross, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ 
(Final Report) (European Commission 2002) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/accesstojustice_final.pdf> accessed 1 September 2011, p. 22 
522 See p. 88 
523 Robert G Lee and Radoslaw Stech, ‘Access to Environmental Justice in England and Wales: Funding 
Representation for Court Reviews of Administrative Action’ in Jenny Steele, Willem H Van Boom (eds), 
Mass Justice. Challenges of Representation and Distribution (Edward Elgar 2011); James Maurici, 
‘Aarhus and Access to Justice’ (2011) Judicial Review 253;  Radoslaw Stech, Robert G Lee and Deborah 
Tripley, ‘Costs Barriers... supra note 32;  Paul Stookes, ‘The environment: public involvement and 
constraints in access to justice’ (2008) 20(4) Environmental Law and Management 165;  Ole W Pedersen, 
‘Environmental Justice in the UK: Uncertainty, Ambiguity and the Law’ (2011) 31(2) Legal Studies 279; 
Lord Justice Brooke, ‘David Hall Memorial Lecture: Environmental Justice: the cost barrier’ (2006) 18(3) 
Journal of Environmental Law 341 
524 R (Buglife, the Invertebrate Conservation Trust) v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development 
Corporation [2008] EWCA Civ 1209 
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the decision of the local planning authority to grant consent to the development of a 
Royal Mail distribution centre on land which provided a habitat to endangered species 
of invertebrates. Although it was accepted that while in granting a PCO in favour of a 
claimant it was open to the court to make an order capping the liability of the defendant 
also, such reciprocal caps were entirely discretionary.  The Court of Appeal ruled out 
any assumption that where the claimant's liability for costs was capped, the defendant 
should equally benefit from a back to back cap on liability.  Such an order lay within the 
courts’ discretion but whether or not this was exercised in this manner would depend 
entirely upon the circumstances of the case. 
 
Environmental cases pitch one into the heart of uncertainties inherent in the PCO 
principles particularly regarding public and private interests. There is no definition as 
such of the public interest and it has been suggested that a broad purposive approach be 
taken to this question525. It has been asserted above that environmental issues naturally 
entail public interests involving questions of protection of the environment rather than 
narrowly drawn personal rights526. In the case of a local project there may be 
considerable local interest but the development itself may be of a type commonly found 
in other locations (as are, for example, phone masts or wind turbines). In part, as a 
consequence, opposition to the project may raise few novel or interesting points of 
law.527  
 
525 Sir Maurice Kay, ‘Litigating in the Public Interest: Report of the Working Group on Facilitating Public 
Interest Litigation’ (Liberty 2006) 
526 R v Somerset County Council supra note 212 
527 An example of this might be the case of R (Bullmore) v. West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust 
[2007] EWCA Civ. 609 where the closure of a local hospital was said not to raise issues of such general 
public interest that they should be litigated under the protective costs regime but R(Compton) v Wiltshire 
PCT [2008] EWCA 749 (also about hospital closures) in which it was said that Corner House did not 
demand that the issue had to be of national importance in order to qualify for a PCO. 
161 
 
                                                 
 
 
Balanced against this, because so much of environmental law in the UK emanates from 
EU law, the adequacy of the UK response to its EU obligations may be at issue. 
Moreover, if one treats the rights under the Aarhus Convention as a package, then rights 
of access to the courts, in line with Article 9, may be seen as an issue of wider public 
interest in ensuring environmental justice. That is to say that the public interest is served 
in establishing effective court access in its own right. This is, however, a rather different 
matter than saying that it is the resolution of the issues involved in a claim that serves 
the public interest. This more limited formulation is written into the CPAG 
principles528, but one might argue that these principles encompass many areas of public 
law including environmental law, which might be seen as a special case, post-Aarhus. 
Significantly the CPAG case pre-dates the UK ratification of the Convention while the 
revision of the principles in Corner House were handed down by the Court of Appeal 
the day after ratification. Understandably, therefore, neither of these two leading cases 
may take full account of international obligations relating to environmental justice.  
 
The notion that a claimant has no private interest in the outcome of a case sits uneasily 
with the rule on standing that requires a sufficient interest529 in the subject matter of the 
application530 but the position is not entirely irreconcilable. As noted in Chapter 1,531 
English law has one of the most generous approaches to locus standi such that any 
established environmental NGO is unlikely to be refused permission to bring an 
environmental judicial review application on grounds of standing. That being the case, 
it might be said that such a body has sufficient interest in a case even though it has no 
private interest as such. For individual claimants, however, the sufficient interest in the 
litigation will often take the form of an immediate private interest in the matter. 
528 See p. 89 
529 Section 31(3) Supreme Court Act 1981 
530 Richard Stein and Jamie Beagant,  ‘Protective Cost Orders’ (2005) 10(3) Judicial Review 206  
531 Supra note 206 
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Since Corner House the Kay Report concerning the litigation in the public interest,532 
the Sullivan Report concerning the environmental litigation533 and the Courts534 have 
doubted the workability of a strict rule that there is no private interest whatsoever. The 
Sullivan Report (2008) was a report of a Working Party chaired by Mr Justice Sullivan, 
a nominated Administrative Court Judge, The Working Party was made up of lawyers 
from claimant and defendant law firms and from government, academia and WWF-
UK535. Although it had no official status, its Chair and its composition gave it great 
credibility. The introduction, which was written by Mr Justice Sullivan was likely to 
represent536 his genuine opinion and predicted the pronouncement of the UK’s breach of 
the Aarhus Convention by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee: 
 
“When it signed up for the Aarhus Convention nearly a decade ago the United 
Kingdom undertook to ensure that ordinary members of the public who wished 
to pursue environmental law challenges should have access to procedures that 
were ‘fair, equitable, timely, and not prohibitively expensive’.[...] Unless it is 
changed, our costs regime will perpetuate the inevitable inequality of arms 
between the publicly funded bodies that take decisions in the environmental 
field and the individuals and environmental groups who have to rely on their 
own resources if they wish to challenge those decisions [...] Unless more is 
done, and the court’s approach to costs is altered so as to recognise that there is a 
public interest in securing compliance with environmental law, it will only be a 
532 Sir Maurice Kay, ‘Litigating in the Public Interest...' supra note 525 
533 Lord Justice Sullivan, 'Ensuring Access to Justice in England and Wales' (May 2008) (Sullivan 
Report) 
534 See Sir Mark Potter in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 835 and Lord Justice Carnwath in R (on 
the application of Derek England) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1742 and Smith LJ in R 
(Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2008] C.P. Rep 36 but in Goodson v HM Coroner for 
Bedfordshire [2005] EWCA Civ 1172 the rule of ‘no private interest’ was said to be expressed in 
‘unqualified’ terms in Corner House 
535 Sullivan Report, supra note 533, p. 37 
536 See David Wolfe, ‘Accessing justice: implications of the Sullivan Report’ (2008) 20 Environmental 
Law and Management  215 
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matter of time before the United Kingdom is taken to task for failing to live up 
to its obligations under Aarhus”537. 
 
The Report concluded, in line with the above discussion, that judicial review filed for 
the purpose of protecting the environment is “inherently a matter of public interest”.538 
It noted that the Aarhus Convention contains “no exclusion on cases involving private 
interests” and the requirement of public interest excludes the overall usefulness of PCO 
in satisfying the Aarhus Convention requirement. The following paragraph will provide 
a review of judicial interpretation and modification of the public interest condition 
attached to the PCO. 
   
In R. (on the application of Bullmore) v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust539 
Lloyd Jones J observed that the Corner House requirement of ‘no private interest’ has 
been “diluted in the later case law”540. In judge’s opinion the concept was elusive and 
troubling to apply in practice in cases where a person sought a private remedy on behalf 
of a larger group of interested persons. He suggested that the private interest of the 
applicant should not disqualify the challenge altogether and that it should be “a flexible 
element in the court's consideration”541. In R (on the application of McCaw) v City of 
Westminster Magistrates Court and Middlesex S.A.R.542 Latham LJ heard an application 
for a PCO to support a challenge to the decision of a district judge in the Westminster 
Magistrates Court in a statutory nuisance case.  Noting that Corner House seemed not to 
take into account considerations of the Aarhus Convention, and acknowledging the 
537 Sullivan Report, supra note 533, p. 2 
538 Ibid 20 
539 supra note 527 
540 Ibid 19 
541 Ibid 
542 R (on the application of McCaw) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court and Middlesex S.A.R. 
[2008] EWHC 1504 (Admin) 
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Sullivan Report, he ruled that the apparent requirement that there should be no private 
interests in the outcome of the case had, in practical terms, been reinterpreted as an 
approach whereby private interest is merely one of the material considerations when the 
court comes to its conclusions. This might suggest that it is a matter for the court to 
determine if there are issues of public interest that rank at least equally alongside any 
private interest. In R. (on the application of Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust543 
some clarification of the rule was provided. Walter J argued that the relevant Corner 
House paragraphs should not “be read as statutory provisions, nor to be read in an over-
restrictive way”.544 
 
The Government was satisfied, even before the clarification in Compton that: 
“provisions on costs capping and PCOs can help to provide certainty to a party as to 
their potential exposure to an adverse costs order if they are ultimately unsuccessful.”545 
The author argues to the contrary and the data analysis in Chapter 8 will show that not 
many ELF clients took an opportunity of applying for the PCO546. While the recent 
judicial intervention seems fair it is not helpful for intending litigants because it is 
difficult to assess whether the court is likely to take less restrictive view of the facts of 
the particular case. This lack of certainty may deter environmental litigation from the 
outset given that the PCO application is itself not cost-free but more importantly that 
exposure to the heavy costs of a defendant may act as “a potent factor in deterring 
litigation”547.  
Legal challenges against the UK government 
 
543 supra note 527 
544 Ibid 23 
545 UNECE ‘Implementation Report submitted by the United Kingdom’, supra note 250 p. 21 
546 See Chapter 8, p. 296 
547 Brooke LJ in R (on the application of Burkett) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 
1342 at 80 
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One of the reasons for conducting this research was to inform the debate and provide 
evidence in relation to the costs barriers to judicial review in the UK548. The following 
paragraphs will provide a short overview of three legal challenges that the Government 
has faced since 2005.  
 
Firstly, in December 2005 WWF-UK filed a formal complaint with the EU Commission 
in relation to an alleged failure of the UK Government to comply with the Article 9(4) 
of the Aarhus Convention as implemented by Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 
96/61/EC. The complaint was lodged with a view to supporting the EU Commission in 
its role as the ‘guardian of the Treaty’. Specifically, Article 258 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union549 prescribes that: 
 
“If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid 
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union”. 
 
Following the complaint, the EU Commission issued a reasoned opinion on the UK 
Government’s compliance with the Aarhus Convention in March 2010550. It highlighted 
that it was 
 
548 See Introduction, p. 21 
549 Formerly Article 226 of the Treaty on the European Community 
550 European Commission ‘Environment: Commission warns UK about unfair cost of challenging 
decisions’ (IP/10/312) (Brussels 2010) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/312&format=HTML&aged=1&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 1 September 2011 
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“concerned that in the United Kingdom legal proceedings can prove too costly, 
and that the potential financial consequences of losing challenges is preventing 
NGOs and individuals from bringing cases against public bodies”. 
 
In line with Article 258 TFEU the UK Government had a chance to submit its 
observations concerning the reasoned opinion. Such communication is not open to the 
public thus it is not possible to establish the UK Government’s arguments in this case. 
By April 2011, however, the EU Commission was still not satisfied with the UK 
Government’s compliance and brought the matter before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union551. The case is pending at the time of writing this thesis. 
Secondly, in December 2008, Client Earth, the Marine Conservation Society and Mr. 
Robert Latimer lodged a communication to the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee552 in relation to Port of Tyne case. The case concerned an alleged failure of 
the UK Government to provide access to justice to challenge a licence granted to the 
Port of Tyne. The licence allowed for the “disposal and protective capping of highly 
contaminated port dredge materials at an existing marine disposal site”.553 The case 
concerned also the general failure of the UK Government’s to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention554. The Committee reviewed the material facts of 
the case and the existing policies, laws and rules (such as PCOs) concerning the issue of 
costs in judicial review in the UK. It found that: 
 
551 European Commission, ‘EC takes UK to court on cost of environment cases’ (Brussels 2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/frontpage/2011/1152_en.htm> accessed 1 September 2011 
552 The Compliance Committee was constituted under Article 15 of the Aarhus Convention: 
“The Meeting of the Parties shall establish, on a consensus basis, optional arrangements of a non-
confrontational, non-judicial and consultative nature for reviewing compliance with the provisions of this 
Convention.” 
553 Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/33 concerning 
compliance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; adopted by the Compliance 
Committee on 24 September 2010, p.3 
554 Ibid 
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“the considerable discretion of the courts of England and Wales in deciding the 
costs, without any clear legally binding direction from the legislature or 
judiciary to ensure costs are not prohibitively expensive, leads to considerable 
uncertainty regarding the costs to be faced where claimants are legitimately 
pursuing environmental concerns that involve the public interest.”555 
 
In 2010 the Compliance Committee issued the final findings in which it pronounced that 
the UK Government: 
 
“has not adequately implemented its obligation in article 9, paragraph 4, to 
ensure that the procedures subject to article 9 are not prohibitively expensive. In 
addition, the Committee finds that the system as a whole is not such as “to 
remove or reduce financial […] barriers to access to justice”, as article 9, 
paragraph 5, of the Convention requires a Party to the Convention to 
consider.”556 
 
Thirdly, the earlier cited case of R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment 
Agency557 reached the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom558. The Supreme Court 
was unsure whether to use an objective or subjective test in relation to the 
apportionment of costs in the case. The difference between the two tests is that, in the 
former, a court makes a reference to an objective basis (such a ‘an ordinary member of 
the public’), and in the latter, by reference to the means of the applicant, when deciding 
on costs. The Sullivan Report559 suggested that the objective test should be followed 
555 Ibid 135 
556 Ibid 136 
557 Supra note 319 
558 Ibid 
559 Supra note 533 
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when deciding on PCOs and the apportionment of costs in judicial review in the UK. 
However, in R (Garner) v Elmbridge Borough Council [2011] 1 Costs LR 48, Lord 
Justice Sullivan expressed uncertainty as to which test should be applied in the UK and 
suggested a possibility of using “some combination of the two bases”.560 Thus, in 
Edwards case, the Supreme Court of Justice referred the question as to which test 
conforms with the Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. That reference, under Article 267 TFEU, will provide an answer to the 
question and should allow the UK Supreme Court to deliver a final ruling in Edwards 
case.  
Reform of civil litigation costs (environmental cases) 
 
In November 2008 Sir Anthony Clarke (then Master of Rolls) announced a need for 
setting up a complete review into the costs of litigation. Lord Justice Jackson was 
appointed to lead a thorough review including a review of environmental cases. He 
published a final report in December 2010 and made recommendations. Essentially, the 
Report recommends an application of “qualified one way cost shifting” which 
constitutes an elaboration of a “one way cost shifting”. Both terms are explained below: 
 
One way cost shifting is: “A regime under which the defendant pays the 
claimant’s costs if its claim is successful, but the claimant does not pay the 
defendant’s costs if the claim is unsuccessful.”561 
 
Qualified one way cost shifting is: “A system of one way costs shifting which 
may become a two way costs shifting system in certain circumstances, e.g. if it 
is just that there be two way costs shifting given the resources available to 
560 R (Garner) v Elmbridge Borough Council [2011] 1 Costs LR 48, at 42 
561 Lord Justice Jackson, 'Review of the Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report' (The Stationery Office 
2010), p. XIII 
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the parties.”562 
 
Jackson provided the following reasons in support of the qualified one way cost 
shifting: 
“(i) This is the simplest and most obvious way to comply with the UK’s 
obligations under the Aarhus Convention in respect of environmental judicial 
review cases. 
(ii) [...] it is undesirable to have different costs rules for (a) environmental 
judicial review and (b) other judicial review cases. 
(iii) The permission requirement is an effective filter to weed out unmeritorious 
cases. Therefore two way costs shifting is not generally necessary to deter 
frivolous claims. 
(iv) [...] it is not in the public interest that potential claimants should be deterred 
from bringing properly arguable judicial review proceedings by the very 
considerable financial risks involved. 
(v) One way costs shifting in judicial review cases has proved satisfactory in 
Canada [...] 
(vi) The PCO regime is not effective to protect claimants against excessive costs 
liability. It is expensive to operate and uncertain in its outcome. In many 
instances the PCO decision comes too late in the proceedings to be of value.”563 
 
Following the publication of the Jackson Report, the Ministry of Justice, published a 
consultation paper on the review of the costs in environmental judicial review in 
October 2011564. As this thesis was being submitted, the Ministry published a summary 
562 Ibid, p. XVI (emphasis in bold original) 
563 Ibid 310-311 
564 Ministry of Justice ' Cost Protection for Litigants...' supra note 4 
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report and initial policy formulation in relation to this matter. The consultation 
suggested the need for greater clarity about the level of costs perhaps through a 
codification of the rules on PCOs.  
The summary report accepts that respondents felt that high costs were a barrier to 
judicial review and that protection as to costs would allow environmental challenges 
through judicial review in line with the Aarhus Convention, not least by negating 
uncertainty as to exposure to defence costs. A number of respondents suggested that the 
full one way cost shifting for an individual (that is an exposure to costs set to zero) 
would be an appropriate way of satisfying the compliance with the Aarhus Convention. 
Ultimately the Government’s initial proposal is to set the cap on applicants’ costs to 
£5000 for an individual, and £10000 for an organisation.  
 
Further, the Government recommended that there should be a cross-cap set at £35,000. 
The cross-cap relates to the amount of money that a successful applicant could recover 
from a defendant. Environmental NGOs opposed the recommendation arguing it might 
inhibit the claimant from making a proper claim or mean that not all costs may be 
recovered even if the claim succeeds. It was said it would make it more difficult for 
solicitors acting under a conditional fee agreement because they will face not only the 
risk of losing but the risk of not being able to recover full costs if successful. Again this 
amount would not be open to challenge. 
 
However, in December 2012, following the Prime Minister’s speech at the CBI 
Conference,565 the Ministry of Justice published a consultation paper566 containing 
565 David Cameron’s speech to the CBI’s Annual Conference 2012. Available at: www.cbi.org.uk/media-
centre/videos/2012/11/david-cameron-cbi-annual-conference-speech. 
566 Ministry of Justice ‘Judicial Review: Proposals for Reforms’ Consultation Paper CP25/2012) (London, 
2012). Available at: https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/judicial-review-
reform/supporting_documents/judicialreviewreform.pdf. 
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firm567 proposals concerning its plans to reform judicial review in the UK. Although the 
proposals concerned various categories of judicial review, including notorious asylum 
and immigration claims, the following analysis will concentrate on those relating to 
environment. First, the government intends to reduce the time limits for decisions of 
planning authorities from a liberal three months to six weeks. This would put the time 
limit in line with statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990. This section provides a basis for challenging the decisions of the Secretary of 
State following appeal, or commonly named ‘call-in’ applications. Further, the 
government proposes: 
 
“that any challenge to a continuing breach or cases involving multiple decisions should 
be brought within three months of the first instance of the grounds and not from the end 
or latest incidence of the grounds”.568  
 
Secondly, the government opposes the number of opportunities that the claimant may 
enjoy in applying for permission for judicial review.569 It sets out the following 
proposals to rationalise the process: 
 
“the first would remove the right to an oral renewal in cases where there has already 
been a prior judicial process involving a hearing considering substantially the same 
issue as raised in the Judicial Review claim;  
 
the second would remove the right to an oral renewal in cases which the Judge, on 
567 The consultation paper resembles more of a White Paper setting out clear proposals and, in light of the 
Prime Minister’s announcement, offered only a six-week consultation period as opposed to the usual 
three-month period. 
568 Ministry of Justice,supra note 566  at 65. 
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written submissions, has determined to be ‘totally without merit”.570 
 
Thirdly, the government intends to make changes to the fees system. This should be 
read in light of the earlier announcement by Ministry of Justice.571 This was published 
in November 2011 and sets out proposals to increase the fees.572 The proposals include 
an increase in the fees for both the permission (currently £60) and substantive (currently 
£215) stages to £235 for both. Further, the government intends to introduce an 
additional fee for an oral renewal which would stand at £235. 
 
 
Summary 
 Chapter 3 analysed the UNECE Convention on access to information, participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus Convention) 
which is binding in the UK through EU law. It is alleged by the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee and the EU Commission that the UK Government is in breach 
of the Convention’s third pillar which requires access to a review procedure not to be 
“prohibitively expensive” (art 9(4)). 
 
  
570 Ibid at 76. 
571 Ministry of Justice Fees in the High Court and Court of Appeal, CP 15/2011, (London 2011). 
572 Since the government has not published a response to the 2011 consultation paper these proposals will 
be dealt with alongside the proposals set out in the 2012 Ministry of Justice paper (December 2012).  
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Part II Research settings and methodology 
The second Part of the thesis is divided into two Chapters. First one will review the 
research settings and the E.L.F. modus operandi. The subsequent Chapter will provide 
an overview of the methodological approach. 
Chapter 4 Research settings – Environmental Law Foundation 
The empirical research which forms part of this thesis was conducted in Environmental 
Law Foundation (E.L.F). This section will explain the way in which E.L.F. handles 
environmental cases. The extensive explanation is necessary for two important reasons. 
Firstly, this will provide an overview of the research field, an elementary part of any 
research; secondly, this is needed to meet the requirements of the pragmatist, 
epistemological perspective. 
Environmental Law Foundation – an overview 
E.L.F. was established in January 1992 by a group of environmentalists, lawyers and 
scientists.  The initiators emphasised that access to healthy and sustainable environment 
is essential for securing a human right to just and fair society and understood their 
mission as requiring a cross-disciplinary approach to address the complex 
environmental concerns.  E.L.F.’s role has been consistent over the years and has 
focused on raising awareness of environmental rights, pursuing community 
empowerment projects, and providing access to law for individuals and communities in 
order to protect their environment. Its activities predate, but have centred around, the 
three pillars of the Aarhus Convention.  E.L.F. helps the public to gain access to 
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environmental information, facilitating their participation in environmental decision-
making and supporting them in litigation.573  
E.L.F. has been primarily focused on fortifying local people and communities as they 
organise themselves in an ad hoc manner to work on particular issues. Cases should 
have an environmental aspect and all such cases are accepted for potential referral 
within the Advice and Referral Service (hereafter A&R Service). This makes E.L.F. a 
distinctive organisation in the UK since other environmental NGOs tend to provide 
legal advice to projects that are likely to receive media attention and become high 
profile cases. E.L.F.’s focus has been consistent from its establishment and was 
relatively quickly recognised nationally.574 
In addition to the A&R Service, E.L.F. runs a Sustainable Communities Project aiming 
at empowering the public in English regions by running seminars, workshops, surgeries 
and other events. Moreover, E.L.F. engages in the wide training and educational 
activities and conducts policy analyses and research projects.575 
Funding arrangements 
The question of funding is of utmost importance for the purpose of this thesis. If a thesis 
that E.L.F. is publicly funded (at the time of conducting this research) can be proved 
then in contributes to the UK Government’s aim of satisfying the requirements of 
Article 9(5) of the Aarhus Convention.576The author asked the trustees whether they 
could provide details of the funding arrangement concerning the A&R Service to no 
573   Environmental Law Foundation, <http://www.elflaw.org/site/index.php?id=2> accessed 15 August 
2011 
574   J Vidal, ‘The defenders Communities which clash with corporate Goliaths face an uphill struggle. 
Now the green arm of the law can offer help’ The Guardian (Manchester, 9 April 1993) 
<http://www.newsuk.co.uk/newsuk/advancedSearchDisplayRecord.do?SortType=reverseChronological&
PageSize=50&ItemNumber=64&QueryType=quickSearch> accessed 15 February 2010 
575Environmental Law Foundation ‘What we do’ <http://www.elflaw.org/site/index.php?id=3> accessed 
15 February 2010 
576 See p. 313 for analysis 
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avail. E.L.F. is currently struggling to secure funding to continue its activity and it 
might explain the trustees reluctance to disclose details of funding arrangements. The 
E.L.F. website indicates that the charity is; 
“[f]unded by private donors, our members, the Department for Communities and 
Local Government and the Tides Foundation. The Environmental Law 
Foundation is a registered charity (number 1045918) and a non-profit company 
limited by guarantee in England (number 2485383).”577 
However, the previous website indicated that the charity was also funded by Big Lottery 
Fund (hereafter BIG)578. The author checked the publicly available Big Fund website 
and found that E.L.F. received £203,314 in 2007579. The website allows a search of 
some details concerning the grants, which are held on an Excel document. It states the 
purpose of the grant: 
“This project represents a major expansion of an existing service and will 
provide a free telephone tax advice service across England and Wales, although 
it is estimated that calls from Wales will represent a very small proportion of the 
total. Individuals will be supported with more in-depth advice provided by 
specialist caseworkers where necessary.” 580  
The above offers a clear indication that the A&R Service has been funded by BIG at 
some time covered by this research. It is significant given the nature of the Fund 
explained below. 
577 Environmental Law Foundation, <http://www.elflaw.org/?> accessed 15 August 2011 
578 Ibid, accessed 1 January 2010. The author has taken part in designing the new website as part of his 
consultancy work for E.L.F. 
579 Big Lottery Fund ‘Big delivers £24 million advice package across England’ 
<http://news.biglotteryfund.org.uk/pr_130607_nat_adv_big_delivers_24_million?regioncode=-
nw&status=theProg&title=Big%20delivers%20%C2%A324%20million%20advice%20package%20acros
s%20England?> accessed 1 October 2011 
580 Big Lottery Fund, Grant details <http://www.biglotteryfundgrants.org.uk:8080/grant-
search/gs_003.xsql> accessed 1 October 2011 
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BIG is “a non-departmental public body sponsored by the Cabinet Office”. It distributes 
“46 per cent of all funds raised for good causes (about 13 pence of every pound spent on 
a Lottery Ticket) by The National Lottery”581. The Fund is governed by Part II of the 
National Lottery Act 1993 and s.21(1) stipulates that it is  
“maintained under the control and management of the Secretary of State and 
known as the National Lottery Distribution Fund” 
The Secretary of State receives money from the sale of the lottery tickets and transfers it 
to the Fund which allocates the grants through “the distributing bodies”582. The latter 
must allocate the grants under the directions of the Secretary of State583 who has the 
“power to prohibit distribution in certain cases”584. In Paul Stuart Allen, (Valuation 
Officer) v English Sports Council/Sports Council Trust Company585 the Upper Tribunal 
(Lands Chamber) recognised the powerful position of the Secretary of State: 
“One matter that is to be noted, however, is that it is SE [Sports England] that it 
is the lottery distributor, and it can be assumed that it would not have awarded 
the grant unless in its view it represented value for money. Moreover the result 
of the section 27 process, under which the Secretary of State has power to 
prohibit a distributing body from distributing the grant, implies that the 
Secretary of State was of the same view”586. [explanation added] 
581 Big Lottery Fund ‘About the Big Lottery Fund’ < http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/index/about-
uk/about_blf.htm> 1 October 2011 
582 National Lottery Act 1993 s. 23 
583 Ibid s. 26(1) 
584 Ibid s. 27 
585 Paul Stuart Allen, (Valuation Officer) v English Sports Council/Sports Council Trust Company [2009] 
UKUT 187 (LC) 
586 Ibid 72 
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Moreover BIG published ‘Good Governance Guide’,587 which was available at the 
time588 the E.L.F received funding for A&R Service. The Guidance states that BIG is  
“a statutory body, accountable for public funds” and, before allocating the grants it must  
“look at an organisation’s capacity to handle public funds”589. The high threshold of 
good governance applies in the same way to the charities, private and public bodies. The 
latter have received much funding, which distribution patterns attracted researchers’ 
attention590. Further, BIG is also perceived as supporting the current coalition 
government’s Big Society policy as expressed recently by Tourism and Heritage 
Minister John Penrose: 
“Protecting lottery funding for these types of projects is an important way of 
building and maintaining the kind of voluntary and community action that is an 
integral part of the Big Society.”591 
Given the above analysis the author argues that the E.L.F.’s A&R Service has received 
some public funding for its administration and functioning. It is uncertain what other 
funding arrangement have been in place during the research period. Yet, as the 
Chairman (at that time) of E.L.F Pamela Castle at that time admitted, following the BIG 
funding decision in 2007, E.L.F. delivers public service to the communities: 
 “As a small private charity that provides a large public service, we are thrilled 
to have received this grant. It will make a real difference to those who most need 
587 Big Lottery Fund  ‘Good Governance Guide’ (undated) 
<http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/good_governance_guide2.pdf> accessed 1 October 2011 
588 Big Lottery Fund ‘Community Buildings’ 
<http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/prog_community_buildings> accessed 1 October 2011 
589 Big Lottery Fund  ‘Good Governance Guide’ supra note 587 
590 Patrick Feehan and David Forrest, ‘Distribution of UK National Lottery grants across local authority 
areas’ (2007) 14 Applied Economics Letters 361 
591 John Penrose cited in Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Lottery funding for voluntary and 
community sector protected’ (News Release) (7 December 2010) 
<http://www.culture.gov.uk/news/media_releases/7627.aspx> accessed 1 September 2011 
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help with local environmental concerns that cause human misery and damage to 
the environment”.592 
E.L.F.’s Advice and Referral Service 
Comprehensive rules governing the A&R Service are set in the ‘Guidance note for the 
Caseworkers’ published in January 2009.593 This is a 49-page technical document, and 
its main provisions are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
The A&R Service relies on the work of the interns, who work in E.L.F. at least 2-3 days 
per week for three months or longer. They can be engaged in various projects in the 
office but must give priority to the A&R Service. They predominantly perform their 
duties of receiving inquiries on the telephone due to space constraints.    
There are a number of the ‘categories’ of people involved in running the A&R service. 
Firstly, there are interns, who, at the beginning of their internship, can answer telephone 
calls but not get involved in the caseworker’s work. Secondly, there are caseworkers, 
who deal with the telephone interviews, research and making decisions as to whether 
the case can be referred further. Thirdly, there is the A&R Coordinator, who coordinates 
the interns’ work and helps them to establish whether the concern has an environmental 
aspect.  Fourthly, there are advisers to whom potential cases are referred. These consist 
of solicitors, barristers and technical consultants. The advisers must participate in the 
A&R Service; they must have become members of the E.L.F. and confirm their 
willingness to work on the inquiries and the referrals.  The A&R service is supervised 
by the Chief Executive.  
592 Pamela Castle cited in UK Idymedia, ‘Big Lottery Fund to help people tackle environmental problems’ 
(9 August 2007) <http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/nottinghamshire/2007/08/377862.html> 
accessed 1 September 2011 
593 Environmental Law Foundation, ‘Advice and Referral Service. Guidance Notes for Case Workers’ 
(E.L.F, 2009) (hereafter E.L.F. Guidelines) 
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As regards the clients, E.L.F. accepts inquiries from individuals, community groups, 
businesses, academics and other professionals. E.L.F. highlights that it does not 
discriminate against the inquirer “on grounds of age, disability or health, gender, race, 
religious or cultural beliefs or sexual preference or income”.594 
Initial telephone inquiry 
Each new inquiry is given a unique reference number. A telephone attendance note is 
filled in and later included in a file. The intern, or other person dealing with the 
telephone call595, should take the basic details of the inquirer (name, address, etc) 
alongside making a note of the issues raised. All initial inquiries are registered on the 
‘Initial Inquiries File‘. However, inquiries which do not concern environmental issues 
are registered elsewhere, namely in the ‘General Inquiries File‘.  
It is important to obtain sufficient information during the initial telephone inquiry in 
order to be able to make a judgement whether the problem carries an environmental 
aspect. When E.L.F. is contacted by a client by email or post, the caseworker should 
take active steps to contact the inquirer by telephone, if possible, in order to obtain more 
information. The decision as to action is taken by a caseworker and often they decide to 
ask the inquirer to provide more details in a form of documentation in order to make the 
final decision.  
Determining the environmental aspect of the case 
E.L.F. accepts genuine environmental inquiries and tries to refer them to an adviser. The 
responsibility for determining whether the inquiry has a genuine environmental angle is 
that of the caseworker. However, caseworkers often discuss the matter with the A&R 
594   Ibid 
595   Most of the inquiries are received on the phone. Some people contact E.L.F. by email or post. 
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Coordinator or even with the Chief Executive if the issue appears to be very complex. 
Crucially, the caseworker must adhere to the Guidelines and in particular Appendix 1596 
of the Guidelines which sets out certain criteria. 
The case is likely to possess a necessary, environmental aspect if it covers one or more 
of the following areas: air pollution; noise pollution; land pollution; water pollution; 
landfill and mining; waste disposal; roads; transport; housing development; industrial 
development; poisoning or personal injury (caused by radiation for example); 
conservation; habitats; and other developments concerning the environment or elements 
of the environment. E.L.F.’s remit is therefore very wide. It covers the environment, its 
elements and human health impacts of environmental pollution. Thus it is in line with a 
broad approach taken by the Aarhus Convention. 597 
The above list is not exhaustive and some inquiries with a genuine environmental aspect 
will not be referred on to an adviser. E.L.F.’s policy is that they do not deal with the 
neighbour disputes, criminal prosecutions, disputes between tenants and landlords, 
commercial concerns and planning applications on behalf of the applicant. Crucially, 
E.L.F. emphasizes that “[t]here usually needs to be some element of public interest”598.  
Cases raising no environmental concern are rejected by E.L.F. but signposted to 
relevant organisations. Thus, for example, clients with concerns over planning 
technicalities are advised to contact another organisation, Planning Aid. The caseworker 
has an access to a contact list of the other organisations with the Quality Mark to which 
they might forward the matter. The caseworker can also provide the inquirer with the 
telephone number of the Community and Legal Service, who can provide contacts to 
other organisations.  
596 not attached to this thesis due to confidentiality 
597 see p. 133 
598 E.L.F. Guidelines p. 1 
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When the caseworker determines that the inquiry falls under the E.L.F.’s scope they 
will ask the inquirer whether or not they have taken any steps to address the issue: 
“find out whether the client has taken the normal steps to address the problem 
themselves e.g., Have they asked for the environmental harm to stop? Have they 
involved the local authority and/or the Environment Agency? Have they asked 
for the appropriate information? Have they made written requests? Have they 
formed a group? Is there a community organisation with which they are 
involved or has been set up to tackle the problem? If not, encourage them to take 
these initial steps.”599 
The above questions are relevant since in some circumstances the clients are unaware of 
any rights that they possess.  
When the caseworker is certain that they want to accept the case they should inform the 
client about E.L.F.’s procedures and its modus operandi. This will ensure that the 
expectations of the client will not exceed E.L.F.’s scope in providing support.  
Dealing with the case 
E.L.F. will try to refer an accepted case to an adviser with suitable expertise, who will 
preferably have their office in the proximity of the client’s location. In addition, the 
E.L.F. tries to spread cases over many advisers so that none of them becomes 
overloaded.  
The caseworker will approach a potential adviser on the phone. E.L.F. asks caseworkers 
to contact one adviser at the time in order to avoid situations in which more than one 
member wished to accept the case. If a contacted adviser does not reply to the request, 
599 Ibid 11 
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the caseworker should wait about three working days before contacting another one. 
This requirement can be lifted and flexibility allowed if the case is urgent.600 
The solicitor/technical consultant might not be able to accept the case due to the conflict 
of interest including the possibility that they already represent the organisation from 
which the client demands an action or have worked for such organisation in the past. In 
addition, the cases from the London area can be referred to E.L.F.’s in-house service 
called E.L.F. Plus, which is still under development. E.L.F. Plus’s cases can also be 
referred to the external adviser for further advice or clarification. In both instances 
E.L.F. relies on the goodwill of its members and tries its best to find the relevant 
adviser. However, support cannot be guaranteed.  
It is usually an external solicitor or E.L.F. Plus solicitor that refers the case to a barrister 
by preparing written ‘Instructions to Counsel’. The case can be referred to a barrister by 
using four different approaches relevant for different circumstances, as explained below. 
Firstly, E.L.F.’s solicitor can request barrister’s opinion when the case comes in. In this 
situation E.L.F. asks its solicitor to send the ‘Instructions to Counsel’ to the office. The 
solicitor may ask the client to pay the fee for writing the instructions if such service 
would go beyond the remit of the free initial advice. After receiving the instructions the 
caseworker will choose a potential barrister according to expertise and the track record 
of recent work done for E.L.F. The idea is to spread the work over as many barristers as 
possible in order to avoid overloading them. The chosen barrister(s) are then 
approached by the caseworker’s contact with the chambers‘ clerk. A case successfully 
referred to the barrister will receive a second referral number. 
600   Ibid 29 
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Secondly, the client themselves may request a barrister’s  opinion. In such cases the 
client is asked to approach his / her  solicitor to write the instructions. If the client does 
not have a solicitor, the caseworker should refer the matter to the A&R Co-ordinator 
who may refer the case via the Bar Direct Service. 
Thirdly, the client may wish to receive a barrister’s opinion by instructing a non-E.L.F. 
solicitor to write the instructions. This is possible provided that the case has a genuine 
environmental concern and the instructing solicitor fills in the Request for Assistance 
Form. 
Finally, E.L.F. has a licence to contact barrister directly on behalf of E.L.F. and its 
clients. E.L.F. resorts to this option on rare occasions, namely when they could not refer 
the case to a solicitor  and “there is a real issue of law to advise upon or there is a  tight 
deadline or sometimes where we cannot get the matter taken on by an ELF solicitor”.601 
This approach requires significant co-operation between the caseworker and the A&R 
co-ordinator since E.L.F. must ensure that all the procedural requirements are met and 
that the written instructions are completed promptly. 
The referred cases will be considered by the adviser within the scope of the initial 
consultation that can take a form of a face to face meeting or an exchange made by 
email, telephone or post. The aim of the initial consultation is an opportunity for the 
adviser “to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the case”602.  Crucially the initial 
consultation is free of charge though the adviser may charge the client for additional 
work required at a reduced fee. The conditions of any extended advice must be 
discussed between the client and the adviser and E.L.F. does not intervene in such 
negotiations. 
601   Ibid 45 
602   E.L.F. Guidelines, p. 12 
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Second referral 
As outlined above, a second referral occurs when an E.L.F. solicitor refers the case to a 
barrister and the case will be given a second referral number. It is a general policy of 
E.L.F. not to refer cases concerning the same matter for a second time to the same 
adviser603. If the client is dissatisfied with the solicitor’s opinion they will be signposted 
to another relevant organisation.   However, E.L.F. does refer cases from one category 
of an adviser to another thus the case may receive the opinion of a solicitor and a 
barrister or both of them together, perhaps, with the technical consultant. In such 
instances the case is given a second referral number in the relevant documentation. 
Nevertheless, “the first referral number given remains the case number through the 
history of the case.”604 
The caseworker sends a copy of the Request for Assistance Form (hereafter the RFA 
Form) and the Case Referral Form (the CRF Form) to the potential adviser, 
accompanied by the relevant documentation provided by the client. In case of the 
referral to the barrister this will be accompanied by the ‘Instructions to Counsel’. This 
provided the opportunity for the adviser to finally accept the case for consideration.  
Dealing with the case – the documentation 
Upon the caseworker’s determination that the case falls under the remit of E.L.F., the 
RFA Form is generated. The form is normally generated from the Digital Red Book 
Database605, which consists of the crucial information concerning the client and the 
material facts of the inquiry. The RFA Form consists of information about and the 
603   Ibid  
604   Ibid 38 
605 an electronic MS Access database 
185 
 
                                                 
 
 
description of the problem “from the caller’s position”606. Table 2 below shows the 
information that can be found on the RFA Form alongside the rationale of obtaining 
such information as explained in the E.L.F. Guidelines. 
Table 2 The Request for Assistance Form (RFA) 
The data on the RFA 
Form 
The explanation and additional information 
Date of the opening of 
the case and sending the 
RFA Form to the client 
for the purpose of chronology  
Enquiry number for tracing the cases 
Caseworker’s name not stated in the Guidelines 
Referral number the number assigned after the inquiry has been accepted by the 
adviser; in order to easily trace the referral 
Client’s contact details this should be a postal address but the availability of an email address 
can be beneficial in urgent cases (for example the RFA Form can be 
quickly sent by email to the client for the latter’s acceptance and 
signature) 
Environmental concern As explained above the case must have a genuine environmental 
aspect; this part of the form will usually have a brief description of the 
environmental concern including any perceived substantial or 
procedural breaches of law as perceived by the client 
The cause of the problem this could include a planning decision, a lack of enforcement of the 
law, breach of the planning conditions 
Number of affected 
people 
this should be a reasonable estimate and this helps proving that the 
case has a public interest 
The details of the 
potential defendant 
this may include business, developer, a Council or other organisation 
The important deadlines The deadlines may include the date of the decision taken by the 
Council or the date scheduled for the Planning Committee Meeting; 
this is extremely important from the point of view of E.L.F. as a 
potential adviser may not accept the case close to the deadline let 
alone the case, where the deadline passed;  
606   E.L.F. Guidelines, p. 14 
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The character of possible 
assistance 
The clients should be acknowledged with the scope of the E.L.F.’s 
work and should be able to choose whether they wish their case to be 
considered by a solicitor, a barrister or a technical consultant; there 
are also cases where clients may ask for assistance in organising a 
workshop, forming a community group or running publicity activities 
Relevant documents The client should have access to the relevant documents supporting 
the case such as the planning decision, independent reports or 
timetables; the caseworker will provide information what documents 
may be helpful however the E.L.F. will allow the client to decide 
which documents they send to the office; the documentation should be 
in two copies (one for the adviser and one for the office file) and 
concise 
Terms of referral this is the extract from the conditions on which the E.L.F. provides 
assistance, namely the initial free consultation, the possibility of 
additional work done by the adviser subject to (reduced) fee, the fact 
that after the referral the E.L.F. does not take part in the relationship 
between the adviser and the client and finally, the explanation that 
E.L.F. requires its members to report back to E.L.F. for monitoring 
purposes and needs an approval of this by the client 
Other information whether the client have contacted E.L.F. before and how they heard 
about E.L.F. 
Source: The RFA form held in E.L.F. and attached as Appendix 2 
 
The RFA Form with relevant information is sent to the client who must duly sign it in 
order to commence the referral process. After receiving the form back it usually takes 
between 2-3 weeks for E.L.F. to find an adviser or provide other assistance.607When an 
adviser agrees to provide the assistance he/she will be provided with the Case Referral 
Form (CRF). The crucial data in the CRF is presented in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 Case Referral Form (CRF) 
The data on the CRF Form Explanation and additional information 
Basic information regarding the 
case 
the case referral number, the name of the client, the short 
description of the matter (for example noise pollution or 
judicial review) and the date of sending the CRF to the 
607   Ibid 19 
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adviser 
The list of supporting documents the documents which the client chose (with support of the 
E.L.F. caseworker) are enclosed to the form and sent to the 
adviser; these documents will normally be held in the case 
file in the office 
Description of the matter this is crucial part of the document including a brief 
description of the matter; this will often resemble the 
description provided by the client in the RFA form but will 
often be shorter 
The adviser’s acceptance  the potential adviser will sign the form and date it upon their 
acceptance 
Source: The CFR form held in E.L.F. and attached as Appendix 3 
 
 
The clients were provided an Equal Opportunities Form which they could complete in 
confidentiality and return to E.L.F. Table 4 below explains the data that the clients were 
asked to provide. 
 
Table 4 Equal Opportunities Form 
Equal Opportunities Form data 
The data on the EOs Form  Explanation and additional information 
Gender in most cases the person who contacted the 
E.L.F. put his or her gender; there were cases 
where both female and male boxes were circled 
reflecting the fact that the client regarded 
themselves a group, where more than one 
person was involved in contacting the E.L.F. 
Age banded, consisting of seven categories 
Income banded, consisting of seven categories 
188 
 
 
 
Profession the client could freely describe their profession; 
the examples included: ‘student’; ‘housewife’; 
‘unemployed’; ‘self-employed’; ‘manager’; 
‘working for in a shop’ etc;  
Region banded, 10 categories 
Disability the form asks “Are you registered disabled?’ 
and asks for giving the title of the disability; 
some people could not answer the first question 
and provided some description of a disability; I 
was only interested whether the client answered 
Yes or No to the first question 
Nationality the form asks “What is your nationality?”; I was 
concerned whether the client’s nationality was 
British or not 
First language whether English or another 
Ethnic origin banded, 19 categories 
Source: The CFR form held in E.L.F. at the time of conducting the research 
 
Further, E.L.F. circulates a Client Monitoring Questionnaire Form608 to each client who 
received free initial advice. The form was largely qualitative with questions concerning 
the conclusion of the case.  
Summary 
 
This Chapter provided an overview of the research settings by analysing how 
Environmental Law Foundation handles environmental cases. It reviewed the E.L.F.'s 
funding arrangements by highlighting the fact that the charity has received some public 
funding for its administration and functioning. The Chapter provided a summary of 
crucial documentation that E.L.F. uses to deliver assistance to the public facing 
environmental problems. 
 
608 E.L.F. Guidelines, p. 37 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
 
This Chapter describes and defends the ontological and epistemological underpinnings 
of the study, the choice of mixed methodology and, stemming from these, the ethical 
and political issues associated with the research. Furthermore, the Chapter shall 
illustrate how the author collected and analysed the data and how he incorporated the 
procedures of reflection. The timing of the study is attached as the Appendix 1.  
Pragmatist ontology and epistemology 
Advanced postgraduate researchers are urged to locate their inquiries in a selected 
ontological and epistemological paradigm. Both ontology and epistemology relate to the 
nature of being and the former answers a question “What kind of being is the human 
being? What is the nature of reality?” whereas the latter answers a question “What is the 
relationship of the inquirer and the known”’.609 The research was based in the 
organizational settings and involved the use of mixed methodology in line with the 
chosen pragmatist paradigm. The research deliberately rejects the positivist 
understanding of social science and law which assumes an existence of objective reality. 
The positivists argue that the reality can be objectively measured and analysed by a 
detached researcher using the quantitative means of inquiry. The interpretivists, who 
rejected the positivistic views in the Twentieth Century, argue that the reality is not 
objectively measurable and suggested using a qualitative means of inquiry. Amongst 
them the constructivists have gained considerable influence arguing that the social 
reality is constructed610. The sections below will show that the database on which the 
609   Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, Sage Handbook on Qualitative Research (Sage 2005) 22 
610  John A Hannigan, Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective (Routledge 1995) 
 
190 
 
                                                 
 
 
research is based has been constructed by multiple actors though the author rejected the 
constructivist paradigm which suits better the qualitative, in-depth collection of data and 
analysis. The author is convinced that he could have used the constructivist paradigm if 
he decided to focus on the analysis of the database itself, namely the in-depth study of 
the construction of variables. The author could also use this paradigm to conduct 
documentary analysis of available cases and capture data on the variety of interests. 
This analysis would be limited given the scarcity of information in legal cases 
themselves611. 
Pragmatist paradigm explained 
Pragmatism emerged as a movement at the end of the Nineteenth Century and became a 
school of thought at the turn of that century. It is associated with the works of Charles S. 
Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. For the 
purpose of this thesis the author shall emphasize the ontological and epistemological 
characteristics of pragmatism.  
 
In terms of ontology, pragmatism rejects the existence of set beliefs and institutions 
upon which knowledge is based. Our concepts are not indubitable but we can make 
sense of our existence on the basis of a number of undoubted occurrences that have not 
been questioned by experience. Therefore, pragmatism elevates the practice, where the 
‘truth’ is an entity, which has not been contradicted by experience. Furthermore, the 
reality is pluralistic and in constant development so that indeterminacy and chance play 
a significant role.  
 
In terms of epistemology, the human mind is part of the world therefore ‘knowing the 
611 See p. 118 
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world’ is not a detached activity. The inquirer will focus their efforts on reconstructing 
the doubted concepts in order to make a better sense of them and the process of inquiry 
will change both the subject and the object. They will also be aware of the reality being 
in constant development and will use experience and experiment for the purpose of 
making sense of this reality. 
 
At the social and political level, pragmatism propagates the distinct worthiness of every 
individual. The individual is seen as being intertwined with their context and 
pragmatism sees them as part of a community. Each individual can make a worthy 
contribution to the society and participatory democracy is supported. This is associated 
with the assumption that the world is in constant development and in need of reform.612    
Pragmatism and constructivism 
The author used a constructivist paradigm in his earlier work613 and the turn towards 
pragmatism in this thesis builds upon this experience. Scholars have identified a number 
of similarities between constructivism and pragmatism. Firstly, both reject 
metaphysical, idealist and absolutist concepts of knowledge and emphasise the 
importance of experience in the process of reasoning. Social constructivism holds that 
the objective knowledge is an end result of different perspectives glued together by 
means of language and institutions.614 Pragmatism also recognises the powerful forces 
of language and descriptions that do not necessarily reflect the reality. It encourages 
612   Kelly A Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’ in Andrew Light and Eric Katz (eds), 
Environmental Pragmatism (Routledge, London 1996) 21-37 
613  Robert G Lee and Radoslaw Stech, ‘Mediating Sustainability: Constructivist Approaches to 
Sustainability Research’ in Alex Franklin and Paul Blyton (eds), Researching Sustainability: A Guide to 
Social Science Methods, Practice and Engagement (Earthscan 2011); Radoslaw Stech, ‘Environmental 
Information, Participation and Citizen Activity: Case Studies from Poland and the UK’ in Sivaram 
Vemuri (ed),  Connected Accountabilities: Environmental justice and Global Citizenship 
(InterDisciplinary Press 2010) 
614  Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (Penguin Books 1991) 
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debates and recognises that particular voices are stronger because they are uttered by 
powerful interest groups or within a particular cultural environment. Secondly, both 
constructivism and pragmatism assert that facts are constructed and alter over time. 
Every-day knowledge is shaped by experience. Thirdly, both paradigms support 
democratic openness, where a variety of groups holding distinct beliefs can interact to 
promote improvement and development. Fourthly, both emphasise experience and 
interaction in the learning process. The learners are perceived as active participants in 
the learning process rather than mere receivers and spectators and provided with an 
opportunity for experimentation. Education leads to growth that brings more 
opportunities for those involved in it.615    
Pragmatism and environmental thought 
As explained in  the Chapter 3, the Aarhus Convention reflects the ideas that the public 
should be allowed more opportunities for making input into decision-making processes. 
The analytical chapters of this thesis consider whether judicial review should be seen as 
part of that input. Pragmatism is in line with environmental thought. Pragmatism is 
anthropocentric as is the underlying theoretical layer of the Aarhus Convention. 
Crucially, pragmatism values a contribution of every individual and, as is widely 
recognised, the complexity of the environmental problems requires the input of the 
public. Finally, the environment is in constant change and development: new forms of 
products and technology have had considerable impact on our surroundings, health and 
well-being. This suggests constant reform of our regulatory systems; pragmatism is pro-
615   Kersten Reich, ‘Constructivism: Diversity of Approaches and Connections with Pragmatism’ in 
Larry A Hickman, Stefan Neubert and Kersten Reich (eds), John Dewey between Pragmatism and 
Constructivism (2009, Fordham University Press, New York) 39-64; Brad M Hastings, ‘Social 
Constructivism and the Legacy of James’ Paradigm’ (2002) 12 Theory Psychology 714 
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reform.616  
Pragmatism and mixed methodology 
The use of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in a single research project has 
been regarded by some as inferior to the use of one discrete methodology. Some 
academics have rejected possibility of retorting to the contrasting paradigms to underpin 
such research.617 However, the pragmatist paradigm has been accepted and used by 
many as the relevant theoretical underpinning for the mixed methodology.618 The 
paradigm is still debated and subject to evaluation. 
 
Pragmatism highlights the end result of the research rather than the process itself: ‘the 
end justifies the means’. The researchers are allowed to determine what works well 
during the process of inquiry in order to answer the research questions. This implies a 
possibility of moving from an inductive to a deductive approach as Morgan explains 
 
 "The pragmatic approach is to rely on a version of abductive reasoning that 
 moves back and forth between induction and deduction—first converting 
 observations into theories and then assessing those theories through action".619 
This author decided to use the pragmatist approach because, as it is explained below, he 
had to ‘experiment’ with the collection of the data by using various techniques in order 
to answer the research questions. The research was initially influenced by the needs of 
the research organisation with which the author was engaged and he had to integrate the 
616   Ibid 
617   John K Smith and Lous Heshusius, ‘Closing Down the Conversation: The End of the Quantitative-
Qualitative Debate’ (1986) 15(1) Educational Researcher 4 
618   David L Morgan, 'Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained Methodological Implications of 
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods' (2007) 1(1) Journal of Mixed Methods Research 48 
619   Ibid 71 
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needs of the thesis into the negotiated tasks . Although the author supports the idea that 
the ‘end justifies the means’ it is necessary to explain the whole process of the inquiry 
in detail, paying attention to the way in which the organisation works and the way in 
which the data was collected and analysed. The previous Chapter reviewed the E.L.F.'s 
modus operandi and the sections below will explain how the data was collected and 
analysed. 
Pragmatism and planning law 
Upon starting the research the author was broadly aware that the majority of the public 
would contact E.L.F. with environmental problems related to the planning law in the 
UK. This was later confirmed with the findings. The pragmatist approach is also in tune 
with the wider area of planning since it is “a philosophy of social reform and 
reconstruction”.620 Blanco argues that because planning seeks to apply the best available 
knowledge and the techniques of rational reasoning to address social problems it is “the 
practising heir of the philosophy of pragmatism.”621  
Pragmatism and socio-legal studies 
Finally, the pragmatic theoretical underpinnings are in line with socio-legal studies, 
where the author wish to position the research. The socio-legal movement in its early 
formative years adopted the sociological techniques of analysis as opposed to those 
rooted in law, what “attracted criticism by those who accused socio-legal scholars of 
eclecticism and almost intellectual burglary”622. As Lee highlighted, the socio-legal 
scholars wished to distance themselves from and challenge the traditional and orthodox 
620   Hilda Blanco, How to think about Social Problems. American Pragmatism and the Idea of Planning 
(Greenwood Press Westport 1994) 3 
621   Ibid 
622   Robert G Lee, ‘Socio-Legal Research – What’s the Use?’ in P A Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies 
(Aldershot 1997) 84 
195 
 
                                                 
 
 
approach to law “in particular the desire to move away from seemingly meaningless 
searches for coherence and consistency as laid down by the judiciary or the 
legislature”623.  
  
The pragmatic approach allows for experimentation and inductive mode of analysis, 
which is in tune with socio-legal studies. Again, however, there is a need to be 
completely transparent in explaining all the steps and stages of the inquiry. Moreover, 
socio-legal approach emphasizes the interaction between the lawmaker and the citizens. 
  
“[T]he positivist recognizes in the functioning of a legal system nothing that can 
truly be called a social dimension. The positivist sees the law at the point of its 
dispatch by the lawgiver and again at the point of its impact on the legal subject. 
He does not see the lawgiver and the citizen in interaction with one another, and 
by virtue of that failure he fails to see that the creation of an effective interaction 
between them is an essential ingredient of the law itself.”624 
 
The theme of collaboration and participation in adjudication will be discussed and 
analysed in Chapter 9625. 
 
The data collection 
The following paragraphs will deal with data collection in the organisational settings. 
The author shall deal with the access issue, the purpose of using the mixed methodology 
and the process of collecting the data. 
623   Ibid 83 
624  Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 
625 See p. 315 
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The access problem in organisational research  
The collected the data in an organisation, namely the Environmental Law Foundation. 
The vast majority of researchers conducting research in organisations mention the 
problem of access, that is the problem of getting entry into the organisation and working 
well with the people in the organisation during the inquiry.626 There have been a 
number of ‘tactics’ employed in order to get the entry, including the use of friends, 
relatives and professional friends. Some researchers gained access by getting into 
trustworthy relationship with the members of the organisations. Furthermore, some 
researchers offered a possibility of writing a report of their findings. 
 
The author used a number of the above tactics. First of all, he gained the initial entry to 
the organisation thanks to my supervisor who was the trustee of the E.L.F. at that time. 
The author negotiated the terms and conditions of the stay in the organisation in May 
before deciding whether to do the research. He agreed with the Chief Executive that part 
of his research could be used by the organisation, however he did not know at that time 
that it would be published as a report. Finally, the author established friendly 
relationship based on trust with the employees of the organisation and the interns. This 
was not achieved by employing any purposeful tactics: it appears that the people 
working there had a similar attitude to life.  
The preliminary research 
The author made several visits to E.L.F. in May 2009 to do preliminary research on the 
electronic database (the Digital Red Book)627 and the files kept in organisation. At this 
stage he established some crucial variables, acquainted himself with the workings of the 
626   Alan Bryman, ‘Introduction: ‘inside’ accounts and social research in organizations’ in Alan Bryman 
(ed), Doing Research in Organisations (Routledge 1988)  
627 See p. 185 
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organisation, and met the employees and interns. Moreover, the author came to a 
conclusion that there were significant gaps in the electronic database so that he decided 
to do content analysis of the paper files. Finally, the Chief Executive informed that she 
was interested in the answers to the following question in order to provide evidence to 
the ongoing debate concerning the costs barriers to judicial review: 
 
‘how many cases in which clients were advised to pursue judicial review were  
prevented from proceeding due to the cost barrier?’ 
 
The author agreed to provide an answer to the above question by breaking it into two 
research questions identified in the Introduction628. The two questions are repeated 
below: 
1. What proportion of judicial review referrals received a negative opinion as to the 
prospects of success at judicial review? What is the proportion of judicial review 
cases where clients were advised to take further steps towards judicial review?  
2. Given the answer to the above question, did clients not proceed primarily 
because of costs? 
The purpose of using mixed methodology 
The utilisation of mixed methodology can serve a number of purposes, as was 
summarised in the Table 5 below. 
 
The author used the content analysis of the documentation found in the case files held in 
E.L.F. for the purpose of developing variables for quantitative analysis. The variable 
628 See p. 20 (questions 3-4) 
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‘stage of cases'629 provides a good example of the usefulness of the documentary 
analysis.  A number of clients asked for advice at the stage of consultation which was 
reflected in the Request for Assistance Form630. There was a need to perform thorough 
analysis of the documentation to check whether or not the case reached a further stage 
such as public inquiry or judicial review. Moreover, some clients mistakenly thought 
that their case was amenable to judicial review where, in truth, it was a civil dispute 
such as a private nuisance case. Another example might be the content analysis of 
descriptive documents such as solicitors’ or barristers’ opinions procured in order to 
establish whether a case received a positive or negative opinion as to the prospects of 
success. The use of various documentation in developing the quantitative analysis 
served also as a tool to triangulate the validity of the results. However, the primary 
purpose in using the mixed methodology was ‘development’ (see Table 5 below). 
629 See p.  263 
630 See p. 185 
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Table 5 The data collection – a design 
Title Purpose Rationale 
Triangulation “seeks convergence, corroboration, 
correspondence of results from the 
different methods” 
to maximise the validity of the 
inquiry and minimise the 
occurrence of bias results by using 
various sources  
Complementarily “seeks elaboration, enhancement, 
clarification of the results from one 
method with the results from the 
other method” 
to maximise the validity, 
interpretability and meaningfulness 
of the results by both “capitalising 
on inherent method strengths and 
counteracting inherent biases in 
methods and other sources” 
Development “seeks to use the results from one 
method to help develop or inform 
the other method, where 
development is broadly construed 
to include sampling and 
implementation, as well as 
measurement decisions” 
to maximise the validity of the 
research results and constructions 
by using the inherent strengths of 
the chosen methods 
Initiation seeks the discovery of paradox and 
contradiction, new perspectives of 
frameworks, the recasting of 
questions or results from one 
method with questions or results 
from the other method! 
to maximise the depth and breadth 
of the research results and 
interpretations “by analysing them 
from the different perspectives of 
different methods and paradigms” 
Expansion seeks to extend the breadth and 
range of inquiry by using different 
methods for different inquiry 
components” 
“to increase the scope of inquiry by 
selecting the methods most 
appropriate for multiple 
components” 
Source631 
 
631 Jennifer C Greene and others, ‘Toward a Conceptual Framework for Mixed-Method Evaluation 
Designs’ (1989) 11(3)  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 255, 260-274 
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 Validity 
Scott,632  makes a distinction between four significant factors that must be kept in mind 
during the documentary analysis. The first factor focuses on authenticity, that is whether 
or not the evidence is genuine. The second factor concerns credibility and whether or 
not documentation is free from distortion and omission. The third factor addresses 
representativeness and whether documents represent the phenomena. The last factor 
relates to the meaning; are documents clearly and comprehensively written?. The author 
shall now analyse an extent to which documentation adhered to the above criteria. 
 
As to the authenticity, the collected documents are held in the E.L.F.’s office in secure 
drawers and there are no grounds to claim that the documents are not authentic. The 
documents are on headed paper and contain signatures and dates. As regards the 
credibility, there are issues of concern. The documents clearly represent different points 
of view, namely the Request for Assistance Form633 form reflects the clients’ views on 
the case, the Case Referral Form634 reflects the clients’ views but often in a shortened 
and summarized form created by the caseworker for the purpose of quickly informing 
the adviser what the case is about. Moreover, the ‘Instruction to Counsel’ documents 
reflect the legal and often technical view on the case given by a solicitor at an initial 
stage counsels’ and the advisers’ opinion following the initial free advice (solicitors’ 
letters to the E.L.F. or the barristers’ opinions on the litigation prospects) can consist of 
highly detailed and reasoned opinion or a brief opinion that ‘the case is good for judicial 
review’ or ‘the case is weak’. In assessing the credibility of the documents the final 
opinion of the document can depend on the initial understanding of the case by the 
632 John Scott, A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social research (Polity Press 1990) 
633 See p. 185 
634 Ibid 
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client and the caseworker. As highlighted above635, the client is responsible for finding 
those relevant documents with support of the caseworker which they think will be 
useful for the adviser. Any omission at this stage could influence the final opinion given 
the limited time resources. Moreover, there were many files which included very limited 
description of the matter generating omissions and gaps in the quantitative database. 
 
As regards the representativeness, the analyzed documents represented the phenomena 
(understandings of, for example, a ‘planning case’ or a ‘judicial review’ case) fairly 
well. It was possible to capture the clients’ views on the case as well as the opinion of 
the adviser. Crucially, the researcher could capture basic information concerning cases 
including:  the stage; the nature of the problem; the area of law; and the socio-economic 
information about the clients. Some cases, however, were not representative as some 
files lacked one or more crucial documents. 
 
As to the meaning, there were documents that consisted of limited information thus not 
allowing the capture of the necessary data or even causing confusion. The confusion 
could be caused by a note in the file that the judicial review was undertaken in particular 
case but, upon a check of the party names in legal databases, the case could not be 
found. Upon further examination by making contact with the adviser it transpired that 
the case was actually settled. In such cases the also sought support from the employees 
in the E.L.F. 
Collection of the quantitative data 
 
The quantitative data has been drawn from the three main sources: firstly and crucially 
the analysed documentation (dealt with in the preceding paragraph); secondly, the 
635 See Table 2 above, p. 186 
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electronic database (Digital Red Book)636 in a form of the Microsoft Access database 
consisting of basic information such as short overview of the case, funding of the case 
and the name and address of the inquirer; and, thirdly, from the Equal Opportunities 
Forms637 completed and sent in confidentiality by the clients.  
 
The sources were, in some cases, incomplete and as a result of this the researcher made 
an intensive and extensive attempt to contact the clients and the advisers. The contacts 
were made within the modus operandi of the E.L.F. The author did not create any 
additional interview questionnaire but used the same questions and similar emails that 
the E.L.F.’s caseworkers or employees would use in their normal monitoring activities. 
This also ensured coherence between the answers which had already been given by the 
clients and the advisers and the answers which the author obtained. However, initially 
he could not perform many interviews during the E.L.F.’s working hours and had to 
work in the evenings and weekends. The author was given access to the office during 
these off-hours on a trust basis. Below is a set of questions that the author and E.L.F. 
send to the clients and the advisers to fill the gaps: 
• Did the matter reach the Courts? 
• Did you apply for a Protective Costs Order (PCO)? 
• What was the probability of success estimated? 
• If the case did reach the Courts, was it successful? 
• If the case did not reach the Courts, did it resolve successfully? Did it not reach 
the Courts solely because of lack of funding?638 
 
636 See p. 185 
637   See p. 188 
638 Source: Reflexive diary as explained below, see p. 210 
203 
 
                                                 
 
 
Linking the data  
The retrieved quantitative data was uploaded into the statistical software package, 
SPSS, which is widely used by governmental, non-governmental and private 
organisations. The author had also been trained in using the SPSS during the Master’s 
course on Socio-legal Methodology at Cardiff University.  
 
The SPSS dataset (hereafter dataset) included the details gathered from the above 
sources. It was especially important to link the socio-economic data with data from the 
electronic database. This could be done by means of a postcode. The electronic database 
with a unique referral number consisted of the postcode, which was searched for in the 
folder containing the Equal Opportunities Forms. This was time consuming but 
successful and not prone to error. The researcher did the scanning twice: firstly, 
reaching around 60% of referrals having linked socio-economic data; and, secondly, 
establishing a 70% link.   
 
Data Analysis 
The analysis of the quantitative database was undertaken by means of the SPSS, which 
offers basic and advanced analytical tools. The author decided to focus on descriptive 
statistics, as opposed to complex probability modelling, due to the limited number of 
cases and missing variables within the cases. Similar approach was taken in E.L.F. 2003 
study639. The author could also use cross-tabulation as a form of the multivariate 
analysis of the judicial review cases. The margin of error was established at 5 
percent640. The following paragraphs will describe the tools of analysis. 
 
639 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29 
640 Alan Bryman, Duncan Cramer Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS 14, 15 and 16 (Routledge 2009) 
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Frequency distribution is often a first step in summarising quantitative data. It shows the 
number of cases in a given category. The number of cases were underpinned by 
percentages to show the proportion of cases in a given category641. The proportion is 
rounded up to one decimal place in order to facilitate the analysis and allow the reader 
to capture the differences comfortably. The frequency distribution was used to present 
socio-economic variables and some variables related to the cases, concerning, for 
example, the area of law.   
Data Presentation 
The analysis of each variable will be accompanied by relevant background information 
including the method of compiling. The presentation in the following Chapters will be 
structured in the following manner. Firstly, each variable will be analysed over the 
whole study period. If there is an opportunity for making a comparison with E.L.F. 
2003 Report642 this will be done in the same table allowing for easier understanding and 
reducing the space. Secondly, an annual analysis of the variable will be performed in 
one table to highlight any noticeable trends. The annual analysis of data in E.L.F. 2003 
Report643 will not be included since there is a two year gap between the two studies.. 
Thirdly, the exploration of the variables will be followed by a part entitled ‘Analysis 
and summary’. This will include performing any additional analysis and cross-variable 
comparisons using cross-tabulation if required to achieve fuller analytical picture. 
Tables in this part will have a slightly different layout because they have been copied 
directly from the SPSS system to ensure authenticity and to allow the reader to compare 
proportions with missing values included with valid proportions. Finally, certain 
passages will refer the reader to the relevant and associated paragraphs of the thesis by 
way of footnotes to enhance understanding and reduce unnecessary repetitions. 
641  Ibid 
642 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects of Environmental Justice’ supra note 29 
643 Ibid 
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Measuring polycentricity 
The main purpose of the thesis is to better understand the concept of environmental 
justice in light of polycentricy. The concept of polycentricity will be further reviewed in 
the Chapter 9. The literature review suggests644 that environmental justice is polycentric 
thus giving rise to conflicts within the environmental justice cohort. The polycentricity 
lies in the substantive and procedural aspect of environmental justice. The substantive 
polycentricity stems from the heterogeneity of parties claiming the right to better quality 
environment at various levels of governance (global, national, regional, local, family 
and individual). Thus, exposure to environmental hazards can be studied through 
numerous variables (age, disability etc) at these levels to measure the degree of 
environmental justice of different groups. Secondly, procedural rights, mainly access to 
information and participation in decision making, have twofold functions. Firstly, as an 
‘integral’ part of environmental justice concept thus the catalyst for or tool through 
which environmental justice can be achieved. Secondly as a corollary of substantive 
polycentricity, allowing various environmental justice parties to assert their rights to the 
healthier environment at the cost of other environmental justice parties.   
The following three Chapters will make an attempt to measure polycentricity of E.L.F. 
referrals and judicial review cases. Chapter 6 will focus on analysing the main 
characteristics of the E.L.F. clients by analysing various variables. Chapter 7 will 
address the key characteristics of the referrals and provide an opportunity to further 
explore the interests which could be involved in the cases. Chapter 8 will focus on 
measuring the access to judicial review. This Chapter will also match the English 
judicial review cases with the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation to identify the 
potential interests involved in the cases.  
644 See p. 71 
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The English Indices of Deprivation (IMD), created by the British Department for 
Communities and Local Government, is a set of data that measures multiple forms of 
deprivation in small areas of England called Lower Layer Super Output Areas.  First 
such index was released in 2004, next in 2007 and the latest on March 24, 2011 (called 
The English Indices of Deprivation 2010, in which the data mostly comes from 2008). 
Seven distinct dimensions of deprivation called Domains are distinguished and they 
make up the indices: Income domain; Employment domain; Health deprivation and 
disability; Education, Skills and Training domain; Barriers to Housing and Services 
domain; Crime domain; and Living Environment domain645.  
 
Education, Skills and Training domain comprises two sub-domains: the children/young 
people sub-domain and the skills sub-domain, both connected with educational 
disadvantage. The barriers to Housing and Services domain also fall into two sub-
domains related to access to housing: wider barriers sub-domain and geographical 
barriers sub-domain. There are two sub-domains included in Living Environment: the 
indoors living sub-domain and the outdoors living sub-domain. They are about housing 
and air quality / road traffic accidents respectively.646 
 
Supplementary indices concerning children and older people - the Income Deprivation 
Affecting Children Index (IDACI) and the Income Deprivation Affecting Older People 
Index (IDAOPI) are subsets of the Income Domain.  
The Indices of Multiple Deprivation is a useful means of recognising the most 
645 David McLennan, Helen Barnes, Michael Noble, Joanna Davies, Elisabeth Garratt, Chris Dibben ‘The 
English Indices of Deprivation 2010’ (Technical Report of the Department for Communities and Local 
Government) (London, 2011) 
<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/indices2010technicalreport> accessed 
1 April 2011 
646 Ibid 
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disadvantaged areas which should be the focus of government policy. IMD is used to 
support decision-making policies. Therefore some necessary activities of local 
authorities and policy makers can be performed. The results from the latest report show, 
for instance, how many people lived in the most deprived areas in England in 2008 and 
how many of them were income deprive; the local authorities with the highest 
proportion of Lower layer Super Output Areas amongst the most deprived in England; 
the proportion of deprivation in urban areas to that across rural areas; and a comparison 
of deprivation of an area with 2007.647  
 
There has been a critique of this method of quantifying deprivation. The Indices of 
Multiple Deprivation “represents a commendable advance’ but provides a reliable tool 
to a certain degree and ‘there remain significant limitations that future approaches could 
profitably address”648. 
There are also claims that such assessments of deprivation are short-sighted since ‘they 
are not able to account formally for the spatial context of individual locations’.  A 
different approach of measuring deprivation is offered by Alasdair Rae - combining 
spatial statistical approaches with a much-used deprivation index.649 
647 Ibid 
648 Iain Deas, Brian Robson, Cecilia Wong, Michael Bradford ‘Measuring neighbourhood deprivation: a 
critique of the Index of Multiple Deprivation’ (2003) 21(6) Environment and Planning C: Government 
and Policy 883  
649 Alasdair Rae 'Isolated Entities or Integrated Neighbourhoods? An Alternative View of the 
Measurement of Deprivation' (2009) 46(9) Urban Studies 1859 
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Ethical and political dimensions of the study 
The chosen methodology posed a number of ethical issues, which included one ‘hard’ 
ethical issue that university departments are particularly concerned with: the researcher 
dealt with the sensitive information and received information in confidence. 
 
Firstly,  access was given to the electronic database and the paper files of E.L.F.’s cases 
consisting of personal information of thousands of inquirers and clients. The Equal 
Opportunities Forms could be inspected and, thanks to the research design, the 
confidential data included there could be linked with the personal information of the 
clients. The author regarded this access as a significant opportunity for a researcher but 
also as a responsibility. He signed a non-disclosure agreement with E.L.F.’s Chief 
Executive. In addition, he agreed that the research work would be done solely on 
E.L.F.’s premises. As a result the author conducted the additional evening and weekend 
interviews from the office in London also using E.L.F.’s electronic space to conduct the 
email interviews if needed. He did not use his own email account. 
 
Secondly, the author received information in confidence especially from the clients 
during the interviews within E.L.F.’s monitoring activities. He resorted to normal and 
ethically accepted conduct which he had applied before and during earlier semi 
structured interviews650.  Hence, he firstly informed the clients/respondents that he was 
a researcher from Cardiff University doing a piece of research on access to justice in 
environmental matters in the offices of the Environmental Law Foundation. In most 
cases the clients expressed their utmost willingness  to be interviewed. However, the 
author followed the further procedures, namely asking the clients “whether or not they 
650  Radoslaw Stech ‘Environmental Information...' supra note 445 
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wanted to take part in the research voluntarily and informing them about the risks and 
nature of my research. 
 
The author was also funded by the Environmental Law Foundation, receiving 2,500 
pounds to conduct the research. In this case he followed the guidance of Lee who 
considered the issue of obtaining sponsorship from various organisations, including 
commercial bodies. Lee does not advise the automatic rejection of the funding but rather 
the need of every researcher to take the responsibility “at the outset of the research to 
fully explore the confines and constraints of the sponsorship offered – even if that leads 
to the withdrawal of the funding”.651  In light of this, a number of preliminary meetings 
with E.L.F. establishing the confines and constraints of the sponsorship, were initiated. 
It was agreed that the author would deliver certain data which could be used by E.L.F. 
for their purposes and agreed that the data would be gathered starting from January 
2005 (rather than from February 2005 as in this research). However, it was also agreed 
that the author's input was much greater, including the reliance on ESRC funding and 
the use expensive SPSS software, which E.L.F. did not possess. As a result there was 
little possibility of E.L.F. influencing the research unduly. 
Reflexivity and precision of the research  
Reflexivity is an important tool that helps in obtaining more objective and valid material 
through qualitative methodology. Reflexivity was significant for the author given that 
the documentary analysis was performed to develop a number of quantitative variables   
Reflexivity is difficult to define, but it includes the researcher’s own feedback at all 
stages of the research; this should be ongoing, habitual and thoroughly thought-through 
process. Reflexivity should be applied during data collection and analysis (Alvesson, 
651   Robert G. Lee, ‘Socio-Legal Research...’ supra note 622, p.93-94 
210 
 
                                                 
 
 
Skoldberg 2000, Mauthner, Doucet 2003). The author aimed at executing the research 
in the most precise and rigorous way and developed the following tools of reflexivity. 
Firstly, the author conducted the research independently in a separate and silent room in 
the E.L.F. headquarters. Nevertheless, he enjoyed an easy access to the E.L.F. 
employees and the interns if he wished to ask a question or clarify certain information 
found in the documents. The author used this opportunity frequently especially when he 
could not find the relevant information or had to contact a lawyer or the client to receive 
that information. The author also contacted E.L.F. to obtain additional information 
when necessary during the data analysis. 
Secondly, the author developed a diary at the stage of initial research and had been 
updating it throughout the data collection and analysis. The diary was kept in an 
electronic form in a Microsoft Office One Note document. The diary allowed the 
researcher to keep the note of interesting referrals and identify the links between the 
referrals. Moreover, in line with the pragmatist mixed-methods approach, the 
information in the diary helped the researcher to develop and cross-check the 
quantitative variables. The author referred explicitly to the data in the diary in this thesis 
when necessary.652 
Summary  
 
The Chapter reviewed the methodological underpinnings of the study, the overview of 
the data collection and analysis. The statistical analysis of 774 referrals will allow 
measuring various interests involved and will allow for limiting the pool of cases to 
judicial review referrals for further analysis. The latter will form a basis for establishing 
652 See the following headings in Chapter 7 for example: ‘Human Rights and Wellbeing’ (p. 255), 
‘Concerns over the Aarhus Pillars’ (p. 259), ‘Bias’ (p .262) or in Chapter 8: ‘Likelihood of success’ 
(p.278) 
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whether or not costs were the barrier for some claimants in starting judicial review 
proceedings. It would also form a basis for measuring polycentricity of environmental 
judicial review cases.   
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Part III Results 
This part of the thesis consists of three chapters which will present the results of the 
statistical analysis of the E.L.F. referrals. Chapter 6 will focus on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the clients; Chapter 7 will then turn to analysing the features of the 
referrals and Chapter 8 will be devoted to referrals at the judicial review stage at the 
time of conducting the study. The overall aim is to answer the first five research 
questions and the relevant questions will be marked at the beginning of each chapter. 
Chapter 9 will provide a further analysis of the findings to answer the final question set 
in the Introduction.653 
Chapter 6 Results: focus on E.L.F. clients 
This Chapter will present results of the quantitative analysis of variables concerning 
regional representation, the socio-economic background of the clients and their status as 
categorised by E.L.F. The following variables will be explored: regional representation; 
gender; age; employment status; income; registered disability; nationality; first 
language; ethnic origin; and client status.  
 
The Chapter aims at answering the first research question, namely: 
 
What are the key characteristics of the ELF clients whose cases have been 
referred to an adviser? Do these characteristics suggest polycentricity? 
 
Overall, the study focused on 774 enquiries referred to the advisers between February 
653 See p. 20 
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2005 and December 2009. Table 6 below depicts the annual number of enquiries 
referred during the study period. It shows the gradual decrease in the numbers every 
year from 188 in 2005 to 120 in 2009. There is no particular explanation for the drop.  
Table 6 A number of referred enquiries: annual representation   
Referred enquiries 
between 2005-2009 
Year Count 
2005 188 
  
2006 160 
  
2007 170 
  
2008 136 
  
2009 120 
  
 
Regional representation 
 
N Valid 774 
Missing 0 
 
Though based in London, E.L.F. receives enquiries from all regions of the UK including 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Figure 1 presents the regional representation of E.L.F. 
referred enquiries between February 2005 and December 2009. The majority of cases 
(196, 25 percent) originated from the South East and from Greater London (127, 16 
percent). The fewest cases came from Northern Ireland (8, 1 percent) and Scotland (21, 
3 percent), where E.L.F. is currently building its network of advisers.  
214 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Regional representation of E.L.F. referred cases 2005 – 2009 
 
 
The first important finding is that the regional representation of E.L.F. enquiries does 
not fully reflect the demographic distribution of the UK population. This can be 
explained by the fact that E.L.F. has an expanded network of advisers working for 
Greater London and among South Eastern law firms. The second noticeable result is 
that, bearing in mind the agreed conventional margin of statistical error set at 5 
percent654, the regional representation is confined to the regions of England and Wales. 
The author knew this result at the time of writing the Report655 and limited the review of 
the legal system in Chapter 1 to that of England and Wales. 
 
 
 
 
654 See p. 204 
655 The BRASS Report, supra note 32 
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Table 7 Regional representation of E.L.F. referrals: annual analysis 
 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to region  
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
Region Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
East Anglia 10 5% 13 8% 15 9% 5 4% 8 7% 
Greater London 30 16% 31 19% 31 18% 20 15% 15 13% 
Midlands 18 10% 13 8% 19 11% 17 12% 25 21% 
North East 17 9% 9 6% 15 9% 12 9% 10 8% 
North West 13 7% 12 8% 12 7% 15 11% 11 9% 
Scotland 6 3% 5 3% 5 3% 3 2% 2 2% 
Northern 
Ireland 
0 0% 1 1% 4 2% 2 2% 1 1% 
South East 52 28% 40 25% 46 27% 30 22% 28 23% 
South West 23 12% 19 12% 19 11% 20 15% 13 11% 
Wales 19 10% 17 11% 4 2% 12 9% 7 6% 
Totals 188   160   170   136   120   
 
Table 7 above shows the annual representation of the enquiries. The proportion of cases 
from the South East was particularly high (over 25 percent) over the first three years 
and dropped slightly to 22-23 percent in 2008 and 2009. A similar trend relates to the 
proportion of enquiries from Greater London, the number of which dropped slightly in 
2008-2009. The smaller proportion of cases from the above overrepresented regions did 
not lead to an increase in a proportion in any one specific region over the last two years; 
it rather spread across a number of regions.  However, there is a significant increase in 
the proportion of Midlands’ enquiries in 2009 up to 21 percent from the average of 10% 
between 2005-2008. This might mark a significant change in the representation of 
E.L.F. cases. Yet, this could also be an anomaly, comparable to that of the Welsh 
enquiries, which dropped suddenly in 2007 and re-established at the usual rate in 2008. 
Finally, the proportion of cases from the Northern regions of England remained steady 
over the five year period of time.  
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Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
The gender of the inquirers was established on the basis of the Equal Opportunities 
Forms, the Digital Redbook and the Case Referral Forms. Figure 2 below breaks down 
the study results by gender: 58 percent of men and 42 percent of women. The 2003 
E.L.F. report found a more equal representation of the 54 percent to 46 percent ratio.656 
Figure 2 Gender analysis 2005-2009 
 
656 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 21 
N Valid 767 
Missing 7 
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Table 8 Gender representation of E.L.F. referred cases: annual analysis 
Annual gender representation 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Gender Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Male 113 60% 93 58% 93 55% 77 57% 66 56% 
Female 75 40% 67 42% 75 45% 56 41% 52 44% 
Totals 188   160   168   133   118   
 
 
The annual analysis indicates that the ratio was particularly unequal over the first two 
years of the analysis and established itself at the average between 2008 and 2009. 
Interestingly, none of the analysed years saw an equal representation (50:50) of cases 
unlike 2002 indicated in the 2003 E.L.F. Report657. 
 
Chapter 1 highlighted a theory according to which women could play a particular role in 
achieving environmental justice.658The results above suggest that women have been less 
engaged in taking active part in reporting the problems to E.L.F.  
Age 
The age of the contacting persons was established solely upon the Equal Opportunities 
Forms. The number of missing cases amounted to 27 percent and was significant. 
Count Valid 568 
Missing 206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
657 Ibid 
658 Rachel Stein ‘Introduction’ supra note 123, Luke W. Cole, Sheila R. Foster. From the Ground Up... 
supra note 124, Dorcetta Taylor ‘Women of Color...' supra note 125 
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Table 9Age of E.L.F. clients with a comparison 
Age of E.L.F. clients with a comparison 
  1999-2003 2005-2009 
Age group Count % Count % 
under 21 0 0% 6 1% 
21-30 21 4% 24 4% 
31-40 95 17% 53 9% 
41-50 142 25% 123 22% 
51-60 182 32% 177 31% 
61-70 97 17% 139 25% 
over 70 24 4% 46 4% 
Totals 561  568  
 
Table 9 above indicates that most of the enquirers were in the 41-70 bracket range (78 
percent): 22 percent in the 41-50 bracket, 31 percent in the 51-60 bracket and 25 percent 
in the 61-70 bracket. The next significant age group of 31-40 attracted 9 percent of 
E.L.F. clients, leaving the under 31s and over 70s significantly underrepresented. This 
representation differs slightly from the earlier report. Between 1999 and 2002 the under 
31s and over 70s were also significantly underrepresented (each at 4 percent). However, 
the 31-40 bracket attracted 17 percent and formed part of the mainstream age bracket of 
31-69 consisting of 91 percent of all clients. Thus, the most enquirers in the current 
study are elder than those clients between 1999 - 2002. 
 
This can be partially confirmed by examining the annual age representation in Table 10 
below. The 61-70 age bracket consisted of more persons in the last two years of the 
study than in the first two years. Another important finding is that the under 21s 
contacted E.L.F. only in 2005 and 2006 therefore statistically they are insignificant. 
Moreover the count in the age group of 21-30 decreased over the study years. 
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Table 10 Age of the enquirers: annual representation 
Annual age representation 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Age group Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
under 21 3 2% 3 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
21-30 7 5% 8 7% 4 3% 2 2% 3 4% 
31-40 18 13% 9 8% 7 5% 13 13% 6 8% 
41-50 35 25% 25 21% 28 21% 22 22% 13 18% 
51-60 42 30% 39 33% 43 33% 33 32% 20 27% 
61-70 22 16% 28 23% 40 30% 23 23% 26 36% 
over 70 14 10% 8 7% 10 8% 9 9% 5 7% 
Totals 141  120  132  102  73  
 
Chapter 1 showed that age has become an important variable for environmental justice 
scholars.659 These are especially children or the elderly who suffer from the exposure to 
environmental hazards. The results above do not reveal the number of children that 
could be involved in the reported issues as the Equal Opportunities Forms did not carry 
such information. Still, nearly 80% of cases were reported by the clients in the 41-70 
brackets and one can assume that many of them could have children or even 
grandchildren. The question whether the clients’ motivations were associated with the 
health and wellbeing of their children (if any) is important but could not have been 
answered by this study.  
659 Gordon Mitchell, Danny Dorling 'An Environmental Justice Analysis of British Air...’ supra note 86 
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Employment status 
Income are the core variables that had been distinguished in early environmental justice 
research both in US and the UK660. Income is associated with the employment status. 
The employment status variable was not considered in E.L.F. 2003 Report661 since it 
was not directly included in the Equal Opportunities Forms662. The enquirers were only 
asked to provide their ‘profession’ and the author developed, in an inductive way, 
categories input later into the SPSS database. It was possible to establish whether the 
clients were employed, unemployed, retired, students, or unable to work due to 
incapacity. Housewives’ were included with that of voluntary work and, indeed, many 
clients indicated that they did both. The number of missing values was comparable to 
other socio-economic variables. 
Work status: statistics 
Count Valid 554 
Missing 220 
 
Table 11 E.L.F. clients works status 
Work status 2005-2009 
Work status Count % 
Employed 253 46% 
Unemployed 45 8% 
Self-employed 31 6% 
Retired 178 32% 
Student 8 1% 
Voluntary/housewife work 37 7% 
Unable to work/Incapacity benefit 2 0% 
Totals 554  
 
660 See Chapter 1 
661 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, 
662 See p. 188 
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According to Table 11 above, nearly half of the clients were employed at the time of 
submitting an enquiry to E.L.F., whereas a third of the clients were retired and both 
groups formed the significant proportion (78 percent). There was a small proportion of 
self-employed (6 percent), unemployed (8 percent) and housewives or people doing 
voluntary work (7 percent). Students and those unable to work accounted for 
insignificant proportion in the sample. 
 
By reading the annual composition of the work status in Table 12 below a significant 
trend must be noted. There was a steady and slight decrease of employed people over 
the years and a steady and slight increase of the retired. For the work status of both 
groups, 2008 was the year of anomaly (increase in employed and decrease in 
unemployed). The recent two years of the study marked a decrease in the number of the 
unemployed and the voluntary professions. The remaining status groups maintained 
their average level throughout the study period. 
Table 12 Work status of E.L.F.’s enquirers: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to the clients' work status 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Employment status Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Employed 66 48% 54 47% 53 41% 52 51% 28 39% 
Unemployed 13 10% 11 10% 10 8% 6 6% 5 7% 
Self-employed 10 7% 4 3% 6 5% 7 7% 4 6% 
Retired 32 23% 36 31% 50 39% 30 29% 30 42% 
Student 5 4% 2 2% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Voluntary / 
housewife work 
10 7% 9 8% 9 7% 5 5% 4 6% 
Unable to work / 
Incapacity benefit 
1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Totals 137  116  128  102  71  
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Income 
This variable was captured exclusively on the basis of the Equal Opportunities Forms 
(EOFs)663 and below information indicates that the number of the missing values was 
slightly bigger than the corresponding numbers in other variables captured solely on the 
basis of the EOFs. This could be explained by the fact that people are, in general, 
hesitant to disclose their income. The major governmental surveys face similar 
problems. 
 
Count Valid 519 
Missing 255 
 
Table 13 Income of E.L.F. clients 
 
Income of E.L.F. clients with a comparison  
 
 1999-2002 2005-2009  
Income Band  
(£ per annum) 
Count % Count % 
under 10,000 209 45% 230 44% 
10,000-14,999 95 20% 74 14% 
15,000-19,999 58 12% 54 10% 
20,000-29,999 54 12% 69 13% 
30,000-39,999 23 5% 40 8% 
40,000-49,999 15 3% 23 4% 
50,000 or over 11 2% 29 6% 
Totals 465  519  
 
663 See p. 188 
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Table 13 above compares the income of the enquirers between the current study and the 
E.L.F. 2003 Report664. A large proportion of the clients (230, 44 percent) stated that 
their gross annual income did not exceed £10,000. Nearly 60 percent of the clients 
earned less than £15,000 and nearly 70 percent earned less than £20,000 per year. A 
small fraction of the clients (13 percent) earned between 20,000 and 29,999 and higher 
income brackets attracted smaller number of the enquirers. Only 29 clients (6 percent) 
benefited from the large wages over £50,000. 
 
A comparison with E.L.F. 2003 Report665 suggests that the respondent’s financial 
situation has moderately improved. Similarly, 45 percent of the clients earned less that 
£10,000, however 65 percent earned less than £15,000 and nearly 80 percent earned less 
than £20,000. There was a similar proportion of the clients receiving the average salary 
between £20,000 and £29,000 and a significantly lower proportion of people earning 
higher salaries. Only 2 percent benefited from the highest income. 
 
The above comparison and the statement that the financial situation of the clients 
improved over the years should not be overestimated.  One has to include the changes in 
inflation and the typical increase of the salaries and the national minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, the significant finding is that the majority of the enquirers remain in the 
poor income group. 
 
 
 
 
664 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29 
665 Ibid 
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Table 14 E.L.F. clients’ income: annual representation 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to income 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Income Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
under 
10,000 
69 51% 51 52% 51 42% 31 34% 28 40% 
10,000-
14,999 
16 12% 14 14% 20 16% 17 19% 7 10% 
15,000-
19,999 
11 8% 8 8% 14 12% 13 14% 8 11% 
20,000-
29,999 
17 13% 12 12% 21 17% 10 11% 9 13% 
30,000-
39,999 
10 7% 8 8% 7 6% 8 9% 7 10% 
40,000-
49,999 
5 4% 1 1% 3 3% 8 9% 6 9% 
50,000 or 
over 
8 6% 5 5% 6 5% 5 5% 5 7% 
Totals 136  99  122  92  70  
 
Table 14 above which breaks down income by year indicates the following trends. 
Firstly, the proportion of the people on the lowest income dropped over the five years 
from around 50 percent to around 40 percent (with an exception in 2008). This may 
suggest that the future proportion of the poorest seeking E.L.F.’s advice will be smaller. 
On the other hand, the proportion of the clients earning between £30,000 and £49,999 
per annum rose steadily over the study period.  
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Registered disability 
This variable was also compiled solely on the basis of the Equal Opportunities Forms666 
and the missing numbers were relatively low. The clients were asked whether they were 
‘registered’ as disabled. Such registration is regulated by the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 at the time of conducting this research.   
 
Count Valid 569 
Missing 205 
 
Figure 3 Disability analysis 
 
  
There are approximately 7 million disabled people of working age in the UK which 
constitutes a significant proportion of around 19 percent in the whole working 
population667. The pie chart above (Figure 3) illustrates the proportion of registered 
disabled people, reaching 10 percent, in the study sample. This proportion does not 
666 See p. 188 
667 Family Resources Survey 2009/10 
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differ significantly from the 11 percent proportion reported in E.L.F. 2003 Report.668 
Table 15 Registered disabled: annual analysis 
Annual representation of the registered disabled 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Disability Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 16 11% 16 13% 12 9% 4 4% 8 11% 
No 126 89% 103 87% 120 91% 97 96% 67 89% 
Totals 142  119  132  101  75  
 
Table 15 above indicates that the proportion of the registered disabled fluctuated 
through the study period between 9 and 13 percent. The number of the disabled clients 
was particularly low in 2008 (4, 4 percent).  
Nationality 
The following 3 variables, namely nationality, first language and ethnicity, were core 
variables in early environmental justice research in the US. The studies showed that the 
non-Whites have suffered disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards.669 
 
This variable was acquired wholly on the basis of the Equal Opportunities Forms 
(EOFs)670. The clients were asked to state their nationality and this allowed the 
British/non-British differentials to be input into the SPSS database. The reason for this 
was that the number of other nationalities was very low and dispersed. Missing values 
in this variable were particularly low. It must be highlighted that the EOF’s question 
referred to the ‘nationality’ and not the ‘citizenship’. The clients were subsequently 
asked to state their ethnic origin thus nationality was understood to be closely associated 
668 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 22 
669 Robert D Bullard Dumping in Dixie... supra note 73, Dorceta E Taylor, ‘The Rise of the 
Environmental Justice Paradigm...’ supra note 36 
670 See p. 188 
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with citizenship. Clients holding dual nationality were linked to one of the groups 
depending on whether one of their nationalities was British. 
Count Valid 577 
Missing 197 
 
 
Figure 4 Nationality of E.L.F.’s clients 
 
Figure 4 above shows that the proportion of non-British was extremely low, much 
below the statistical error and the proportion of non-British in the whole UK population.  
Table 16 Clients’ nationality: annual analysis 
Annual representation of the nationality 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Nationality Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
British  141 98% 116 96% 127 96% 100 97% 73 96% 
Other 3 2% 5 4% 6 4% 3 3% 3 4% 
Totals 144  121  133  103  76  
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Table 16 above shows that the annual representation of the clients’ nationality indicates 
no particular trends. These were the British citizens who had their cases referred to in 
the overwhelming majority over the study period. 
First language 
Having considered the citizenship of the clients this researcher may assume that the 
similar overwhelming majority would speak English. This was also compiled on the 
basis of the Equal Opportunities Forms671 that asked the clients about their first 
language. Missing values were exactly the same as with the ‘nationality’ variable. 
Count Valid 577 
Missing 197 
 
Figure 5 below indicates that the proportion of the clients using English as their first 
language is the same as the proportion of British nationals.  
671 See p. 188 
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Figure 5 Clients’ first language 
 
Table X above shows no particular trends except one anomaly in 2008 when the 
proportion of native English users dropped to 93 percent. 
Table 17 Representation of first language: annual analysis 
Annual representation of the first language 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
First 
language 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
English 140 98% 121 98% 128 96% 95 93% 73 96% 
Other 3 2% 2 2% 5 4% 7 7% 3 4% 
Totals 143  123  133  102  76  
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Ethnic origin 
 
Count Valid 562 
Missing 212 
 
This variable was acquired entirely on the basis of the Equal Opportunities Forms 
(EOFs)672. It could not be compared with E.L.F. 2003 Report even though that report 
considered ethnic origin of the clients contacting E.L.F. between 1999-2002. The results 
were not fully comparable to be included in one table. The 2003 Report used vague 
descriptions such as “English/French”, “English/Irish”, “English/Welsh”673 with no 
specific ethnic origins such as “English” or “Welsh”. The author’s descriptions were 
taken from the EOFs used throughout the study period with an exception of “British”. 
The clients used this name to describe their ethnic origin and, in line with the mixed 
pragmatic methods, this label was added to the SPSS dataset. 
 
The author admits that the EOFs available descriptions for ethnic origin were imperfect 
and posed certain problems for the analysis. Take for example “European” which may 
include all English, Welsh, British, French and Polish etc.  
 
The ethnic origin analysis is useful in capturing the definite number of Asians, Blacks 
and Indian people in view of separating their origins from the Whites. This is not ideal 
as people who described themselves as British or European could be non-Whites. The 
analysis of Table 18 below indicates a minimal presence of non-Whites in the group of 
the clients whose cases were referred to advisers during the study period (15, 2 percent). 
The English constituted the highest proportion of the clients (369, 66 percent) followed 
by the Europeans (66, 9 percent).  
672 See p. 188 
673 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 22 
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Table 18 Ethnic origin 
Ethnic origin of E.L.F.’s clients 
Ethnic origin Count % 
Asian British 8 1% 
Black African 1 0% 
Black British 1 0% 
Black 
Caribbean 
2 0% 
English 369 66% 
Indian 3 1% 
Irish 20 4% 
Scottish 20 4% 
Turkish 1 0% 
Welsh 27 4% 
European 66 9% 
British 10 1% 
Other 34 4% 
Total 562 1% 
 
 
Table 19 below shows no particular trends except one for the Europeans. Their 
proportion stood above 10 percent during the first three study years and slumped to 4 
percent between 2008 and 2009. It appears that people described themselves as British 
only in 2007 which might be explained by the way EOFs were processed during this 
year. 
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Table 19 Representation of the clients’ ethnic origin: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to the clients' ethnic origin 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ethnic origin Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Asian British 5 4% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 
Black African 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
Black British 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Black 
 
0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
English 97 70% 61 52% 80 62% 79 78% 52 68% 
Indian 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 
Irish 2 1% 7 6% 5 4% 1 1% 5 7% 
Scottish 5 4% 3 3% 9 7% 1 1% 2 3% 
Turkish 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Welsh 8 6% 5 4% 3 2% 6 6% 5 7% 
European 16 12% 24 20% 18 14% 5 5% 3 4% 
British 0 0% 0 0% 10 8% 0 0% 0 0% 
Other 4 3% 16 14% 2 2% 6 6% 6 8% 
Total 138  118  129  101  76  
 
 
Client status 
 
Count Valid 740 
Missing 34 
 
Chapter 1 showed that environmental justice claims (both legal and political) and 
research have been lodged and conducted predominantly by community groups and 
NGOs.674 
 
The clients who contact E.L.F. represented themselves and their families or acted on 
behalf of community groups. E.L.F. can also be contacted by lawyers representing firms 
in situations where their clients cannot afford to pay further fees. E.L.F. can also be 
contacted by other legal persons such as charities and associations. 
674 See Chapter 1, p. 45; see also R v H.M. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace (No 2)supra 
note 206 
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Table 20 below shows that nearly all contacts were made by individuals (380, 52 
percent) and the community groups (350, 48 percent). Enquiries were also made by an 
insignificant proportion of practitioners and legal persons. 
Table 20 Client status 
Client status 2005-2009 
Client status Count % 
Community group 350 48% 
Individual 383 52% 
Practitioner 3 0% 
Legal person 4 1% 
Totals 740  
 
Table 21 below illustrates trends: the proportion of community groups’ enquiries rose 
and the proportion of the individuals’ calls decreased with a few fluctuations. Over the 
last two years of the study period the proportion of the individuals was slightly lower 
than the proportion of the community groups contrary to the overall average. This result 
is nevertheless insignificant due to the nearly equal overall division. 
Table 21 Client status: annual analysis 
Annual representation of the clients' status 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Client status Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Community 
group 
63 37% 91 58% 68 42% 66 52% 62 52% 
Individual 105 62% 66 42% 95 58% 61 48% 56 47% 
Practitioner 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Other 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 
Totals 170  158  165  128  119  
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Summary and analysis 
E.L.F. provides a referral opportunity to anybody in the UK as long as their concern is 
environmental and carries a public interest element. However, E.L.F. is based in 
London and its network is well developed in this part of the country including South 
East. It is no surprise that the regional representation does not reflect the demographic 
distribution of the UK population. The analysis shows that the over-representation in the 
aforementioned regions is decreasing and this may be the beginning of a better 
representation for E.L.F. in other UK regions. Nevertheless, in the author’s opinion the 
better reflection of the ‘census distribution’ should not be the most important ambition 
for E.L.F. It is rather the ability to support those who face environmental problems, 
which are not dispersed geographically in the same way as the population. In addition, 
the analysis in Chapter 8 will show that many judicial review cases stopped by cost 
barriers came from the most deprived UK districts and, in light of environmental justice, 
such representation is crucial. 
 
As for the less contentious variables in terms of the traditional environmental justice 
socio-economic factors, most clients were male (58 percent) and middle-aged or old. 
The almost insignificant proportion of young people, in their 20s or 30s, is somewhat 
unsurprising given the fact that this fraction of the population is less concerned with 
biodiversity and the environment when compared with the population in their 40s and 
older675. However, it is surprising given the proportion of people in their 30s in E.L.F. 
2003 Report. Furthermore, 10 percent of the clients were disabled people and this is 
well below the UK average. 
 
675 DEFRA, ‘Attitudes and Knowledge Relating to Biodiversity and the Natural Environment, 2007 – 
2011. From the Survey of Public Attitudes and Behaviour Towards The Environment’ (National Statistic 
Report for DEFRA, 13 April 2011, London) 
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Let us now turn to the more controversial variables which are potent in environmental 
justice discourse: the nationality and ethnic origin and employment/income status. 
 
Firstly, the clients were British with an insignificant proportion (3 percent) of the clients 
possessing solely non-British passports. The same result relates to the use of the first 
language: the statistically irrelevant minority uses other than English as their first (often 
native) language.  Moreover, the majority of the clients are of English/Welsh and 
European ethnic origin. Only 2 percent of the clients declared to be non-Whites. This 
finding is worthy of attention as it suggests that the concerns about race are limited or 
even non-existent in the UK unlike in the US.676 
 
Secondly, the majority of the clients were employed or self-employed (52 percent) 
during the referrals. A third of the group was retired which can be linked to and 
explained by their age. A very small number of enquirers were either unemployed or 
incapable to work: the least active did not seek the charity’s advice. Conversely, the 
overwhelming majority were professionally active or had been active (retired). What 
links them is the drive and courage to act when facing environmental problems. 
Furthermore, the income of the overwhelming majority is either tiny or low with a 
minority benefiting from high wages.  
 
In light of the above a question arises whether low income is accounted for by the 
majority of the retired or is it somewhat equally shared by clients in various 
employment statuses. Table 24 below677 indicates that nearly third (61, 27 percent) of 
all employed are on the lowest income compared with 44 percent (68 persons) of the 
retired. Moreover, half of all self-employed are on the lowest income. Compare this 
676 See p. 38 
677 See p. 240 
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result with the professionally inactive:  the overwhelming majority of students (7, 88 
percent), volunteers and housewives (29, 85 percent) and incapable (2, 100 percent) are 
in the same bracket of the lowest income. The finding is significant since it suggests 
that even the professionally active constitute a large proportion of the people on a very 
low income. Table 24 below also indicates that the employed with the lowest income 
constituted a significant proportion in the whole sample (12 percent) compared with the 
retired (14 percent). Crucially, if we compute the employed with the self- employed on 
the lowest income we will obtain the highest proportion in the whole dataset (15 
percent). The professionally active earning less than £10,000 per annum constitute the 
highest proportion of all categories within employment status/income group. 
 
Finally, the clients are divided, almost equally, between those representing themselves 
or their families and those acting on behalf of the community group. This finding must 
not be underestimated as community groups are better placed to choose the person on 
the lowest income who could ask for advice and request further (financial) support. This 
was tested in Tables 22 and 23 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22 Income in the ‘individuals’ category 
Income of individuals 
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Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid under 10,000 135 35% 49% 
 10,000-14,999 39 10% 14% 
 
15,000-19,999 26 7% 10% 
 20,000-29,999 32 8% 12% 
 
30,000-39,999 21 6% 8% 
 
40,000-49,999 10 3% 4% 
 50,000 or over 11 3% 4% 
 
Total 274 72% 100% 
Missin
 
Lack of data 106 27%  
 
does not apply 2 1% 
 
 
System 1 0% 
 
 Total 107 28%  
Total   383 100% 
 
 
 
Table 23 Income in the ‘community group’ category 
Income of people representing community groups 
    
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid under 10,000 88 25% 39% 
 10,000-14,999 32 9% 14% 
 15,000-19,999 24 7% 11% 
 20,000-29,999 33 9% 15% 
 30,000-39,999 18 5% 8% 
 40,000-49,999 12 3% 5% 
 50,000 or over 18 5% 8% 
 Total 225 64% 100% Missi
 
Lack of data 125 36%  Total   350 100.0  
 
The finding is highly significant. There is much bigger proportion of the people on the 
lowest income within the ‘individuals’ category (35 percent) than in the ‘community 
group’ category. When assessing the valid cases, thus excluding those individuals 
whose income bracket could not be determined, nearly half of individuals earned in the 
lowest income compared with 39 percent of the representatives of the community 
groups. This analysis suggests that the community groups did not choose a particular 
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person to make the enquiry. 
E.L.F. clients – polycentricity  
The above analysis tracked the major characteristics of the E.L.F. clients in the overall 
sample. It suggests weak polycentricity as it is possible to identify the mainstream 
interest of the clients in the sample. Most of the persons who reported an environmental 
issue seem to reflect the needs of the economically disadvantaged British people. In this 
sense the above results reflect the traditional understanding of environmental justice. 
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Table 24 Income in the employment status group 
 Income of the clients according to employment status 
  
Work status 
 
Income band   Employe
d Unemployed 
Self-
employed Retired Student 
Voluntary 
work/housewif
e incapacity 
 Totals 
under 10.000 Count 61 35 15 68 7 29 2 217 
 
% within whether 
working 
27% 85% 50% 44% 88% 85% 100% 44% 
  % of Total 12% 7% 3% 14% 1% 6% 0% 44% 
10.000-14.999 Count 28 3 6 30 1 2 0 70 
 
% within whether 
working 
12% 7% 20% 19% 13% 6% 0% 14% 
  % of Total 6% 1% 1% 6% 0% 0% 0% 14% 
15.000-19.999 Count 33 1 2 17 0 0 0 53 
 
% within whether 
working 
15% 2% 7% 11% 0% 0% 0% 11% 
  % of Total 7% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 11% 
20.000-29.999 Count 43 0 3 19 0 2 0 67 
 
% within whether 
working 
19% 0% 10% 12% 0% 6% 0% 14% 
  % of Total 9% 0% 1% 4% 0% 0% 0% 14% 
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30.000-39.999 Count 29 1 1 9 0 0 0 40 
 
% within whether 
working 
13% 2% 3% 6% 0% 0% 0% 8% 
  % of Total 6% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 8% 
40.000-49.999 Count 12 1 2 6 0 0 0 21 
 
% within whether 
working 
5% 2% 7% 4% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
  % of Total 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
50.000 or over Count 20 0 1 6 0 1 0 28 
 
% within whether 
working 
9% 0% 3% 4% 0% 3% 0% 6% 
  % of Total 4% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 6% 
Totals Count 226 41 30 155 8 34 2 496 
 
% within whether 
working 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
% of Total 46% 8% 6% 31% 2% 7% 0% 100% 
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Chapter 7 Results: Focus on referrals 
 
This Chapter will present results of a quantitative analysis of the variables relating to 
the referred enquiries. The following variables will be analysed: an estimate of the 
number of affected people; the funding of cases; the type of environmental problem; the 
area of law; human rights issues; Aarhus pillars engaged; bias; the stage of cases and 
remedies sought. Unlike in the previous chapter the problem of missing values does not 
occur save for the variable relating to the funding of enquiries. Moreover, a greater 
number of variables were available on the basis of the content analysis. The chapter 
following this one narrows the focus to a chosen fraction of the database, namely the 
judicial review cases. Thus, for clarity and orderly transition in presentation the 
variables concerning the stage of cases and remedies sought are explored at the end of 
the Chapter.  
 
The Chapter aims at answering the second research question, namely: 
 
What are the key features of the referrals? Do these features suggest polycentricity? 
 
Number of people affected 
The analysis of E.L.F.’s modus operandi in Chapter 5 (Methodology) highlighted that 
the organisation focused on public interest cases and not on the private disputes 
including those with neighbours.678  It is for the case workers and other members of 
staff to assess the enquiry prior to referral in order to satisfy this requirement. Such an 
678 See p. 179 
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analysis can be performed by following the rules of legal analysis of material facts 
underpinned by advice of the supervisors in more complicated situations. To highlight 
and recap, this requirement should be satisfied for E.L.F. to continue to receive public 
funding and meet its objectives. 
 
The issue whether the referrals carry an element of public interest is significant since 
environmental justice movement exposed a pattern whereby a certain cohort of the 
population faced disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards679.  
Environmental justice claims are therefore a matter of public interest given the ambition 
of the democratic society to create opportunities for all citizens. 
 
E.L.F. adopted a supplementary method of assessing whether the enquiries carry a 
public interest element by way of a survey. Enquirers were asked to assess how many 
people could be affected by the reported environmental problem. The clients were asked 
to state a number which was subsequently noted in the Digital Red Book680 and in the 
paper file. The author acquired clients’ self-assessments and input the numbers into 
SPSS. 
 
The E.L.F. 2003 Report analysed the same variables albeit by employing a different 
method. Stookes noted a difficulty in analysing this variable, which was shared by the 
author: 
 
“In some instances, the inquirer was not able to specify the numbers of people 
affected in numerical form and, instead, provided a description such as '10 
679 See Chapter 1(the groups include Blacks, poor, children, women, disabled etc) 
680 See p. 185 
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neighbours' or 'a small village'”.681 
 
In these circumstances Stookes performed the following estimation which resulted in 
the below numbers: 
 
“a best estimate was made to provide the total number of people likely to be 
directly affected by the problem. The numbers recorded tend to be conservative, 
with under-estimating of numbers wherever there was uncertainty. For the 
purpose of the study, referrals that were county-wide, regional or that related to 
general environmental government policy, were recorded as nought to avoid 
distorting the final analysis. Similarly, concerns that were identified as primarily 
causing harm to wildlife were not registered as directly affecting people. 
According to information from inquirers when requesting assistance, the total 
number of people affected by the specified environmental problems was 98,981 
during 2001 and 224,141 in 2002. Overall, these figures provided an average of 
869 people affected by each environmental problem.”682 
 
The author decided to record all numbers without interfering with the clients’ self-
assessments. Indeed certain clients stated large numbers reflecting their belief that a 
given environmental problem could affect a whole region or even the whole country. 
Table 25 below indicates that the minimum number was nought and, according to the 
diary from the content analysis, this was a case involving animal welfare where the 
client could be persuaded that humans were not affected. At the extreme, a client 
estimated a maximum number of people affected at 60 million: close to the UK 
population. There were a few other large numbers in the database. The overall sum 
681 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 19-20 
682 Ibid 20 
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exceeded 20 million and the average mean was calculated at just above 36,000 people. 
The average differs significantly from that stated in E.L.F. 2003 Report and may be 
improbably skewed. This is also reflected in a high standard deviation. 
Table 25 Statistical analysis of persons affected: enquirers' viewpoint 
Estimated number of persons affected 
Valid 570 
Missing 204 
Mean 35768 
Median 200 
Mode 1000 
Std. Deviation 350301 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 6000000 
Sum 20388004 
 
There are various methods of calculating average; median and mode are more 
appropriate in the current analysis. These include all numbers into the equation. 
Therefore the median equals 200, which is very close to the Stookes’ result683 albeit 
calculated differently. Crucially, the value which occurred more frequently, the mode, 
was estimated at 1000. The latter is cited as the average in the later passages of the 
thesis. 
 
The result is significant since the author will match judicial review referrals with the 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation in the next Chapter684. The analysis will be performed 
by matching the postcodes that the clients declared with the Lower Layer Super Output 
Areas, which include minimum population of 1000 and the mean amounts to 1500685. 
683 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 19-20 
684 See p. 299 
685 Lower Layer Super Output Area 
<http://www.datadictionary.nhs.uk/data_dictionary/nhs_business_definitions/l/lower_layer_super_output
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Thus the above analysis suggests that, according to the clients, the alleged 
environmental problems affect the majority or the whole area in which they reside.  
Funding of cases 
 
N Valid 544 
Missing 230 
 
This variable was collected from the Digital Red Book and the Monitoring 
Questionnaires686 found in the paper files. Following the referral, and after receiving 
advice, clients were asked how they funded their case. The E.L.F. questionnaire was 
inaccurate as it did not specifically ask the clients to distinguish between the funding of 
E.L.F. enquiries and any other activities performed prior to or during the enquiry such 
as campaigns, additional legal advice etc. We should also note that all cases at the outset 
are done for free and certain cases are considered entirely on this basis. 
Table 26 Funding of cases according to the clients 
Funding of cases 
Type of funding Count % 
CFI 2 0% 
Group "fighting 
 
82 15% 
Legal Aid 11 2% 
None 80 15% 
Private 147 27% 
Pro bono  166 31% 
Insurance 2 0% 
Not needed 42 8% 
Other 2 0% 
Mixture of 
 
10 2% 
Totals 544  
 
The majority of cases were considered without asking for payment (166, 31 percent) 
_area_de.asp?shownav=0> accessed on 1 May 2012 
686 See p. 185 
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(Table 26) and we may assume that the pro bono work has been done solely by E.L.F or 
E.L.F. members. The questionnaire allowed the clients to indicate that they used no 
funding (‘none’) for their cases (80, 15 percent) or that funding was ‘not needed’ (42, 8 
percent). As was indicated above, all cases benefited from pro bono advice, thus, the 
author understands values such as ‘none’ or ‘not needed’ to mean pro bono advice only 
is required. On balance, at least 287 clients (54 percent) benefited from free advice. This 
indicates the importance of pro bono legal work: without it more than half of the clients 
would not be able to obtain any legal advice whatsoever. On the other hand, the reliance 
on the pro bono work could entirely stem from a negative opinion of the adviser 
suggesting that any other investment would be economically unwise. Clients were 
allowed to indicate that funding was ‘not needed’ and this category could embrace 
enquiries where the enquirers were dissuaded from any investment.  Further analysis 
excludes therefore values of ‘none’ and not needed’. 
 
 The second highest source of funding (142, 26 percent) came from a private pocket. 
The third source of funding was collections by a group, such as a ‘group fighting fund’, 
(82, 15 percent) and is surprisingly low when compared with the proportion of 
groups/communities which made the enquiry to E.L.F. (see below).687 This may 
indicate that people are likely to run or take part in organised campaign but not inclined 
to contribute money to the common purpose. This assumption may not be true though 
earlier work, including work by the author, indicates that only a few people in a group 
or community are ready to donate money.688 The least frequent sources of funding were 
a ‘mixture’ of funding (11, 2 percent), legal aid (10, 2 percent) and conditional fee 
arrangements (hereafter CFI). The proportion of legal aid is a meaningful finding as this 
source is a form of state support for those on very low income or people relying on 
687 See p. 266 
688 Radoslaw Stech ‘Environmental Information...” supra note 445 
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benefits. The analysis of income in the previous chapter indicated that a large proportion 
of 44 percent of clients689 benefited from very low income below £10,000 and we might 
assume that they would satisfy the legal aid criteria. The analysis of the criteria that one 
has to meet to qualify for legal aid is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to 
note a few procedural problems which clients face when trying to obtain legal aid. First, 
the case should carry good prospects of success and it is difficult to meet this test in 
environmental cases. Secondly, alongside low funding the administrator will have to 
take other factors such as the owned property which value may exceed the statutory 
threshold. This may explain the low reliance on legal aid in relation to E.L.F. enquires. 
Finally, only two clients benefited from their insurance (mostly covering the value of 
property) but this source of funding is unpopular in general and subject to even higher 
procedural thresholds.690 
Table 27 Funding of enquires: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to source of funding 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Region Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
CFI 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 1 2% 
Group "fighting 
fund" 
20 19% 22 16% 19 14% 14 14% 7 11% 
Legal Aid 6 6% 0 0% 1 1% 2 2% 2 3% 
None 17 16% 22 16% 15 11% 23 22% 3 5% 
Private 29 27% 30 22% 45 33% 29 28% 14 23% 
Pro bono  22 20% 38 28% 51 38% 19 19% 35 57% 
Insurance 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Not needed 13 12% 14 10% 3 2% 12 12% 0 0% 
Other 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Mixture of 0 0% 6 4% 2 1% 2 2% 0 0% 
689 See p. 223 
690 Lord Justice Jackson 'Review of the Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report' (The Stationery Office 2010) 
p. 304-307 
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funding 
Totals 108  134  136  104  62  
 
The annual analysis of enquiries according to the source of funding in Table 27 above 
indicates that the reliance on pro bono funding rose gradually over the study period 
except for 2008. In 2009 this reached the proportion of 57 percent and could be 
explained by significant drops in ‘none’ and ‘not needed’ values. This can be explained 
by the change of E.L.F. strategy in understanding pro bono bracket capable of capturing 
the two other categories as explained above. Moreover, the reliance on group fighting 
funds decreased steadily over the five year period from 19 percent to 11 percent. The 
private capital, with small fluctuations, remains at a high level of 23-25 percent on 
average.  
Type of environmental problems 
 
N Valid 770 
Missing 4 
The definition of environment is wide, as reflected in the definition of ‘environmental 
information’ in the Aarhus Convention691. The Aarhus’s categorisation692 of state of 
elements of the environment, environmental factors and the state of human health 
(including built environment) are mirrored in the author’s SPSS category, which was 
compiled on the basis of the Digital Red Book693 in which E.L.F.’s case workers and the 
staff made categorisation decisions which remain unchanged in this analysis. 
Table 28 Environmental concerns in enquires 
Environmental concern with a comparison 
Environmental concern 1999-2003 2005-2009 
691 See p. 132 
692 Aarhus Convention Art. 2(3) 
693 See p. 185 
249 
 
                                                 
 
 
 Count % Count % 
Air pollution 110 13% 37 5% 
Built Environment 33 4% 66 9% 
Conservation 139 17% 105 14% 
EIA 12 1% 19 3% 
Flooding 25 3% 12 2% 
Human Health 80 10% 9 1% 
Land 157 19% 324 42% 
Light Pollution 22 3% 14 2% 
Noise pollution 144 17% 90 12% 
Other 33 4% 19 3% 
Radiation 34 4% 17 2% 
Waste 20 2% 37 5% 
Water Pollution 27 3% 21 3% 
Totals 836  770  
 
Table 28 above breaks down types of environmental concerns found in enquiries 
between E.L.F. 2003 Report694 and the current study. The right-hand side of Table 28 
indicates that clients were predominantly concerned about the state of elements of the 
environment relating specifically to land (324, 42 percent). This includes concerns over 
open spaces, landscape or visual amenities. The second highest category also relates to 
the state of elements of the environment peculiar for conservation (104, 14 percent) 
including habitat conservation and biological diversity. Other elements of the 
environment are poorly reflected in the referrals. As for the environmental factors only 
noise pollution constituted a noticeable proportion of environmental concerns during the 
study period (90, 12 percent). Other factors such as radiation or light pollution 
amounted to insignificant proportions. Finally, the third category of the Aarhus’s 
definition relating to human health and built environment constituted a relatively small 
proportion of all cases. Built environment was fairly significant, with 65 cases (9 
percent) whereas human health was a potent aspect in 9 cases only (1 percent). 
 
694 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29  
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The comparison with E.L.F. 2003 Report695 is somewhat surprising. The concerns about 
land constituted nearly half (42 percent) of those in the current study with a much 
higher proportion of other elements of the state of environment including air (110, 13 
percent) and conservation (139, 17 percent). Some factors of the environment were also 
higher with noise pollution amounting to 17 percent and radiation to 4 percent. This can 
be explained by looking into methodology as Stookes indicated that: 
 
“[m]people contacting E.L.F. stated that there were two or more environmental 
concerns. For example, proposals to develop a rail freight yard in a residential 
area raised concerns about dust, vibration and noise. Where there was clearly 
more than one environmental concern these were recorded as separate items.”696 
 
The present analysis records only primary environmental concern as indicated in the 
Digital Red Book697. Nevertheless, the comparison shows that land has been the most 
significant environmental concern in the earlier and the current study. 
 
 
Table 29 Type of environmental concerns: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to environmental concern 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Environmental 
concern 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Air pollution 11 6% 7 4% 6 4% 4 3% 9 8% 
Built 
Environment 
11 6% 9 6% 13 8% 21 15% 12 10% 
Conservation 16 9% 20 13% 24 14% 27 20% 18 15% 
695 Ibid (data presented in Table 28) 
696 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 17 
697See p. 185 
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EIA 1 1% 1 1% 10 6% 2 2% 5 4% 
Flooding 3 2% 0 0% 2 1% 3 2% 4 3% 
Human Health 2 1% 1 1% 3 2% 1 1% 2 2% 
Land 74 39% 91 57% 78 46% 45 33% 36 31% 
Light Pollution 2 1% 5 3% 4 2% 2 2% 1 1% 
Noise pollution 38 20% 9 6% 10 6% 22 16% 11 9% 
Other 5 3% 1 1% 7 4% 2 2% 4 3% 
Radiation 6 3% 3 2% 4 2% 2 2% 2 2% 
Waste 6 3% 8 5% 8 5% 2 2% 13 11% 
Water 
Pollution 
11 6% 5 3% 1 1% 3 2% 1 1% 
Total 186  160  170  136  118  
 
An annual analysis of the cases according to the type of environmental concern in Table 
29 above indicates that the proportion of land-concerned enquirers dropped significantly 
from 39 percent in 2005 to 31 percent in 2009 (34 percent in 2008). The proportion of 
conservation-related cases rose gradually with some fluctuations over the study period. 
Noise pollution fluctuated widely being 20 percent, 6 percent, 16 percent and 9 percent 
in various years. Built environment problems rose considerably and human health issues 
remained at the very low level over the years. 
Area of law 
 
N Valid 770 
Missing 4 
 
Enquiries consisting of various environmental concerns can be assessed by lawyers 
specialising in specific areas of law. In fact, most of environmental lawyers decide, at 
some point of their career, to focus on specific legal terrain since environmental law is a 
broad discipline. This is reflected in E.L.F.’s network embracing advisers with various 
specialities. ‘Area of law’ variable was also compiled on the basis the caseworkers’ and 
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staff’s choices recorded in the Digital Red Book698 with which this analysis did not 
interfere. The input related to the primary area of law and the secondary one was 
omitted.  
 
The analysis of Table 30 below shows that planning law was linked to the 
overwhelming majority of the enquirers (618, 81 percent). The second highest category 
constituted nuisance law including statutory and common law strands with 81 referrals 
(11 percent). The remaining categories constituted overwhelming minority when 
analysed individually and were grouped together to be labelled as ‘other’. 
 
E.L.F. 2003 Report699 indicated that “some concerns may have been based on two or 
more legal areas”700 and categorised accordingly. The comparison, as with the 
environmental concerns, cannot be performed precisely. Nevertheless, the proportion of 
planning law in the earlier report was also highest with 409 enquiries (56 percent). 
Nuisance constituted the second highest category with a proportion significantly higher 
than that in the current report (25 percent to 11 percent ratio). This suggests that 
nuisance law categorised as primary area of law may constitute a relatively significant 
secondary area of law. Finally, 19 percent of enquires in E.L.F. 2003 Report were 
dispersed over other legal specialisations.   
Table 30 Legal area of the referrals 
Area of law with a comparison 
Area of law 1999-2003 2005-2009 
Count % Count % 
Contaminated land 3 0% 9 1% 
Housing 15 2% 5 1% 
698 See p. 185 
699 Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29 
700 Ibid 18 
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IPCC 7 1% 2 0% 
Intellectual Property Rights 3 0% 1 0% 
Negligence 18 3% 9 1% 
Nature conservation 3 0% 6 1% 
Nuisance 183 25% 81 11% 
Planning law 409 56% 620 81% 
Transport 11 2% 13 2% 
Waste 9 1% 1 0% 
Water 15 2% 1 0% 
Other 58 8% 22 3% 
Total 734  770  
 
 
An annual analysis of the referrals according to the area of law in Table 31 below 
indicates that planning law remained at a similar level, slightly above 80 percent over 
the latest 3 years of the study, save for small fluctuations during the first two years. 
Interestingly, the proportion of enquiries linked to the nuisance law was significantly 
high (20 percent) in 2005 and remained at the average 7 percent in the following years. 
This may suggest that nuisance law was indeed at the high level prior to 2006 when 
compared with E.L.F. 2003 Report. This cannot be fully tracked however due to the 
lack of data from 2003-2004. Table 31 below does not show any other significant 
trends. 
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Table 31 Area of law: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to area of law 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Area of law Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Contaminated land 2 1% 0 0% 3 2% 3 1% 1 1% 
Housing 0 0% 3 2% 2 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
IPCC 2 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Intellectual 
Property Rights 
0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Negligence 6 3% 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 
Nature conservation 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 3 3% 
Nuisance 36 20% 13 8% 13 8% 12 9% 7 6% 
Planning law 137 74% 137 86% 140 82% 109 80% 97 82% 
Transport 0 0% 2 1% 5 3% 3 2% 3 3% 
Waste 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
Water 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Other 1 1% 3 2% 4 2% 8 6% 6 5% 
Totals 185  160  170  136  119  
 
Human Rights and wellbeing 
This variable was composed on the basis of the inductive content analysis performed 
entirely on the clients’ ‘voices’. The author noticed that the enquirers indicated 
explicitly human rights aspects at the early stage of research. This had been noted in the 
diary with corresponding referral numbers and then input into SPSS after realising that 
the numbers could be significant. Inductive analysis was appropriate to report the 
human rights concerns of the clients rather than linking people’s concerns with a wide 
catalogue of rights in a deductive manner. The reason for focusing on this variable is 
associated with the wider environmental justice’s claims concerning the wellbeing701.  
In addition, another reason for compiling this variable resulted from the fact that Aarhus 
701 See p. 61 
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Convention links the environment with human rights: 
 
“Recognizing that adequate protection of the environment is essential to human 
well-being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life 
itself”702 
 
There is a question as to whether or not the clients voluntarily expressed their concerns 
about human rights or whether they were prompted by case workers to do so. At the 
time of performing the research E.L.F. highlighted its environmental focus and clients 
were expected to prove that their concerns were solely environmental. E.L.F. started 
advertising its human rights focus in 2010 after obtaining funding from the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission suggesting that this variable reflects the true concerns about 
human rights expressed in a voluntary way.  
 
N Valid 766 
Missing 8 
 
Table 32 below indicates that 76 clients (10 percent) were concerned over life and 
health aspects of enquires. The second highest category related to matters over property 
and personal possessions (60, 8 percent) and family life (51, 7 percent). Interestingly, 
two clients were worried about discrimination and one client about the right to 
education. There were 6 cases where a mixture of rights was indicated. Overall, 27 
percent of all enquires carried a human rights aspect according to the clients.  
 
702 Aarhus Convention Preamble 
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Table 32 Human rights aspects of enquires 
Human Rights aspect 
Type of funding Count % 
Life/Health concerns 77 10% 
Family life 54 7% 
Property/possessions 59 8% 
Fair trial 1 0% 
Right to education 1 0% 
Non-discrimination 3 0% 
Mixture of rights 6 1% 
Unidentified 565 74% 
Totals 766  
 
 
An annual analysis of the cases according to the human rights aspect in Table 33 below 
indicates that concerns of life and health remained at the average of around 10 percent 
over the final three years of the study period. The first year showed a particularly large 
proportion of such concerns (17 percent) and 2006 a low proportion at 6 percent. The 
fraction in relation to the concern about property and possessions fluctuated over the 
first three years to establish itself at 7 percent during the last two years. The family life 
category did not show any particular trend whereas cases with a mixture of human 
rights aspect remained fixed at the level of 1-2 cases every year.  
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Table 33 Human Rights aspect: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases according to region 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Human rights aspect Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Life and health 
concerns 
29 15% 9 6% 13 8% 12 9% 14 12% 
Family life 16 9% 3 2% 15 9% 10 7% 10 9% 
Property and 
possessions 
18 10% 19 12% 5 3% 9 7% 8 7% 
Fair trial 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Right to education 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Non-discrimination 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 2 2% 0 0% 
Mixture of rights 1 1% 0 0% 2 1% 1 1% 2 2% 
Unidentified 121 64% 128 80% 134 79% 101 74% 81 70% 
Totals 187  159  170  135  115  
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The rule against private interests has also been said to conflict with the notion that 
where human rights claims are at issue in judicial review, these must be brought by 
‘victims’703. It is entirely possible for environmental claims to entail some associated 
infringement of the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to family 
life or the right to enjoyment of property.704 If as part of an environmental judicial 
review claim, it is asserted that the administrative action amounted to a breach of human 
rights under the Convention, does the applicant’s status of a ‘victim’ mean that the 
interest is private? One might argue entirely the opposite case, of course, that a plausible 
claim of a breach of human rights should be supported in the public interest. This 
demonstrates the fallacy of the implicit position that private and public interests are 
mutually exclusive. In a sense all NGOs pursuing an environmental manner will be 
exhibiting a private interest since their trust objectives will often commit them to 
promoting certain interests. In the Thames Gateway705 litigation Buglife’s wish to 
protect invertebrates was its passion and its raison d’etre.  
 
Concern over the Aarhus pillars 
 
N Valid 764 
Missing 10 
 
The concerns about procedural hurdles were also generated from content analysis on the 
basis of the clients’ information which was precisely distinguished from other voices as 
reported in the Methodology Chapter. Such concerns, if identified by the caseworkers 
and the staff as primary environmental concern, would be categorised as ‘other’ 
703 Within the meaning of Article 34 of the European Convention of Human Rights and by virtue of  
section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
704 See Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1 respectively. 
705 R (Buglife, the Invertebrate Conservation Trust) v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development 
Corporation supra note 524 
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environmental concerns described and analysed above706. If secondary, they would also 
be captured by E.L.F. 2003 Report.707 In the latter there were 33 such cases and 19 in 
the current study. The ‘other’ category includes such problems as ‘tax’ and ‘trusts’, as 
well.708 
 
The clients’ perceptions differ noticeably from the legal analyses performed by the 
E.L.F. team. As Table 34 indicates a large proportion of clients (207, 27 percent) 
signalled procedural problems relating to participation in decision-making. Such 
problems included a lack of participatory process, delays and flawed engagement. A 
small proportion of clients (24, 3 percent) declared that their enquiries carried 
associated problems with access to environmental information. The small fraction can 
be explained by the fact that E.L.F. refers such enquiries to the relevant section of the 
Friends of the Earth 709 or Planning Aid710.There were also a small number of enquiries 
(26, 3 percent) where clients signalled problems with both access to information and 
participation in environmental decision-making. On balance, in 231 referrals (30 
percent) assumed difficulties with participation. This finding clashes significantly with 
the number of referrals linked to such concerns by E.L.F.’s caseworkers and staff. 
Finally, only one client complained about the access to justice which may indicate that 
they were unaware of the potential barriers to justice. In addition, the content analysis 
and notes in this researcher's diary show that in majority of cases these were the 
advisers or caseworkers who informed the clients about the potential difficulties with 
access to justice. Moreover, the insignificant proportion of the clients who complained 
about the access to justice might suggest that the alleged environmental problems were 
706 See p. 249 
707Paul Stookes, ‘Civil Law Aspects...' supra note 29, p. 16 
708 Ibid 
709 Rights & Justice Centre at Friends of the Earth 
710 Advice Helpline at Planning Aid 
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premature.  
Table 34 Concerns about Aarhus Convention’s pillars 
Aarhus pillars' concerns 
Pillar Count % 
 Information 24 3% 
Participation 207 27% 
Both 26 3% 
Access to justice 1 0% 
Unidentified 506 66% 
Totals 764  
 
An annual analysis of the referrals according to the in Table 35 below indicates no 
particular trends except that concerns about participation remained steadily at a level 
above 24 percent over the study period with two exceptions in 2006 and in 2008, when 
the proportion exceeded 30 percent. The worries about access to information and about 
‘both’ concerns fluctuated over the study period and dropped to 1 percent in the end. 
Interestingly, there were no complaints about the access to justice in the last two years 
when the issue became more potent in the country. 
 
Table 35 Concerns about the Aarhus pillars: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases with alleged Aarhus's pillar concern 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Pillar Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Information 7 4% 5 3% 5 3% 6 4% 1 1% 
Participation 41 22% 48 30% 48 28% 42 31% 28 24% 
Both 5 3% 9 6% 4 2% 7 5% 1 1% 
Access to justice 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Unidentified 132 71% 98 61% 112 66% 79 59% 85 74% 
Totals 185  160  170  134  115  
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Bias 
 
N Valid 739 
Missing 35 
 
 
This variable was generated in a similar inductive way to the two categories above. The 
notes in the author’s diary indicate that some clients directly expressed concerns about 
bias thus a creation of this variable and input into SPSS would be useful. In addition, 
this decision was made at the time of the Redcar711 decision involving bias and this 
problem was expressly discussed in E.L.F.’s headquarters. The issue is important and 
distinct from the procedural difficulties discussed above. If clients think that public 
authorities are prejudiced an atmosphere of distrust posing barriers to any cooperation 
can be created.712 
Figure 6 Perceived bias in enquiries 
 
 
 
711 R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland BC and others [2007] EWHC 3166 
712 Radoslaw Stech ‘Environmental Information...’ supra note 445 
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The Figure 7 above illustrates that the perception of bias in Redcar case was shared by 8 
percent of E.L.F. clients (62 referrals). This is a low proportion, yet above the accepted 
statistical error of 5 percent. The conclusion, underpinned by the annual analysis in 
Table 36 below, is that the problem of perception of bias exists among the clients. It 
must be highlighted that the author captured explicit complaints about bias without 
prompting or directing the enquirers.   
 
 
Table 36 Bias: annual analysis 
Annual number and percentage of E.L.F. cases with alleged bias 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Bias Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Bias 
identified 
12 7% 17 11% 14 8% 12 9% 7 6% 
Unidentified 150 93% 142 89% 156 92% 120 91% 109 94% 
Totals 162  158  168  131  116  
 
Stage of cases 
 
N Valid 769 
Missing 5 
 
The variable was generated from the detailed content analysis of the electronic database 
and the paper files. The author could establish the stage at which the enquiry was made 
by indicators, where clients and/or advisers directly referred to, inter alia, judicial 
review, consultation, early participation. However, there were enquiries, where such 
conclusions could not be drawn easily and an analysis of the material facts had to be 
performed. This included checking the dates of decisions; whether planning applications 
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were submitted or were due to be submitted by a developer; or whether a label ‘appeal’ 
meant ‘judicial review’ or ‘public inquiry’ or proceedings before the ombudsman. The 
variable was captured on the basis of all available material and does not reflect any 
particular person’s viewpoint. 
 
Table 37 below indicates that majority of referrals (227, 30 percent) were at the stage of 
consultation followed by almost equal proportion of enquiries at judicial review stage. 
The third highest group constituted complaints (96, 12 percent), where clients expressed 
dissatisfaction over certain issues such as noise pollution or fumes travelling from a 
nearby industrial plant. The following group constituted public inquiry cases (71, 
percent). The complaints must be distinguished from 44 (6 percent) grievances about an 
alleged lack of enforcement or monitoring action by a public authority in relation to 
certain activities. The enquiries were classified to be at the stage of complaints if the 
grounds for dissatisfaction arose from acts not related to statutory obligations of public 
authorities. In turn, the enquiries were classified at the stage of enforcement if the 
grounds for dissatisfaction arose from the public authority’s breach of its enforcement 
duties. Further, a small and tangible proportion of enquiries (45, 6 percent) stood at the 
early participation stage where planning applications were due to be submitted by a 
developer. The clients sought advice on how they could influence the course of events 
before a formal consultation was commenced. Finally, there was a significant group of 
enquiries (58, 8 percent) which were classified as ‘other’ and included a range of cases: 
guidance sought how to set up an environmental charity, guidance on how to use a 
specific legislation, complaints to European institutions etc. 
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Table 37 Stage of enquiries 2005-2009 
Stage of enquiries 2005 – 2009  
Stage Count % 
Consultation 227 30% 
Early participation 45 6% 
Public Inquiry 71 9% 
Enforcement 44 6% 
Complaint 96 12% 
Ombudsman 4 1% 
judicial review 224 29% 
Other 58 8% 
 769  
 
 
Table 38 Stage of enquiries: annual analysis 
Annual representation of the stage of enquiries 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Stage Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Consultation 44 23% 58 36% 47 28% 45 33% 33 29% 
Early 
participation 
20 11% 5 3% 10 6% 6 4% 4 3% 
Public 
Inquiry 
20 11% 8 5% 18 11% 8 6% 17 15% 
Enforcement 13 7% 12 8% 8 5% 7 5% 4 3% 
Complaint 34 18% 16 10% 14 8% 15 11% 17 15% 
Ombudsman 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 2 2% 
judicial 
review 
51 27% 51 32% 54 32% 47 35% 21 18% 
Other 6 3% 9 6% 18 11% 8 6% 17 15% 
Totals 188  160  170  136  115  
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Table 38 above indicates that proportions of consultation and judicial enquiries 
fluctuated over the study period and the former was higher only in 2006 and 2009. The 
difference is particularly visible in 2009 when 29 percent of cases stood at the 
consultation stage and only 18 percent at the judicial review. Setting aside this year, the 
judicial review stage was most prominent followed by the consultation stage.  
Summary and analysis 
This Chapter focused on referrals and provided an exploration of types of enquiries, 
some aspects of their substance and their stage. A number of variables were generated 
from the Digital Red Book713, whereas another set of variables could only be established 
upon content analysis of paper files. The number of missing values did not exceed the 
conventional five percent error and we can summarise the findings with absolute 
confidence. 
713 See p.185 
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The quantitative analysis confirmed that the enquiries carried a significant public 
interest element affecting, on average, 1000 persons. This confirms the operational 
principles of E.L.F. highlighted in the Methodology Chapter714. Given the significant 
public interest it is worth noting that only a few cases were funded from the public 
purse in the form of legal aid. This can be explained and justified by the high threshold 
of requirements that must be met before legal aid can be provided. Most of the referrals 
were analysed for free or funded privately. It is striking that only a small fraction of 
enquiries benefited from the groups’ fighting funds given the large proportion of groups 
as established in the previous chapter. Table 39 below provides further analysis of the 
funding of cases within community clients and clarifies that communities did not rely 
significantly on the common funds. The proportion is higher than in the whole sample 
yet, nonetheless, 20 percent of clients relied on private funding and pro bono work by 
E.L.F. 
 
Table 39 Funding of cases in the ‘community group’ category 
Funding of cases by community groups 
  Count % Valid % 
Valid CFI 2 1% 1% 
 Group "fighting fund" 66 19% 25% 
 Legal Aid 6 2% 2% 
 None 33 9% 13% 
 Private 54 15% 20% 
 Pro bono  80 21% 30% 
 Insurance 1 0% 0% 
 Not needed 15 4% 6% 
 Other 1 0% 0% 
 Mixture of funding 7 2% 3% 
Missing Total 265 75.7 100 
 Lack of data 74 21.1  
 System 11 3.1  
714 See p. 181 
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 Total 85 24.3  
Total  350 100%  
 
A further significant finding is that more than 50 percent of the clients were concerned 
about the state of the environment relating to land and conservation. Factors of the 
environment, built environment and human health constituted significantly smaller 
proportions of enquiries as classified by E.L.F. The human health constituted only 1 
percent of enquiries; however, it does not mean that such concerns were non-existent. 
The variable focus on human rights shows that in 10 percent of the enquiries clients 
were concerned about their health and life. Furthermore, 7 percent of the clients were 
concerned about their family life which also includes human health concerns as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights715. This is an example how content 
analysis shed deeper insight into the content and type of cases alongside the 
conventional quantitative analysis. 
Table 40 below sheds more light on the occurrence of human rights aspects in the 
environmental concerns classified by E.L.F.’s caseworkers and staff. Most cases in 
which clients expressed anxiety about human life and health were classified to be 
primarily concerned with land (16), air pollution (13), radiation (11) and noise pollution 
(9). This finding is important since, as it was indicated in Section 3 above, there were 
only 37 enquiries concerning air pollution and 17 regarding radiation. Conversely, there 
were 324 referrals relating to land. Thus, the concerns about life and health amounted to 
5 percent of all land referrals and 35 percent of all air pollution and 65 percent of all 
radiation enquiries. Interestingly, the cross-tabulation in Table 40 indicates 7 life and 
human health concerns in the group ‘Human Health’ as classified by E.L.F. Section 3 
above noted that E.L.F. classified 9 such cases therefore we would expect that these are 
captured these cases in the content analysis.  
715 See p. 96 
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The author went back to the files at the time of writing up this Chapter at the end of 
2010 and found that the two cases that he had not marked as possessing life or health 
aspect were wrongly classified by E.L.F.’s caseworkers. The two cases concerned 
housing developments. There is an explanation for the caseworkers’ error that seems 
viable.  The Digital Red Book consisted of abbreviations for environmental concerns 
and ‘HH’ meant ‘Human Health’. It might me that the caseworkers mistook HH for 
‘Housing’ or ‘Housing Development’  
Further, Table 40 below indicates that the majority of complaints concerning family life 
were classified under noise pollution. This finding is in accord with a general 
importance given to noise pollution in environmental law and the recognition that an 
exposure to noise may breach human rights and interfere with the enjoyment of private 
and family life. In fact many cases which reach the European Court of Human Rights 
are interwoven with noise pollution and its impact on private and family life.716   
Further, Table 40 shows that most complaints relating property and possessions were 
later classified under land (22 enquiries), flooding (8), noise pollution (8), built 
environment (6), waste (3), water pollution (3) and air pollution (2). The findings seem 
logical since property issues can be dispersed within a variety of environmental 
concerns. Even noise can lead to problems with property where the clients are expected 
to undertake insulation work to limit the pollution. 
716See p.  96 
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Table 40 Environmental problems and human rights: crosstabulation 
Environmental problems and human rights 
 
Life/Health 
concerns 
Family 
life 
Property/ 
possessions 
Fair trial Right to 
education 
Non-
discrimination 
Mixture of 
rights 
Unidentified Total  
 
Air Pollution Count 13 5 2 0 0 0 2 14 36 
  % within human 
 
17% 9% 3% 0% 0% 0% 33% 3% 5% 
Built 
 
Count 2 2 6 0 0 1 0 54 65 
  % within human 
 
3% 4% 10% 0% 0% 33% 0% 10% 9% 
Conservation Count 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 100 105 
  % within human 
 
3% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 14% 
EIA Count 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 17 19 
  % within human 
 
1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 
Flooding Count 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 4 12 
  % within human 
 
0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 
Human Health Count 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 
  % within human 
 
9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Land Count 16 11 22 0 0 1 1 269 320 
  % within human 
 
21% 20% 38% 0% 0% 33% 17% 48% 42% 
Light Pollution Count 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 5 14 
  % within human 
 
1% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 
Noise Pollution Count 9 26 8 0 1 0 1 45 90 
  % within human 
 
12% 48% 14% 0% 100% 0% 17% 8% 12% 
Other Count 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 17 19 
  % within human 
 
0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 3% 3% 
Radiation Count 11 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 17 
  % within human 
 
14% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 17% 1% 2% 
Waste Count 12 2 3 0 0 1 0 17 35 
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  % within human 
 
16% 4% 5% 0% 0% 33% 0% 3% 5% 
Water pollution Count 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 14 21 
  % within human 
 
4% 0% 5% 100% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 
Total Count 77 54 58 1 1 3 6 562 762 
  % within human 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Further, the majority of enquiries were classified primarily under planning law. As a 
result, it comes as no surprise to learn that the majority of cases were either at early 
participation, consultation, public inquiry or judicial review stage. Planning law is one 
of the most contentious areas of law yet it offers broad opportunities for the public to 
use law at various stages, which is reflected in the E.L.F. database. Planning law 
procedures are closely associated with the pillars of the Aarhus Convention: in both 
instances there is an emphasis on access to information, participation in decision 
making and access to justice in a wider sense including public enquiries, judicial review 
and resort to the ombudsman. The variable which focused on the pillars shows that there 
was a considerable proportion of clients complaining about participation. An 
insignificant fraction of clients was concerned about access to information since such 
cases had been referred to the Friends of the Earth specialist service. An insignificant 
proportion of the clients complained about access to justice and we can assume that they 
would not be knowledgeable about the barriers to justice at this initial stage of sending 
an enquiry to E.L.F.  Finally, the author found that eight percent of the clients 
complained about biased and prejudiced public authorities, which constitutes serious 
accusations, posing problems for the entire relationship between the public and their 
representatives in public authorities. 
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Finally, the author identified 224 referrals at the judicial review stage. Such enquiries 
concerned situations where decisions had been made and other forms of appeal were not 
available. Nevertheless, judicial review cases often involve more than one defendant 
and included legal persons. For this reason it was important to establish how many 
clients with enquiries at judicial review stage decided to use or wanted to use judicial 
review rather than private law challenges based on common law. Other clients could be 
persuaded not to pursue judicial review claims but rather continue influencing public 
authorities prior to any opinion on prospect of success in judicial review. The author 
found five such instances, two in which clients decided to challenge the private part in 
courts and three where they decided to continuing exerting their demands on pubic 
authorities. The figure 8 below indicates that there were 219 cases at judicial review 
stage pursuing this route. This number is a base number for further analysis in the 
following chapter. 
Figure 7 Referrals at judicial review stage 
 
 
 
 
Judicial Review, 
219 
Other route, 5 
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E.L.F. referrals – polycentricity 
The above analysis tracked the major characteristics of the E.L.F. referrals in the overall 
sample. The confirmed that the enquiries carried a significant public interest element 
affecting, on average, 1000 persons. The variable focus on human rights shows that in 
10 percent of the enquiries clients were concerned about their health and life. 
Furthermore, 7 percent of the clients were concerned about their family life which also 
includes human health concerns. Moreover, planning law was linked to the 
overwhelming majority of the enquirers. The above suggest that there are many interests 
involved in each case.  
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Chapter 8 Results: Focus on referrals at judicial review stage 
Chapter 8 will focus on 219 referrals which were at the stage of judicial review during 
the study period. The main purpose of the Chapter is to address the two questions 
relating to the narrower purpose of the study: 
1. What proportion of judicial review referrals received a negative opinion as to the 
prospects of success at judicial review? What is the proportion of judicial review 
cases where clients were advised to take further steps towards judicial review?  
2. Given the answer to the above question, did clients not proceed primarily because 
of costs? 
 Thereafter the Chapter will focus on measuring polycentricity of the judicial review 
cases which originated in England only. The author will match the clients’ postcodes 
with the Indices of Multiple Deprivation in order to observe the wider context in which 
the cases are embedded. The aim is to answer the following question: 
Are judicial review referrals polycentric? 
Type of legality challenged 
The type of legality challenged variable was generated from the content analysis of the 
clients’ complaints and was compiled solely on the basis of their views. The variable 
was compiled following the preliminary research during which the author understood 
that it was possible to distinguish between the complaints regarding broad substantive 
or procedural legality of an administrative decision in question. Chapter 2 reviewed the 
grounds for judicial review717  and Chapter 2 showed that courts in England and Wales 
717 See p. 85 
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may be unprepared to deal with certain substantive aspects of the environmental 
cases718. The variable was compiled by matching the content of clients’ complaints with 
the grounds of judicial review depicted in the previous Chapter. The variable was 
particularly difficult to establish given the nature of legal skill required in matching the 
merits of the case with particular grounds. The variable distinguishes the clients which 
solely complained about the merits of the decision such as claiming that ‘it was wrong’, 
‘unreasonable’ or ‘against the environment’. Such clients’ complaints were labelled as 
‘substantive challenge’. The clients who chose to complain about the procedural 
impropriety and included claims that the decision substantively flawed were included 
into the ‘mix of procedural and substantive’ category. There were also clients who only 
attacked the procedural aspect of the decision and were classified accordingly.   
 
Table 41 below indicates that there was a fairly small proportion of clients (41, 19 
percent) who complained solely about the merits of the decision affecting the 
environment. The reflexive diary719 indicates that most of such complaints were related 
to pure dissatisfaction with the decision. Such disenchantment would not probably serve 
as a basis for ground in judicial review. The overwhelming majority complained either 
about the procedural impropriety (80, 37 percent) or about the mixture of grounds (91, 
42 percent). It is important to note that the complaints were mostly written by the 
interns following the initial telephone interview or email exchange. It might be true that 
the interns interrogated the clients only about the procedural impropriety. The test of 
irrationality is difficult to pass. The establishment of procedural impropriety is likely to 
improve the chances of receiving a positive opinion as to the prospects of success by the 
adviser. 
718 See p. 156 
719 See p. 210 
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Table 41 Type of challenge in judicial review referrals 
Type of challenge 
Challenge Count % 
procedural challenge 80 37% 
substantive challenge 41 19% 
mix of procedural and 
substantive 
91 42% 
not stated 6 3% 
Total 218  
 
However, Table 42 below, which shows the annual representation of the same variable, 
suggests that the substantive complain can form the fair share of all complaints as it 
occurred in 2005 (33 percent) and 2009 (29 percent).  
 
Table 42 Type of judicial review challenge: annual analysis 
 
 
Likelihood of success 
The likelihood of success variable was generated through the content analysis of the 
Annual representation of the type of challenge 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Type of 
challenge 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
procedural 
challenge 
14 29% 25 50% 19 35% 17 38% 5 24% 
substantive 
challenge 
16 33% 8 16% 6 11% 5 11% 6 29% 
mix of 
procedural and 
substantive 
15 31% 16 32% 29 54% 22 49% 9 43% 
not stated 3 6% 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 1 5% 
Total 48  50  54  45  21  
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advisers’ opinions attached to the referral files. A number of files carried an extensive 
opinion of counsel while some included solely a brief note as to the likelihood of 
success in the courts. The preliminary research informed the author that it was 
impossible to make a basic distinction between referrals with either a negative or 
positive opinion as to the prospects of success. A number of advisers were reluctant to 
give either but advised that there was a need for further work on the case before giving a 
clear opinion. The author classified such cases as ‘advised to proceed’. This 
categorisation was also consulted with and influenced by E.L.F. as the organisation 
wished to distinguish such scenario720. The referrals were classified as with ‘negative 
prospects’ when the adviser specified clearly that the referral would not succeed before 
the courts or estimated the chances of success at 49% or less. Finally, the category of 
referrals with ‘prospects of success’ requires further explanation. The cases that 
received 50 percent or more chances of success were included in this category. In 
addition, the referrals which were assessed to have “reasonable grounds for judicial 
review” were included into this category. This is in line with the literature review and 
especially with the Corner House case which lowered the threshold of the initial 
opinion as to the merits of the cases which would qualify for the PCO.721 The author 
deducted from the content analysis that ‘arguable case’ was that where the adviser 
pronounced 50 percent or more chance of success, which is in line with the Corner 
House principle. 
720 See political dimension of the study, p. 209 
721 Supra note 267 
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Table 43 Prospects of success in judicial/statutory review 
Prospects of success in the High Court 
Challenge Count % 
prospects of success 60 27% 
negative prospects 109 50% 
advised to proceed 40 18% 
not stated 10 5% 
Total 219 
 
 
 
Table 43 above indicates that half of the referrals at the stage of litigation received a 
negative opinion as to the prospects of success in or available grounds for judicial 
review.  It is important to note that some of these referrals could have been arguable 
cases but did not pass the prospects of success test due to time delay722. It was 
mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis723 that claimants had 3 months to commence 
judicial review following the final decision. This timeframe has been widely criticised 
for being too short to commence complex litigation. In addition, it is possible that lack 
of funding caused the delay as poor clients could be unaware as to the possible avenues 
of obtaining legal redress in line with a theoretical concept presented by Galanter and 
described in Chapter 9 of this thesis. The reflexive diary indicates that the clients who 
received negative opinion as to the prospects of success were advised to seek alternative 
support from European Commission, local MP or Ombudsman724. 
 
The second largest group of clients (60,  27 percent) received a positive opinion as to 
the prospects of success in the courts and another 40 clients (18 percent) were advised 
to proceed further. Thus, in total, nearly 50 percent of clients (100) were encouraged to 
722 However the research did not trace the time limits and it is impossible how many arguable cases could 
not proceed further due to time delay. 
723 See p. 82 
724See p. 210 
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take their cases onto the avenue of litigation. The author found 10 cases (5 percent) 
where he could not establish the advisers’ opinion. 
Table 44 Prospects of success in judicial/statutory review: annual analysis 
Annual representation of the advisers' opinions 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Opinion Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
prospects of 
success 
8 17% 15 30% 18 33% 13 28% 6 29% 
negative 
prospects 
22 46% 26 52% 28 52% 25 54% 8 38% 
advised to 
proceed 
16 33% 7 14% 7 13% 6 13% 4 19% 
not stated 2 4% 2 4% 1 2% 2 4% 3 14% 
Total 48  50  54  46  21  
 
 
An annual analysis in Table 44 above shows that the referrals with a negative opinion 
remained at approximately 50 percent in the first four years of the study period. The 
number plummeted to 38 percent in 2009. Conversely, the proportion of the referrals 
with positive prospects of success in the courts was noticeably low in 2005 and 
established itself at the average of 30 percent in the remaining years. The cases which 
were advised to proceed reached a very high proportion of 33 percent in 2005 and 
established itself at the average of 13 percent between 2006 and 2008. Such cases were 
at higher proportion of 19 percent in the final study period. The annual analysis shows 
that the referrals with a negative opinion dominated the sample throughout the study 
period.  In addition, the observed fluctuations concerned the referrals that were either 
advised to proceed further or received positive prospects of success, proving the 
difficulty in drawing clear boundaries between them. It is also interesting to note the 
swing in the final year and further research could be conducted to establish whether the 
proportion of cases with a negative opinion dropped in the following years not included 
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in the sample. 
Conclusion of cases 
This variable was compiled on the basis of E.L.F.’s client monitoring questionnaires725 
complemented by the author’s extensive telephone interviews and email contacts with 
the clients and the advisers. The search was conducted towards the end of the 
secondment in E.L.F. and in the periods afterwards to ensure the accuracy of data and 
rigour. At the time of writing the BRASS Report726 in December 2009 the author found 
15 cases which reached the courts. This number resulted from the client monitoring and 
the advisers’ statements. Yet, in the follow-up research conducted in the legal databases 
such as Lawtel, Westlaw and LexisNexis the judicial review reports could not be found. 
Subsequent contact with the advisers on the phone or email revealed that some of them 
understood settlement in the High Court by means of court order as ‘judicial review’. 
Following this discrepancy in understanding the meaning of judicial review The author 
conducted additional searches and established a large number of possible conclusions 
reflecting the complexity of litigation. The final check was performed at the time of 
writing-up in July 2011. 
Table 45 Conclusion of judicial/statutory review cases 
Judicial/statutory review cases conclusions 
Challenge Count % 
Court judgment 8 4% 
Barred from court due to cost 56 26% 
Barred from court due to other reasons 117 53% 
Resolved successfully by chance 2 1% 
Settled out of court 9 4% 
Quashed at permission stage for judicial 7 3% 
725 See p. 185 
726 Radoslaw Stech, Robert G Lee and Deborah Tripley, ‘Costs Barriers...' supra note 1 
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review 
Settled with consent order 7 3% 
Progressing 4 2% 
Not found 8 4% 
Ombudsman 1 1% 
Total 219  
 
Table 45 above indicates that there were 8 referrals (4 percent) which reached the 
courts. The author was able to find that 7 of these cases were reported in the widely 
available legal databases online. One of these cases was reported by the advisers and the 
clients to have reached the courts without further details. It might be possible that the 
case was litigated under a different name and not reported. The further analysis on the 
conclusions of the judgments conducted on the basis of judgment transcripts revealed 
that there were 3 successful and 3 unsuccessful judicial challenges. The outcome of one 
case could not have been determined. The author was unable to confirm the final result 
of the one case mentioned above.  
 
Table 45 indicates that there were 56 cases which did not reach the courts due to the 
cost barrier and 117 cases due to other reasons. The latter concerned primarily reasons 
associated with time delay but also clients’ ill health or even death.727 Further, there 
were 2 cases which were resolved successfully ‘by chance’. This category was compiled 
when the clients stated that it was luck resulting from developer’s bankruptcy or 
financial crisis which contributed to the final outcome rather than the work of E.L.F. or 
its advisers. 
 
The further three categories relate to the settlement and quashing order by the court in 
727 There was one case with positive prospects of success which did not proceed further due to the death 
of the claimant. (Source: Reflexive diary) 
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the permission stage. The author accepted the general definition of settlement proposed 
by Bondy and Sunkin, which is relevant for E.L.F. out of court settlements: 
 
“[A]n outcome agreed by the parties as opposed to an outcome achieved by 
adjudication. Overwhelmingly, this is reached in correspondence, telephone 
communication and discussions outside court on hearing dates."728 
 
Eisenberg offers a definition which draws a line between settlement and adjudication: 
 
“Adjudication is conventionally perceived as a norm-bound process centred on 
the establishment of facts and the determination and application of principles, 
rules, and precedents. Negotiation, on the other hand, is conventionally 
perceived as a relatively norm-free process centred on the transmutation of 
underlying bargaining strength into agreement by the exercise of power, horse-
trading, threat, and bluff.”729 
 
Settlement can also include formal ADR such as mediation. The analysis of the Client 
Monitoring Forms and the contacts made with the clients and their advisers did not 
show that such methods have been used. As mentioned above and earlier, the advisers 
were reluctant to disclose any details concerning the settlement.  
 
The second category of cases which settled with consent order requires  further 
discussion. The consent order can be granted by the court in line with s 40(6) of the 
728 Varda Bondy and Maurice Sunkin, ‘Settlement in judicial review Proceedings’ (2009) Public Law 
237, 240 
729 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking’ 
1976 89(4) Harvard Law Review 637 
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CPR730. In The Practice Direction (Administrative Court: Uncontested Proceedings)731 
Collins J. provided guidance as to the practical implementation of the rules: 
 
“Where the parties are agreed as to the terms on which proceedings in the 
Administrative Court can be disposed of and require an order of the court to put 
those terms into effect they should lodge with the Administrative Court Office a 
document (with one copy thereof) signed by the parties setting out the terms of 
the proposed agreed order and a short statement of the matters relied on as 
justifying the making of the order, authorities and statutory provisions relied on 
being quoted. 
[...], if the court is satisfied that the order should be made, the order will be made 
without the need for attendance by the parties or their representatives. The 
making of the order will be publicised on the Court Service website. 
If the court is not satisfied on the information originally provided or 
subsequently provided at the court's request, that the order can properly be 
made, the proceedings will be listed for hearing in the normal way”732. 
 
Moreover, the settlement, though made by parties, requires judicial intervention because 
the court must be satisfied that the consent order should be made. In order to assist the 
court the parties should enclose their justification for settlement in the document. The 
court must be primarily satisfied that it is in the public interest to make the order and if 
the agreement does not meet this threshold “[t]he court will not make an order”733. 
There is an instance where the court rejected making the consent order as in R. v St 
730 Supra note 218 
731 [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1377 
732 Ibid 
733 Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s judicial review (Sweet & Maxwell 
2007) 
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Helens Justices Ex p. Jones.734 The lodging of the consent order is not prohibitively 
expensive as it amounts to £45735 unless the claimant qualifies for a remission. 
Moreover, it can be submitted prior to or after the permission stage order with an 
important variation. According to the Administrative Court Guidance the lodging of the 
draft consent order prior to the permission consent “must include provision for 
permission to be granted.”736 The court will consider the documents and can either issue 
a consent order or refer the case for a full hearing. As a result, settlement by way of 
Rule 40(6) of the CPR must be distinguished from the above definitions of the 
settlement737. It includes some degree of judicial intervention, which extent varies and 
depends on the stage of the overall proceedings. In all cases the judge must be satisfied 
that the consent order will benefit the wider society and, as the Administrative Court 
Guidance suggests, the judge could consider the merits of the case if the lodging is 
made prior to the formal permission consent.  
 
There were 7 cases which were settled with a consent order issued by the Court. This 
means that the parties reached a settlement agreement certified by the court. This 
category is different from the settlement out of court (9 cases, 4 percent) where the 
parties did not seek such a certification. Furthermore, there were 7 cases which were 
quashed at the permission stage by the judge. Finally, there was one case which was 
reported to have reached the Ombudsman, 4 cases progressing and 8 which outcome 
could not be found. 
 
 
734 [1999] 2 All E.R. 73 
735 Administrative Court Guidance, ‘Notes for Guidance on Applying for judicial review’ (London 2011) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/administrative-
court/judicial-review.pdf> accessed 15 June 2011, 16 
736 Ibid 
737 See p. 284 
285 
 
                                                 
 
 
 Table 46 Conclusion of judicial/statutory review cases: annual analysis 
 
 
The annual analysis of the conclusions in Table 46 above indicates that referrals barred 
from litigation due to other reasons than costs remained at the fairly steady proportion 
of average 50 percent throughout the study period except 2008. Moreover, the referrals 
stopped by the cost barrier were at the highest 31 percent in 2005 and remained close to 
the overall average between 2006 and 2009. There are no other trends worthy attention 
in Table 46. 
Cost barrier to environmental judicial review 
The analysis above showed the descriptive statistics concerning judicial/statutory 
review referrals. In order to answer the research question of how many positive cases 
Annual representation of the advisers' opinions 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Opinion Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Court judgment 1 2% 1 2% 3 6% 3 7% 0 0% 
Barred from court due 
to cost 
15 31% 11 22% 14 26% 11 24% 5 24% 
Barred from court due 
to other reasons 
25 52% 26 52% 29 54% 27 59% 10 48% 
Resolved successfully by 
chance 
0 0% 1 2% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 
Settled out of court 3 6% 2 4% 3 6% 1 2% 0 0% 
Quashed at permission 
stage for jr 
1 2% 2 0% 3 6% 0 0% 1 5% 
Settled with consent 
order 
1 2% 5 10% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 
Progressing 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 4% 2 5% 
Not found 2 4% 2 4% 0 0% 1 2% 3 14% 
Ombudsman 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 48  50  54  46  21  
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were stopped by the cost barrier the author had to perform cross-tabulation in the SPSS. 
The two variables were crossed, namely the opinion on the prospect of success in the 
courts and the cases’ conclusions.  
 
Firstly, Table 47 (Case Conclusions) below indicates that there were 7 cases which 
reached the courts and concluded with a judgment following the positive opinion as to 
the prospects of success by E.L.F.’s advisers. There was also one case that concluded in 
the same fashion with no clear opinion by E.L.F. The content analysis of this case 
revealed that it was the only statutory review in the sample of cases with positive 
prospects of success or ‘advised to proceed’ opinion. The case did not receive the 
opinion of the adviser due to unavailability yet the client managed the challenge and 
was unsuccessful.738 As it was indicated above739 3 cases were successful, 3 
unsuccessful and the author could not determine the final outcome of one case. Initially 
the number of judicially reviewed cases, and the successful ones in particular, seems 
very low. Yet when compared with other reported statistics the number of 6 judicial 
review cases which started in E.L.F. appears to be a significant figure. Table 47 below 
illustrates the number of judicial reviews taken by various groups and individuals 
between 1995 and 2001 in the UK. The overall number of such cases (110) brought 
over a seven year period of time is not striking and renders E.L.F.’s work in this aspect 
to be of high significance. 
 
 
 
738 Referral 2629 (Source: Reflexive diary) 
739 See p. 283 
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Table 47 Estimated number of public interest court cases brought by environmental NGOs, citizen groupings 
and individuals 1995-2001 
Category of applicant Total number of 
cases 
Established environmental NGOs 25 
Ad hoc identifiable grouping 20 
Ad hoc collection of individuals 21 
Individual applicants 42 
Other 2 
Source740 
 
This result gains even further significance when compared with a number of judicial 
reviews pursued in their own right by major UK NGOs between 2005 and 2009. Table 
48 below indicates that Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and WWF undertook 8 judicial 
reviews over the study period altogether. 
Table 48 Summary of judicial reviews undertaken by a selection of NGOs between 2005-2009 
NGO  Total number of cases Total number of court 
judgments 
Friends of the Earth 4  
Greenpeace 2  
WWF 2  
Total 8  
Source741 
 
Further, Table 45 demonstrates that there were 56 cases which were stopped by the cost 
barrier which constituted 26 percent of all judicial review referrals. Out of these 26 (12 
percent) referrals received a clear-cut opinion as to the good prospects of success in the 
courts and 28 (13 percent) required further work before estimating the likelihood of 
success. There were also 2 cases where clients stated that they could not proceed further 
740 Sheridan M, ‘United Kingdom Report’ in N de Sadeleer, G Roller and M Dross (eds), Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters... Supra note 249 
741 Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee, 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/Compliance%20 Committee/27TableUK.htm> 
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because of costs but the author could not establish whether these received negative or 
positive opinion on further litigation. This result is deeply significant when compared to 
the number of judicial reviews undertaken by E.L.F. and other NGOs (described above). 
It indicates that were 26 cases that potentially lost an opportunity of the court judgment 
predominantly because of costs. There were also 28 cases which could be subject to 
further work potentially leading to litigation but were immediately chilled by the cost 
barrier.  
The significance of the outcome 
The author is not suggesting that the 26 cases would succeed in the courts. This would 
be overly optimistic given the complexity of environmental cases. Yet, it is possible to 
develop an additional argument that these cases should be worthy of attention at the 
litigation stage on the basis of results found in Table 49, 50 and 51. The author will 
firstly look at Table 49 to establish in what area of law the cases arose and, secondly, at 
the Table 50 to ascertain possible outcomes. 
 
Firstly, Table 50 demonstrates that the vast majority of all judicial/statutory review 
referrals (197 out of 219) were primarily concerned with the area of planning law. 
Specifically, 7 out of 8 cases which concluded with the court judgment and 50 out of 56 
cases which were advised to proceed/said to be arguable were primarily concerned with 
planning law. This is important given the fact that environmental concerns constitute 
only one of many material considerations in making the planning decisions. This 
produces a difficulty at the outset of litigation because the advisers are not able to 
envisage the approach of the courts to such disputes. Moreover, planning law is closely 
linked to government policy and certain environmental concerns, even if strong, might 
fall victim of the wider economic or political interests. Furthermore, any litigation in 
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this area threatens substantial delays in pursuing developments rendering a probability 
of significant economic loss for the developer and communities. As a result, courts took 
a strict approach to the time limits attached to the litigation. To compensate for these 
shortcomings the system is equipped with ample opportunities for participation. The 
author will not review the participatory aspect of the planning law because it would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to note that the planning system meets the 
procedural requirement of the second pillar of the Aarhus Convention742.  Nevertheless, 
the opportunities for participation may not be satisfactory for the public in terms of 
substantive opportunities for influencing the decision-making process743. Table 34 in 
Chapter 5 indicated that there were 231744 E.L.F. referrals (30 percent) in which clients 
expressed difficulties with participation745. When limited to judicial/statutory review 
referrals the results are particularly striking as shown in Table 49 below. The clients 
signalled problems with participation in 95746 judicial/statutory review referrals out of 
all 219.  More importantly, nearly half (27747) of all 56 arguable/advised to proceed 
referrals which were stopped by cost barrier were said to hold procedural flaws 
associated with participation. When limited to 26 cases with good prospects of success 
barred by cost barrier 13748 such referrals were concerned with flawed participation 
according to the clients Setting aside whether or not the problems with participation 
would constitute an arguable element in potential litigation this is an important result. It 
demonstrates that the notable part of E.L.F. clients who were advised to commence a 
court challenge had been dissatisfied with and signalled concerns over inadequate 
participation. It is therefore logical to suggest that litigation may offer further 
742 See Chapter 3 
743 Supra note 445 
744 For simplicity the author compiled the categories where clients expressed sole problems with 
participation and compound problems with participation and access to information 
745 See p. 259 
746 For simplicity the author compiled the categories where clients expressed sole problems with 
participation and compound problems with participation and access to information 
747 See ibid for information concerning the calculation 
748 See ibid for information concerning the calculation 
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opportunities for participation and influencing the final decision on a particular planning 
case with a significant environmental aspect.  
 
Secondly, referring back to Table 47 it is clear that a fairly significant number of cases 
(7, 12 percent of all cases with good prospects of success) were quashed at permission 
stage of judicial review. The primary goal of permission stage, which is done on papers 
and can be followed by oral appeal if unsuccessful, is to weed out the weak cases. It 
suggests that a fair share of the 26 cases with good prospects of success but barred by 
costs could be quashed at this stage of litigation. Nevertheless the larger number of 
referrals with positive prospects of success has been settled either out of court or by way 
of a consent order. The former might imply more of a political agreement to avoid 
further litigation whereas the latter might imply more of a legal agreement to avoid the 
expensive challenge in the courts.749This suggests that a bigger share of the 26 cases 
with good prospects of success but barred by costs could conclude in the settlement 
which is favoured by most stakeholders.750 Crucially, three out of seven cases which 
were judicially reviewed were successful for the claimant. The unsuccessful cases might 
have contributed to the development of law by clarifying legal uncertainties and thus 
avoiding similar attempts by other clients. They could also be waste of time and money. 
To sum up the second part of the argument the figure of 26 is significant because, given 
the other results, as it suggests that some of these cases could lead to settlement or 
judicial review contributing to the final resolution of the dispute or 
establishment/alteration of the rule of law. 
 
749 In fact the settlement with a consent order issued by the judge were reported by the advisers to mean 
“judicial review” as explained above, see p. xx  
750 See above definitions of settlement and s 40(6) of CPR 
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Table 49 Opinion on the prospects of success and cases conclusions: cross-tabulation 
 
    Case conclusion 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
   Judgment Barred 
(costs) 
Barred 
(other) 
Successful Settled Quashed Consent 
order 
Progressi
ng 
Not 
found 
Ombud
sman 
Totals 
prospects of 
success 
Count 7 26 2 2 5 7 7 3 1 0 60 
% within advice 12% 43% 3% 3% 8% 12% 12% 5% 2% 0% 100% 
% within conclusion 88% 46% 2% 100% 56% 100% 100% 75% 13% 0% 27% 
  % of Total 3% 12% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 1% 0% 0% 27% 
negative 
prospects 
Count 0 0 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 
% within advice 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
% within conclusion 0% 0% 93% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 
  % of Total 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 
advised to 
proceed 
Count 0 28 5 0 4 0 0 1 1 1 40 
% within advice 0% 70% 13% 0% 10% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 100% 
% within conclusion 0% 50% 4% 0% 44% 0% 0% 25% 13% 100% 18% 
  % of Total 0% 13% 2% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 
not stated Count 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 10 
 % within advice 10% 20% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60% 0% 100% 
 % within conclusion 13% 4% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 0% 5% 
  % of Total 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 5% 
Totals Count 8 56 117 2 9 7 7 4 8 1 219 
 % within advice 4% 26% 53% 1% 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 0% 100% 
 % within conclusion 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 % of Total 4% 26% 53% 1% 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 0% 100% 
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Table 50 Area of law and conclusion of cases 
Count 
primary 
   
  court (whether case went to court) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Total 
    yes no due 
to 
costs 
no due 
to other 
reasons 
no but 
resolved 
successfully 
settled 
out of 
court 
yes but 
quashed at 
permissio
n stage 
 
settled 
with 
court 
consent 
progress
ing 
do not 
know 
ombuds
man 
  
Contaminat
  
positive  1      1   2 
  advised to proceed  1      0   1 
     2      1   3 
Housing negative   1        1 
      1        1 
Negligence positive       1    1 
          1    1 
Nuisance negative  0 7        7 
  advised to proceed  2 1        3 
     2 8        10 
Planning 
 
positive 6 25 2 1 4 7 6 2 1 0 54 
  negative 0 0 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 
  advised to proceed 0 25 4 0 4 0 0 1 0 1 35 
  not stated 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 9 
    7 51 106 1 8 7 6 3 7 1 197 
Transport positive  0 0 1 1      2 
  negative  0 1 0 0      1 
  not stated  1 0 0 0      1 
     1 1 1 1      4 
Other positive 1  0      0  1 
  negative 0  1      0  1 
  advised to proceed 0  0      1  1 
    1  1      1  3 
293 
 
 
 
Table 51 Aarhus pillars and conclusion of cases 
 
    
yes 
no due 
to costs 
no due 
to other 
reasons 
no but 
resolved 
successf
ully 
settled 
out of 
court 
yes but 
quashed at 
permission 
stage paper 
settled 
with court 
consent 
progress
ing 
do not 
know ombudsman 
  
problems with 
access to info  
positive 0 2 0 
       
2 
 
negative 0 0 4 
       
4 
 
problems with 
participation 
  
  
  
  
not stated 1 0 0 
       
1 
  1 2 4 
       
7 
positive 1 9 0 
 
3 2 5 
 
1 
 
21 
negative 0 0 43 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
 
43 
 
both 
  
  
  
  
advised to proceed 0 11 1 
 
2 0 0 
 
0 
 
14 
not stated 0 2 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 22 44 
 
5 2 5 
 
2 
 
81 
positive 
 
4 0 
   
1 
 
0 
 
5 
negative 
 
0 6 
   
0 
 
0 
 
6 
 
unidentified 
  
  
  
  
advised to proceed 
 
1 1 
   
0 
 
0 
 
2 
not stated 
 
0 0 
   
0 
 
1 
 
1 
  
 
5 7 
   
1 
 
1 
 
14 
positive 6 11 2 2 2 5 1 2 0 0 31 
negative 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
 
positive secondary 0 16 3 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 24 
not stated 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 5 
  6 27 62 2 4 5 1 3 5 1 116 
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Protective Costs Orders 
PCO were reviewed in Chapter 2 where we concluded that the current rules sit uneasily with the 
Aarhus Convention. Moreover the rules are uncertain and capable of discouraging the legal 
adviser from pursuing the application for the PCO. For the purpose of the E.L.F./BRASS 
Report751and this thesis this author sought cases whose clients applied for judicial review. The 
following is a rare example of comprehensive qualitative analysis given the confidentiality 
agreed with ELF at the outset of the research.752 It is replicated from the BRASS/E.L.F. Report. 
 
“'The research discovered that an application for a Protective Cost Order (PCO) was lodged in 
only one out of 26 cases with supposedly good prospects of success. There were a few cases in 
which the clients stated that they had considered an application for a PCO but found it still to be 
prohibitively expensive.  The case where an application for a PCO was lodged concerned local 
residents wishing to register an area, consisting of a pond surrounded by land on two sides, as a 
village green. The land has been used and the pond has been fished for many years by the local 
community; facts which were underpinned by witnesses’ testimony. Subsequently, a significant 
part of the pond was purchased with an intention of establishing a fish farm.  The Council stated 
that there had been an interruption to the use of the land and the local community would have to 
issue a further application with regard to the status of the land. The latter proceeded to a public 
inquiry where an Inspector excluded the pond from any protected status.  
 
The client, who was retired but ineligible for legal aid, was advised by an E.L.F. adviser (in this 
instance Queen’s Counsel) to judicially review the above decision. The prospects of success 
were estimated at 50 percent but the insurance could not cover the legal costs. The matter 
proceeded ultimately by way of a Conditional Fee Arrangement together with Counsel’s 
application for the PCO.  The PCO was not granted because, in the judge’s view, the issues 
751 Radoslaw Stech, Robert G. Lee, Deborah Tripley ‘Costs Barriers to Environmental Justice’ (Report for 
Environmental Law Foundation and BRASS)  (Alen & Overy 2009), see supra note 1 
752 See p. 209 
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raised were not of general importance and the public interest did not require that they should be 
resolved. In addition, the judge added:  
 
“Further, I would only consider it just to make a protective cost order if the same or 
similar cap was applied to the costs which the claimant might recover from the 
Defendant and/or the interested party. The cap would be set so far below the estimates of 
recoverable costs under the conditional fee agreement made by the claimant as to defeat 
its purpose”753 
 
Counsel, who is a specialist on the law relating to village greens, advised on issuing an 
application for the PCO by way of an oral hearing. The client could not risk the potential costs at 
this stage.  There is one other example of a case in which an application for a PCO was 
considered by an adviser. A client opposed planning permission for commercial and residential 
development in a woodland area, which is part of the green network. The development included 
the erection of retail units, houses and more than 50 apartments.  
Counsel identified numerous grounds for judicial review suggesting that this would be a good 
arguable case in the Courts. For example, the Council had failed to take into account relevant 
considerations and to give adequate reasons for the decision. Counsel advised:  
 
 'However the claimant will no doubt be advised that there is no guarantee of success. 
 There is always a risk of an order for costs if the application for permission or the 
 substantive claim fails. On the information presently available to me I do not think that 
 an application for a protected costs order is likely to succeed because the issues, while of 
 great importance to the claimant and the local community, are unlikely to be considered 
 ‘of general public importance’; nor can it be said that it is in the public interest for those 
 issues to be resolved'754 
753 R v. Sunderland City Council [2008] CO/6798/2008 (Application for a protective costs order) 
754 Opinion of Counsel, taken from the cases file 
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The client decided not to proceed with the case in the light of this advice.'”755 
  
755 E.L.F. Report 20-21 
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Polycentricity of E.L.F. judicial review referrals 
 
This section will analyse the referrals in context of spatial distribution. Chapter 1 showed that 
environmental justice can be measured spatially on the basis of the Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD)756. The researchers focused on measuring the exposure of communities living 
in the most deprived areas of the UK. Thus the focus was on establishing the aggregate exposure 
to environmental elements and factors. Yet, environmental justice concerns the procedural 
mechanisms, notably access to information and participation in decision-making. Chapters 2 and 
the above analysis in this Chapter showed a limited usefulness and success of judicial review in 
addressing the equality concerns. Crucially, the author argues that it is important to measure the 
aggregate access to the procedural mechanisms related to environmental justice. This section 
will focus on judicial review referrals in England only. The rationale for this choice alongside 
more detailed methodological note will be explained immediately below. Thereafter the author 
will present the results in a form of a visual ‘polycentric matrix’ (Appendix 4). Given the 
pragmatist epistemological underpinnings the matrix is a result of the author’s experimentation 
as to how the results could be best presented and analysed. The aim was to produce a simple, 
user-friendly, matrix with the use of different colours. Similarly to the Fuller’s spider web757the 
‘polycentric matrix’ illustrates the variety of centres in the results. 
 
Methodology note  
The author analysed the spatial distribution of the E.L.F. referrals at the time of collecting the 
data. The postcodes of all referrals were input alongside other variables in SPSS. The description 
of the IDM was provided in the main Methodology Chapter earlier in this thesis758. Given the 
pragmatist approach, the agreement with E.L.F759 and the limited time and financial resources it 
756 See p.50 
757 See p. 316 
758 See p. 206 
759 See p. 190 
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was decided to focus on presenting the spatial distribution of the judicial review referrals only. 
Moreover, this focuses on the aggregate index rather than on the individual indices.  
 
The matrix includes the case ordinal number, the year, the name of the district. Further, the 
measurement is conducted at the national and district level. The former includes the overall score 
and each of the 32,480 Lower Super Output Areas is assigned a unique score. It also includes 
two ranks of each of the 326 districts at the national level. The inclusion of two ranks stems from 
the complexity of measuring the districts as explained in the IDM Technical Report 
 
“There are a number of reasons why districts are complex to describe as a whole and to 
compare. Districts can vary enormously in both geographic and population size. Districts 
also have very different populations. Some contain more variation in deprivation while 
in other places deprivation may be concentrated in severe pockets rather than being 
more evenly spread. This makes an overall picture more difficult to establish. All areas 
experiencing high levels of deprivation will be identified by one or more of these six 
measures, as they are designed to capture deprivation in areas of different sizes with 
different levels of heterogeneity.” 760 
 
Table 52 below summarises the six measures:
760 IMD Technical Report, supra note 645, p. 54 
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Table 52 IDM measures 
Name Description Aim and methodology 
Lo
ca
l 
co
nc
en
tra
t
io
n 
“Population weighted average of 
the ranks of a district’s most 
deprived LSOAs that contain 
exactly 10% of the district’s 
population”. 
Allows the identification of districts’ ‘hot spots’ of deprivation. Created by “taking the mean of the population 
weighted rank of a district’s most deprived LSOAs that capture exactly 10% of the district’s population”.  
Ex
te
nt
 
“Proportion of a district’s 
population living in the most 
deprived LSOAs in the country”. 
Measures “how widespread high levels of deprivation are in a district. It only includes districts containing LSOAs 
which fall within the most deprived 30% of LSOAs in England. Therefore some districts do not have an overall score 
for this measure and they are given a joint rank of 294. In this measure, 100% of the people living in the 10% most 
deprived LSOAs in England are captured in the numerator, plus a proportion of the population of those LSOAs in the 
next two deciles on a sliding scale – that is 95% of the population of the LSOA at the 11th percentile, and 5% of the 
population of the LSOA at the 29th percentile”. 
In
co
m
e “[T]he number of people who are income deprived” 
Gives an indication of “the sheer number of people experiencing income deprivation” at district level. It “is a count of 
individuals experiencing income deprivation”.  
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
[Th]e number of people who are 
employment deprived 
Gives an indication of “the sheer number of people experiencing employment deprivation” at district level. It “is a 
count of individuals experiencing employment deprivation”. 
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
LS
O
A
 ra
nk
s 
 “This measure is useful because it summarises the district taken as a whole, including both deprived and less deprived 
LSOAs. All the LSOAs in a district need to be included to obtain such an average, as each LSOA contributes to the 
character of that district. This measure is calculated by averaging all of the LSOA ranks in each district. The LSOA 
ranks are population weighted within a district to take account of the fact that LSOA size can vary. 
The nature of this measure means that a highly polarised district would not score highly because extremely deprived 
and less deprived LSOAs will ‘average out’. Conversely, a district that is more homogenously poor will have a 
greater chance of scoring highly on an average measure.” 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
of
 L
SO
A
 
sc
or
es
 Population weighted average of 
the combined scores for the 
LSOAs in a district 
This measure also describes the district as a whole, taking into account the full range of LSOA scores across a district. 
The advantage of this measure is that it describes the LSOA by retaining the fact that more deprived LSOAs may 
have more ‘extreme’ scores, which is not revealed to the same extent if the ranks are used. This measure is calculated 
by averaging the LSOA scores in each district after they have been population weighted. 
Source
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The following steps were taken in creating the polycentric matrix. 
 
1. There is no direct way of matching the postcode with the IMD, which is based upon the 
LSOAs and districts. The matching is possible through the ‘Neighbourhood Statistics’ on 
the Office for National Statistics Website761. As a result the author established the overall 
score of the LSOA from which the referral originated in England (hereafter "REF LSOA") 
and the name of the district (hereafter "REF DISTRICT"). The author focused on the 
referrals originating from England because the IMD are different in Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. 
 
2. The author captured the average of LSOA rank and score for the district summaries 
available online762. 
 
3. The author found the LSOA score in the overall LSOA summary available online763. The 
document consists of the scores of all 32,480 LSOAs arranged according to the district 
name. The author established the number of LSOAs within the district. 
 
4. The author copied all scores within a given district to a blank Excel spreadsheet and sorted 
them from smallest to largest. He identified the rank of the REF LSOA within the REF 
DISTRICT.  
 
5. The author input income of the client. Overall, there are 219 judicial review referrals and 
193 based in England. Further, 62 out of 193 referrals had missing income variable. The 
761 Office for National Statistics ‘Neighbourhood Statistics’ 
<http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadHome.do;jessionid=GpQvTNsL0vyCtVnM5LCW
slvLPVCWnQc0X4z5QWmn7FqJ1FTGG2Mk!-
40454641!1322085416594?m=0&s=1322085416875&enc=1&nsjs=true&nsck=true&nssvg=false&nswid=1280> 
accessed 1 May 2011 – 1 July 2011 
762 Department for Communities and Local Government 'The English Indices of Deprivation 2010:  Local Authority 
District Summaries’ (London 2011) 
<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/indices2010> accessed 1 April 2011 
763 Department for Communities and Local Government ‘The Indices of deprivation 2010: Overall’ (London 2011) 
< http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/indices2010> accessed 1 April 2011 
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analysis focused therefore on 131 referrals consisting of the income variable. 
 
6.  The table was created consisting the following five variables subject to further analysis: 
LSOA score, average district rank, average district, rank within district and income 
representing the interests at national, regional and personal level. 
 
7. Each variable established upon the IMD was weighted accordingly:  
 
• Values within the first 10 percent were assigned a RED colour; 
• Values between 10-20 percent were assigned an colour ORANGE colour; 
• Values between 20-30 percent were assigned a BRIGHT YELLOW colour; 
• Values between 30-50 percent were assigned a LIGHT GREEN colour; 
• Values between 50-100 percent were assigned a DARK GREEN colour. 
 
8. Income variable was weighted accordingly: 
 
• under 10,000 was assigned a RED colour; 
• 10,000-14,999 was assigned an colour ORANGE colour; 
• 15,000-19,999 was assigned a BRIGHT YELLOW colour; 
• 20,000-29,999 was assigned a LIGHT GREEN colour; 
• 30,000 and above was assigned a DARK GREEN colour. 
 
 
9. The referrals which all 5 variables were assigned the same colour or colours within the 
range of two corresponding colours are non-polycentric or uniform. This is represented in 
highlighting the ‘Case No’ with the colour.  
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The cases are polycentric when there is a clear contrast between the colours which 
represents different centres. 
 
Results 
 
The results are presented in the polycentric matrix (Appendix 4) below. Out of 131 referrals 42 
(32 percent) are non-polycentric. Further,  8 (6 percent)  are purely environmental justice (with 
all IMD variables within the first 30 percent of deprivation and income below £20,000) and 34 
(26 percent) are purely environmental (with all IMD variables below the 30% threshold and 
income above £20,000). The remaining 89 referrals (68 percent) are polycentric and can be 
characterised as follows: 
 
• Claims of poor individuals living in a relatively non-deprived area altogether  (for 
example referrals 12 and 13). 
 
• Claims of poor individuals living in a relatively deprived LSOA which is one of the most 
deprived within a district. Yet the district is one of the least deprived when compared 
with other districts nationally (referrals  9, 88, 102). 
 
• Claims of poor individuals living in a relatively non-deprived LSOA and district. Yet, 
still, their LSOA is one of the poorest in the district (referrals 2, 3, 17, 21, 93, 94). 
 
• Claims of poor individuals living in one of the most deprived districts. Yet, their LSOA 
is non-deprived and highly ranked within the district (referral 19). 
 
• Claims of poor individuals living in deprived LSOA and district. Yet their LSOA is 
highly ranked within the district (referral 20). 
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• A claims of an individual on average or high income living in a deprived area altogether 
(referral 46). 
 
• Claims of individuals on average or high income living in a non-deprived LSOA highly 
ranked within the district. Yet the district itself is one of the most deprived nationally 
(referral  7, 27, 56, 62, 63, 78, 79, 83, 105, 113). 
 
• Claims of individuals on average or high income living in a non-deprived LSOA based in 
a non-deprived district. Yet, still, the LSOA is one of the most-deprived within the 
district (referral 11, 64, 77). 
 
• A claims of an individual on average or high income living in a deprived LSOA and 
district. Yet, their district is one of the least deprived in the country (referral 102). 
 
Summary 
 
 
Chapter 8 showed that the judicial review sample consisted of planning law-based claims which 
are said to be polycentric due to the variety of involved interests.  A half of these referrals 
received a negative opinion as to the prospects of success at judicial review and the remaining 
half were advised to proceed. In the latter pool there were 54 cases which were prevented by the 
cost barrier. A small number of referrals ended with a full judgment in the High Court and a 
significant number concluded in out-of-court/in-court settlement.  Chapter 8 analysed spatial 
distribution of the referrals which originated in England by matching the postcode with the 
English Indices of Multiple Deprivation. Such methodology allowed for measuring interests 
involved in each judicial review referral. It found that the majority of cases were polycentric. 
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Chapter 9 Ramifications of the findings 
Chapter 9 will discuss the ramifications of the findings and will be followed by a short 
conclusion. It will attempt to answer the final research question. 
 
The thesis has reviewed the modus operandi of E.L.F. in detail764 and noted the organised flow 
of information in place; a specific set of documents used for accepting and reviewing enquires 
and taking them further to the referral stage. It is crucial to note that E.L.F. does not aim 
specifically at lower income or disadvantaged communities in its referral service. Everybody 
who faces an environmental problem can make an enquiry but the research showed that there 
was increased demand from lower socio-economic class in the UK. It makes E.L.F. one of the 
main environmental justice organisations alongside others recently recognised in the 
literature.765  Above, we concluded the interdependence of the type of funding and experts’ 
opinion on the referrals’ suitability for litigation. In this section The author will argue that the 
expertise which E.L.F. provides through its network of solicitors and barristers is unique in the 
sphere of environmental justice in the UK.  The author will underpin his thesis with the 
theoretical structure developed by Marc Galanter which has become one of the most frequently 
cited pieces in socio-legal community.  
Have-nots and litigation: theory 
Galanter’s article766 concerns the structural features of the litigation parties and, more broadly, 
the organisation of the society and the legal system. The author made the distinction between 
Repeat Shooters and One Players: 
 
“Because of differences in their size, differences in the state of the law, and differences in 
764 See p. 174 
765 Ole W Pedersen, ‘Environmental Justice in the UK...' supra note 170 
766 M Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead” 
<http://marcgalanter.net/Documents/papers/WhytheHavesComeOutAhead.pdf>, see also Marc Galanter, 
‘Afterword: Explaining Litigation’ (1974-75) 9 Law and Society Review 347 
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their resources, some of the actors in the society have many occasions to utilize the 
courts (in the broad sense) to make (or defend) claims; others do so only rarely. We 
might divide our actors into those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the 
courts (one-shooters or OS) and repeat players (RP) who are engaged in many similar 
litigations over time. The spouse in a divorce case, the auto injury claimant, the criminal 
accused are OSs; the insurance company, the prosecutor, the finance company are RPs. 
Obviously this is an oversimplification; there are intermediate cases such as the 
professional criminal. So we ought to think of OS-RP as a continuum rather than as a 
dichotomous pair.”767 
 
The litigation itself can take various combinations: OS vs OS, OS vs RP, RP vs OS and RP vs 
RP. The RP are expected to behave differently to OS during the litigation due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, they possess experience, expertise and can rely on the “economies of scale and 
have low start-up costs for any case”768 Secondly, they enjoy opportunities to develop informal 
relationship with various institutions. Thirdly, they develop reputations unlikely to be achieved 
by the OS which is then utilised as a resource in bargaining procedures. Fourthly, the OS tend to 
act in a way so that they can minimise the probability of maximum loss; whereas the RP can 
‘invest’ in a long series of lawsuits, therefore maximise the loss in certain cases. Fifthly, the RP 
can make efforts to change the rules, through lobbying for example, as well as secure immediate 
gains in particular cases.  Sixthly, “RP can also play for rules in litigation itself, whereas an OS 
is unlikely to.”769The latter tends not to be interested in similar litigation elsewhere. Moreover, 
the RP “by virtue of experience and expertise, are more likely to be able to discern which rules 
are likely to penetrate and which are likely to remain merely symbolic commitments”770. As a 
result they can give in symbolic for the tangible gains. In addition, given usefulness of various 
resources for the ‘penetration’, “RPs are more likely to be able to invest the matching resources 
767 Ibid 3 
768 Ibid 4 
769 Ibid 
770 Ibid 9 
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necessary to secure the penetration of rules favorable to them”.771  
 
Galanter considers the position of lawyers who are themselves the Repeat Players. Nevertheless, 
an assumption can be made that the RP party can have a better access to the legal services and 
better advice, which they can buy en mass and higher rates. In short, they have access to more 
talent that the One Shooters. 
 
Galanter highlights a number of features of the legal services, which OS has access to. The first 
demands a full citation: 
 
“First, they tend to make up the “lower echelons” of the legal profession. Compared to 
the lawyers who provide services to RPs, lawyers in these specialties tend to be drawn 
from lower socioeconomic origins, to have attended local, proprietary or part-time law 
schools, to practice alone rather than in large firms, and to possess low prestige within 
the profession. Of course the correlation is far from perfect; some lawyers who represent 
OSs do not have these characteristics and some representing RPs do. However, on the 
whole the difference in professional standing is massive).”772 
 
Secondly, the OS tend to possess lower awareness about the availability of the service thus the 
lawyers face problems with mobilising their clients. In addition, the clients “encounter “ethical” 
barriers imposed by the profession which forbids solicitation, advertising, referral fees, advances 
to clients, and so forth”773  
 
Thirdly, lawyers servicing the OSs are stereotyped as “uncreative brand of legal services”774 due 
to their sporadic and intermittent relationship. They also face accusations of being unethical 
771 Ibid 
772 Ibid 23 
773 Ibid 24 
774 Ibid 
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when adopting similar strategies to lawyers acting for the benefit of the RPs. 
 
Importantly for this thesis, Galanter considers the distribution of legal facilities which benefits 
the RPs due to passivity and overload. Passivity refers to the notion that the legal services must 
be mobilized by the potential claimants. Nevertheless, they must give advantages to the 
claimants to initiate the process by providing information on how to overcome the procedural 
requirements. The overload refers to the truism that there are many more cases than resources to 
cover the expenses of adjudication thus the claimants are under pressure to seek or agree to the 
settlement.  
 
Finally Galanter considered the rules, where he noted that the laws in general do not benefit 
either party, nevertheless, the OSs have limited resources for implementing the rules. Moreover, 
various procedural requirements pose barriers for the potential claimants. Finally,  
 
“the rules are sufficiently complex and problematic (or capable of being problematic if 
sufficient resources are expended to make them so) that differences in the quantity and 
quality of legal services will affect capacity to derive advantages from the rules”.775 
 
The Galanter’s thesis seems to be accepted by UK scholars: 
 
“the poorer salaries of legal aid lawyers relative to nonlegal aid work mean that more 
poorer-quality lawyers tend to do legal aid work.”776 
Analysis 
In relation to the OS-RP dichotomy it is clear that the vast majority of E.L.F. clients would be 
classified as the One Shooters whereas the potential defendants as Repeat Players. The author 
775 Ibid 31-32 
776 Richard Moorhead, Avrom Sherr, Alan Paterson ‘Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in 
England and Wales’ (2003) 37(4) Law & Society Review 765, 797 
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starts with this premise relying on the results concerning income of the clients and the primary 
area of law linked to the judicial review referrals.  It is very unlikely that people with income 
below £15,000 would engage in repetitive recourse to the courts. Moreover, having all judicial 
review referrals linked to planning law the author concludes that the defendants are likely to be 
public authorities and, in some instances, public authorities and developers. Such entities tend to 
have experience with litigation. 
 
In relation to the problem of access to legal services OS tend to receive advice from the less 
experienced lawyers. However, this is not the case in relation to our study cohort. E.L.F. clients 
have access to the network of commercial and renowned lawyers following the initial 
consideration made by the in-house lawyers.  The raison d’être of E.L.F. is its connections with 
the network of advisers who practice law and serve the wider society on the everyday basis 
rather than specialising in providing advice to the poor or disadvantaged part of the society. 
There is irrefutable evidence supporting this argument. Firstly, the analysis of the Members’ 
Database in E.L.F. Digital Redbook reveals that there were 543 advisers as for October 2009 on 
the list.777 Crucially, there were 108 barristers and 16 Queen’s Counsels who tend to charge 
considerable amount of money for their advice. Moreover, the author noted in Methodology 
Chapter778 that a solicitor to whom inquiry is referred in the first instance can refuse the referral 
due to conflict of interest. The probability that the adviser will be serving the potential defendant 
of E.L.F.’s enquirer is written into the organisational code of conduct. It suggest, nevertheless, 
that the communities who contact E.L.F. will eventually receive advice from the ‘higher 
echelons’ of the legal profession rather than, as Galanter suggests, from the less experienced and 
qualified peers.  
 
777 E.L.F. Member’s Database, Digital Redbook, accessed 1 October 2009 
778 See p. 182 
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ELF expertise and funding 
This study showed almost equal representation of individuals and community groups which 
contacted E.L.F. between 2005 and 2009. This proves a considerable organisation of people 
facing environmental problems and reflects the established fact that E.L.F. referrals concern the 
public interest. Yet, when the author looked at funding of referrals in previous Chapter779  he 
found that ‘group fighting funds’ constituted a small proportion of funding (15 percent) when 
compared with the proportion of community groups. Moreover, when taken together with the 
proportion of ‘private funding’ (27 percent) nearly 60 percent of the referrals did not receive 
financial support from the proponents.  
 
Similarly, nearly 60 percent of referrals did not obtain funding of the claimants in judicial review 
cases as Table 53 below indicates. In this scenario, however, the author could cross-tabulate the 
funding variable with the variable concerning the advisers’ opinion as to the prospects of success 
of judicial review cases. The cross-tabulation aims at measuring whether there is a correlation 
between the type of funding and the advisers’ opinion. The analysis of Table 53 indicates that 
the two variables are fairly independent of each other. Whether or not the client funded the case 
by means of their funding there was a similar chance of receiving a positive or negative opinion 
as to the prospects of success in judicial review. The much greater number of pro bono referrals 
with a negative opinion suggests a potential link which is weakened by a clear majority of 
privately funded referrals with a negative opinion. The finding is significant for the 
understanding of environmental justice. It shows the importance of the expertise being a sole 
determinant of the referrals’ chances in litigation. The analysis shows that it is crucial to obtain 
access to expert’s opinion regardless of the type of funding.  It is also reflected in case law as the 
example of R v H.M. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace (No 2780) proves. 
 
779 See p. 246 
780 Supra note 206 
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Table 53 Funding and advice on success in judicial review cases 
Funding * advice on success of judicial review Crosstabulation 
  Advice on success of judicial review Total 
  positive negative advised to 
proceed 
not stated 
 
CFI 2 0 0 0 2 
Group "fighting fund" 11 10 2 0 23 
Legal Aid 2 3 0 0 5 
None 10 11 11 0 32 
Private 15 22 10 3 50 
Pro bono 5 29 7 2 43 
Not needed 0 11 0 0 11 
Mixture of funding 3 1 1 1 6 
  48 87 31 6 172 
 
 
E.L.F. and Aarhus Convention 
 
E.L.F. is not an environmental NGO that advises directly on the right of access to information or 
participation in decision-making. E.L.F. serves the public by empowering them to make the 
fuller use of their rights. This assistance helps achieving the objective of the Aarhus Convention. 
The author will suggest here that E.L.F.’ s role is more direct and tangible in relation to access to 
justice pillar. This role is of particular importance in light of the study results and environmental 
justice. 
 
The Aarhus Convention’s Article 9(5) encourages the Parties to establish assistance mechanism 
in the area of access to justice. Let us look at the Article below: 
 
“In order to further the effectiveness of the provisions of this article, each Party shall 
ensure that information is provided to the public on access to administrative and judicial 
review procedures and shall consider the establishment of appropriate assistance 
311 
 
 
 
mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to access to justice.”781 
 
This Article is divided into limbs: Parties should firstly, ensure that the public is informed about 
administrative or judicial review procedures and, secondly, consider the establishment of 
assistance mechanism to minimise barriers to access to justice. The UK government has been 
convinced that they satisfied the requirement which is reflected, for example, in their 
implementation report sent in 2008: 
 
“The UK has engaged in extensive activity to provide information to the public on 
accessing administrative and judicial review procedures, and to remove any financial and 
other barriers to access to justice or to consider how they could be removed.”782 
 
The extensive activity includes information available at Community Legal Service Direct,783 
DEFRA,784 and the Magistrates' Association.785 This information is complemented with E.L.F.’s 
activity, which provided opinion as to the litigation avenue in at least 219 scenarios between 
2005-2009. Moreover, given the results from the previous Chapter, E.L.F. is an important and 
acknowledged786 provider of information concerning the structural barriers to access to courts in 
the UK. More importantly, E.L.F. constitutes one of the mechanisms which contribute to 
reducing financial barriers to access to justice. Indeed, E.L.F. was not established directly by the 
government but it has relied on public funding to deliver its Advice and Referral Service787. This 
fact is sufficient to include E.L.F. as one of the mechanisms entrenched into Article 9(5) of the 
Convention according to the reasoning written into implementation Guide to the Convention: 
 
“Article 9 requires access to justice to be affordable for members of the public. The 
781 Aarhus Convention, Art 9(5) 
782UK Implementation Report, supra note 250, 111 
783 Ibid 112 
784 Ibid 114 
785 Ibid 116 
786 BRASS/E.L.F. report was cited in UNECE case; supra note 3 
787 See p. 175 
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earlier discussion under article 9, paragraph 4, gives examples of how to overcome some 
of the financial barriers to access to justice such as no-cost alternatives to courts, shifting 
fees for court expenses to the violator, reducing court costs, and finding alternatives to 
bond requirements. In addition, some countries establish and support legal assistance 
offices that provide free or low-cost legal advice to individuals and citizens’ 
organizations. In Poland, individuals or associations that cannot pay the costs associated 
with going to court may be entitled to a court-appointed lawyer. Other countries, such as 
Armenia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, the Republic of 
Moldova, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United 
States have privately funded or university-based legal assistance centres. In these cases, 
elimination by the government of technical obstacles to the creation, operation and 
funding of a not-for-profit organization is crucial to ensuring that such privately funded 
legal assistance centres continue to exist.”788 
 
Fostering participation through access to litigation 
Thirdly, given the above, litigation can contribute to further participation of the dissatisfied 
claimant. Of course, much of the work in such circumstances is done by the solicitor and counsel 
and the claimant is limited in their participation. This may be insignificant since meaningful 
participation in decision-making is done by representatives. Consult the ladder of participation 
developed by Arnstein where it was argued that meaningful participation would place demands 
on the side of the public such as the need for paid representatives.789 Moreover, the 
commencement of judicial review proceedings opens a possibility for settlement negotiations 
which can provide additional opportunities for the more active involvement of the claimant. This 
is particularly tangible in circumstances where the claimant decided not to engage the lawyers 
following the commencement of legal action due to lack of funds for example. Such a client 
788 Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide supra note 375, p. 135 
789 S Arnstein, (1969) ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ in T. R. LeGates and F. Stout (eds), The City Reader 
(Routledge 2003) 245-255 
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could enter the stage where the defendant takes the possibility of lengthy proceedings seriously 
and approaches the client directly to reach an agreement. 
Participation thesis 
Alongside the primary function of settling disputes Fuller saw adjudication as form of social 
ordering, “as a way in which the relations of men to one another are governed and regulated”790. 
The other two forms of social ordering are contract, which requires negotiation, and election 
which is based on voting. The adjudication is distinguished because of its intrinsic feature 
namely “that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that 
of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favour”.791 This proposition 
was later792 referred to by Eisenberg as the “participation thesis”793, which the author accepts for 
the clarity of further analysis. The originality of the approach lies in the chosen departure point 
where adjudication is considered from the view of participants rather than the judge. Placing the 
latter as the departure point would amount to agreeing that the office of the judge constitutes 
“the essence of adjudication”794. Instead, the adjudication is a device which gives “formal and 
institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs.”795 The 
participation in the adjudication, unlike in other forms of social ordering where emotions and 
preferences can take the lead, is based upon the rules and principles; the claimants must underpin 
their claims by revoking the law. It is therefore undisputable that the clients are advised to seek 
legal advice before engaging in legal challenge in order to embed their claims in the existing 
legislation, case law and guidance. The judge’s role is to attend the to the parties’ evidence. 
Fuller then introduces the crucial drawback of litigation, namely its “relative incapacity [...] to 
solve "polycentric" problems”796. The polycentric disputes have many “interacting points of 
790 Lon Fuller,‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‘ (1978-1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 357 
791 Ibid 364 
792 Fuller published his article post mortem 
793 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller’ 
(1978-1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 410, 411 
794 Lon Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits... supra note 790, 365 
795 Ibid 366 
796 Ibid 371 
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influence”797 and “normally involve many affected parties and a somewhat fluid state of 
affairs”798. Fuller gives a metaphor for the polycentric disputes: 
 
“We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. A pull on one 
strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole. 
Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting 
tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of tensions. This would 
certainly occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker 
strands to snap. This is a "polycentric" situation because it is "many centered" - each 
crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions”799. 
 
Fuller gives a number of examples of polycentric disputes which are difficult to adjudicate as the 
task of assigning football players to particular positions on the pitch. Another example was 
described in Chapter 1800 of this thesis and involves the distribution of water for the purpose of 
litigation and dykes for flood control. Fuller was fairly convinced that, in general, “that problems 
in the allocation of economic resources present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for 
adjudication.”801 The polycentric disputes should not be subjected to litigation because the lack 
of adequate and full information about the interests of all involved parties. Instead, Fuller 
proposed “managerial and contract”802 systems as adequate methods for solving polycentric 
disputes. The former requires a manager who provides the direction and assigns the tasks by 
using intuition to some degree. The human judgment is also indispensable in resolving complex 
economic problems: 
 
“In the solution of some economic polycentric problems, recently developed 
797 Ibid 395 
798 Ibid 397 
799 Ibid 395 
800 See p. 39 
801 Lon Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits... supra note 790, 400 
802 Lon Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits... supra note 790, 398 
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mathematical methods, like those of Leontief, may reduce the necessity to rely on 
intuition, though they can never eliminate the element of human judgment.”803 
 
The latter is “a reciprocal adjustment of each center of interest with those with which it 
interacts”804. Fuller was largely sceptical as to the usefulness of game theory and voting and 
noticed a possible adequacy of parliamentary method which he called the “political deal”805. In 
summary, the Fuller’s concept of adjudication and its limits can be framed in the wider socio-
legal discourse in which this thesis is embedded806.  
Participation thesis – reception, critique and elaboration 
The ‘participation thesis’ has received wide attention from scholars aiming at criticism and 
elaboration both in the US and UK. Importantly, it was recognised as an abstract and ideal 
model807. The below analysis will primarily focus on the UK reception, which has never been 
immune to borrowing ideas from the US literature.  
 
First of all, the model was criticised and elaborated by Eisenberg in the same issue of Harvard 
Law Review808. The author challenge the premise that what distinguishes adjudication from other 
forms of social ordering is the parties’ right to present the evidence and the judges’ obligation to 
attend. Instead, Eisenberg introduced the concept of “strong responsiveness”,809 which 
distinguishes adjudication from other forms of social ordering. It follows that “the decision 
ought to proceed from and be congruent with those proofs and arguments” where 
 
“strong responsiveness does not follow from the Participation Thesis, but is an 
independent norm which both helps define adjudication and gives a special meaning to 
803 Ibid 399 
804 Ibid 
805 Ibid 400 
806 See p. 195 
807 Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion’ (1973) 1 Public Law 178 
808 Eisenberg, ‘Participation, Responsiveness... supra note 793 
809 Eisenberg, ‘Participation, Responsiveness... supra note 793, 412 
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participation through proofs and arguments”.810 
 
Eisenberg proposed another form of social ordering where parties are able to present reasoned 
arguments and, “to varying degrees, proofs for a decision in their favour”.811 This is called the 
consultative process which is 
 
“The consultative process is distinguished from adjudication by the fact that the norm of 
strong responsiveness is inapplicable - that is, the decision need not proceed from or be 
congruent with the parties' proofs and arguments. Instead, the decision maker may base 
his decision solely on evidence he has himself collected, on his own experience, on his 
institutional preferences, and on rules neither adduced nor addressed by the parties”812. 
 
Given the lack of the requirement for a decision maker to base their decision logically on the 
basis of attendants’ arguments, Eienberg asked himself about the purpose of consultative 
process. In return he offered the following reasons: 
 
“(i) Where a decision will have a serious impact on a discrete set of persons, preservation 
of individual dignity points to the desirability of an ordering process in which those 
persons will be able to express their view of the matter to the decisionmaker before the 
decision is made; (ii) Requiring the decisionmaker to attend to the parties' proofs and 
arguments serves the societal interest of assuring that decisions are well informed. (iii) 
Requiring decisions to proceed from and be congruent with the parties' proofs and 
arguments is often inappropriate or infeasible, either because of the nature of the subject-
matter or the nature of the setting. (iv) Decisionmakers will normally accommodate their 
decisions to convincing proofs and arguments even though not obliged to do so, and are 
more likely to make such accommodation in shaping decisions than in unmaking or 
810 Ibid 413 
811 Ibid 414 
812 Ibid  
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revising them."813 
 
The above reasons for resorting to consultative process are in line with the identified benefits of 
environmental participation in Chapter 3814. Although environmental justice advocates often 
argue that the properly run consultation process leads to the longetivity of the project. It follows 
from the second Eisenberg’s argument that the decision are well informed. Moreover, the author 
noted that  
 
“In major variants, the process can be coupled either with judicial review of the decision 
on the basis of the facts and rules properly considered by the decisionmaker, or with an 
adjudicative hearing afforded only after the decision has been given provisional 
effect.”815 
 
In the UK Jowell provided a seminal response to the participation thesis of adjudication in 
context of planning law. Firstly, the author summarised the merits and limits of adjudication in 
the UK. The former include the ability of the parties to participate in the judgment to advance 
“the strongest case for their position”,816 the strong responsiveness, “the tendency of 
adjudication to promote administrative integrity” arising from the requirements that the 
judgment is justified “by a rule, standard or principle”817. Further, adjudication limits the 
involvement of political or private interests, provides legitimacy and the fact that the judgment is 
based on the previous case law. In terms of drawbacks of adjudication Jowell emphasised the 
limits of responding to the nature of substantive rights and costs of deteriorating the relationship 
of the parties. Further adjudication is not well suited to accommodate the polycentric cases 
which call for compromise rather than the outcome in which “[o]ne side must win and the other 
813 Ibid 417 
814 See p. 140 
815 Ibid 415 
816 Jowell, ‘The Legal Control... supra note 807, 197 
817 Ibid 
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must lose; the defendant is liable, guilty or not guilty”.818Moreover, adjudication is complex and 
can pose problems for the lawyers let alone the lay public. Further, Jowell emphasises the 
conflict between rights and administrative duties and wider interests:  
 
“The adjudicative decision concerns individual rights, and may thus bear little or no 
relation to the primary administrative function, which involves the performance of a 
particular task. A particular case, for example may raise questions wider than the 
questions at issue [...] Furthermore, although the specific decision may affect parties 
similarly situated to the direct participants in the litigation the decision-maker is not 
required to consult or notify these wider interests”.819  
 
Jowell provides urban planning as the “most obvious form”820 of polycentric disputes. It is 
because the planning decisions are largely based upon development plans which carry vagueness 
as to the meaning of ‘public interest’ or ‘best planning principles’ and the nature of planning 
itself where the placement or relocation of one element interacts with or creates problems in 
another area.  
 
The concept of polycentricism received judicial attention albeit, as King’s useful analysis 
provides821, it was predominantly indirect. In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service Respondent Lord Dipock, in context of irrationality ground, pronounced that 
certain decisions would not be suitable for judicial review: 
 
“Such decisions will generally involve the application of government policy. The reasons 
for the decision-maker taking one course rather than another do not normally involve 
questions to which, if disputed, the judicial process is adapted to provide the right 
818 Ibid 199 
819 Ibid 
820 Ibid 214 
821 Jeff A King, ‘The pervasiveness of polycentricity’ (2008) Public Law 101 
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answer, by which I mean that the kind of evidence that is admissible under judicial 
procedures and the way in which it has to be adduced tend to exclude from the attention 
of the court competing policy considerations which, if the executive discretion is to be 
wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one another - a balancing exercise which 
judges by their upbringing and experience are ill-qualified to perform. So I leave this as 
an open question to be dealt with on a case to case basis if, indeed, the case should ever 
arise.”822 
 
In certain cases the courts considered the polycentricity directly823. In  R, on the application of 
British Telecommunications Plc v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills 824 the 
court considered the polycentricity of material facts relating to intellectual property rights and 
made an express referral to Lon Fuller. In R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) 
v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Alconbury) 825 Lord 
Hadley made an indirect reference to polycentric disputes and reiterated the limitations of 
judicial review in planning: 
 
“The whole justification for a national planning policy is based on the idea that there are 
wider interests than those of the applicant himself and his neighbours e g environment 
policy. The limitations on the scope of judicial review reflect a distribution of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches and the courts. Planning adjudications are 
not between competing private interests but made in the public interest […] In the 
language of the European Court of Human Rights this is a discretionary decision i e one 
taken on behalf of a wider public interest which outweighs private rights. The role of the 
Secretary of State makes the planning system coherent and consistent across the country. 
822 Supra note 232, at 411 
823 R. v Home Secretary and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex p. P [1995] 1 All E.R. 870, CA; R. (on the 
application of Hooper) v Secretary of State for Works and Pensions [2002] EWHC Admin 191; [2002] U.K.H.R.R. 
785 at [160], R. (on the application of Cityhook Ltd) v Office of Fair Trading [2009] A.C.D. 41,  
824 R, on the application of British Telecommunications Plc v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills 
[2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin) 
825 R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions (Alconbury) [2001] UKHL 23 
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Local authorities prepare development plans which reflect national policy and must be 
adhered to. The right of appeal to an inspector and the Secretary of State's right to call in 
a case are essential features of the scheme. If it is legitimate to have a national planning 
policy it is also legitimate to have it decided and applied by accountable elected ministers 
which the courts only oversee to the extent of ensuring decisions are taken lawfully”826 
 
In seminal guide on judicial review, Woolf, Jowell and Sueur consider polycentricity as the 
limitation to adjudication. The authors pay a particular attention to the “allocative decisions” 
which involve “the distribution of limited resources.”827 One of the reasons for the unsuitability 
is that “the re-allocation of resources in consequence of the judicial review will normally involve 
the interests of those who were not represented in the initial litigation”828. 
 
Polycentricity of E.L.F. referrals 
It follows from the Chapter 1 that environmental justice claims are polycentric in nature829. They 
involve the diversity of substantial demands and involve multiple interests830. The author has 
argued that the E.L.F. referrals carry the polycentric interests accordingly. The analysis pays 
particular attention to the suitability of the referrals to be resolved by way of judicial review in 
context of the above deliberations. 
 
Firstly, the referrals were reported to carry a substantial human rights element, which 
complicates the environmental cases and renders them as polycentric831. The clients’ claims 
about a number of ECHR rights at stake could, subject to the minimum severity test, lead to 
complex judicial considerations. Yet, the Human Rights Act 1998 eliminates another drawback 
826 Ibid 288 
827 Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s judicial review (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 20 
828 Ibid 21 
829 See p.71 
830 Ibid 
831 See also Jason Coppel and Michael Supperstone, ‘Judicial review after the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 3 
European Human Rights Law Review 301 
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of adjudication proposed by Jowell namely the inability of courts to the wider and individual 
interests at stake.  As a result, though human rights are polycentric, the procedural opportunity 
entrenched in the UK legal system addresses the kernel of the problem to some extent. 
 
Secondly, while most of the clients identified the procedural impropriety in the decision or 
process in their referrals, still many of them presented substantive claims. Chapter 3832 showed 
the relative inability of British courts to satisfy the requirements of the Aarhus Convention in 
terms of providing the substantive review of decisions. Some substantive claims will inevitably 
carry the polycentric interests where a decision in favour of the claimant may cause disturbances 
in the wider web of interests. 
 
This leads us to the third aspect of E.L.F. referrals, namely the fact that the vast majority of them 
relates to the planning law. The current planning regime, although largely reformed since 
Jowell’s paper, is still an ‘obvious’ example of polycentric disputes833.  
 
Fourthly, and most importantly, the E.L.F. judicial review referrals carry polycentric economic 
interests of individuals and the wider society in terms of access to environmental justice 
(Appendix 4). 
 
832 See p. 165 
833 Patrick Bishop and Victoria Jenkins, ‘Planning and nuisance: revisiting the balance of public and private interests 
in land-use development’ (2011) 23(2)  Journal of Environmental Law 285 
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Negotiation and settlement: solution to E.L.F. polycentric disputes? 
This final heading in the thesis does not aim to provide a comprehensive answer to a question 
whether negotiation and settlement could provide solution to polycentric disputes. 
 
Negotiation and settlement have been proposed as a distinguishable form of resolving complex 
polycentric disputes834.  Boyer proposed “a true bargaining approach in which affected interests 
negotiate solutions by compromise or agreement” with a decision maker.835 This can take 
various forms where the decision-maker or its subdivision “is a party to the bargaining”, acts as a 
“surrogate for affected segments of the general public” or “merely serves as a mediator between 
conflicting claims”836. Allisson suggests that Galanter’s “sociological observations”837 could 
serve as a mechanism of improving the social ordering. Galanter noticed an increase in the use of 
settlement and negotiations, often triggered by judges, in resolving disputes in the US. He coined 
a term “litigotiation” and "bargaining in the shadow of the law" for:838 
 
“[T]he strategic pursuit of resolution through mobilizing the court process. In this 
process, full-blown adjudication is an infrequently occurring alternative to negotiated 
settlement - though one that remains a compelling presence even when it doesn't 
occur.”839 
 
Galanter reiterated and highlighted a number of advantages of settlement, for example, the 
reduction of court caseload and limited court resources and the increased satisfaction of the 
parties with the process. Crucially, he noticed that “settlement is thought to permit compromise 
834 For review see J W F Allison, ‘Fuller's Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication’ (1994) 
53 Cambridge Law Journal 367 
835 Barry B Boyer, ‘Alternatives to Administrative Trialtype Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, 
and Social Issues’ (1972-73) 71 Michigan Law Review 111, 167 
836 Ibid 
837 Allison ‘Fuller's Analysis... supra note 834 
838 Marc Galanter, ‘" •• A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge:" Judicial Mediation in the United States’ (1985) 
12(1) Journal of Law and Society 1 
839 Ibid 1 
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positions that are unattainable through adjudication” without, however, explicitly calling the 
problem of polycenticity.840 Galanter supported judicial intervention as part of ’litigotiation’.  
Table 45 in the previous Chapter841 indicates that there were 16 settled cases and 8 cases which 
reached the full court judgment. Moreover, 7 cases were settled with a consent order. Such 
settlement, though made by parties, requires judicial intervention because the court must be 
satisfied that the consent order should be made. In order to assist the court the parties should 
enclose their justification for settlement in the document. The court must be primarily satisfied 
that it is in the public interest to make the order and if the agreement does not meet this threshold 
“[t]he court will not make an order”842.  
Given the findings concerning the judicial review cases' conclusion the author suggests that the 
costs barrier to judicial review prevents the public access to settlement in the first instance. The 
removal of the barrier will increase a chance of cases reaching the negotiation stage which might 
be more appropriate for polycentric disputes. As a result the third pillar of the Aarhus 
Convention is closely related to the first and the second one. The third pillar provides 
opportunities for further participation of the claimants in the resolution of the complex 
polycentric disputes. 
Judicial review reforms – analysis  
 
Following the submission of this thesis, Advocate-General Kokott provided her opinion on the 
meaning of ‘prohibitively expensive’ in R (Edwards & Pallikaropoulos) v Environment 
Agency843 which reached the Court of Justice of the European Union through a reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court.  The case was described below in this thesis. 844The 
Advocate-General first expressed her concern about giving ‘a comprehensive and definitive 
answer’ due to the discretion that Member States enjoy in implementing Article 9(4) and 
840 Ibid 3 
841 See p. 282 
842 Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s judicial review (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 
843 Case C-260/11 R (on the application of Edwards and Pallikaropoulos) v the Environment Agency & Ors 
(Advocate General Kokott's opinion). 
844 See p. 168 
324 
 
                                                 
 
 
because ‘of the many possible scenarios’.845 She recognised the ‘two-fold interest’ of the 
environmental litigation discussed briefly above. Thus, the award of costs amounting to £5,130 
in a private nuisance case involving neighbours, disputed before the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee,846 was not prohibitively expensive. However, the existence of private 
interests should not preclude the courts from taking due account of the wider public interest and 
assessing the exposure of costs in accordance with this assessment. The prospect of success may 
be an important factor in assessing the public interest. All in all, the Advocate-General advised 
the use of both tests: 
“in examining whether costs of proceedings are prohibitive, account must be taken of the 
objective and subjective circumstances of the case, with the aim of enabling wide access to 
justice. The insufficient financial capacity of the claimant may not constitute an obstacle to 
proceedings. It is necessary always, hence including when determining the costs which can be 
expected of claimants having capacity to pay, to take due account of the public interest in 
environmental protection in the case at issue”.847 
Crucially, the Court of Justice of the European Union preferred a mixture of subjective and 
objective factors to be taken by the Supreme Court in the Edwards & Pallikaropoulos and 
similar cases under the Aarhus Convention848. 
The proposals to set the cap on the applicant’s exposure to costs are welcome as they are capable 
of providing certainty and clarity849. As noted above850, the courts enjoy much discretion as to 
which form of PCO to grant in a given case and the clear-cut caps should resolve the matter. It 
may be more difficult to implement the recommendations especially when ‘it may prove difficult 
in practice to define and determine quite which environmental judicial review cases might be 
said to involve public participation issues based on Aarhus’.851 Indeed, the Aarhus Convention 
845 Case C-260/11 (Advocate General Kokott's opinion) at 33 
846 Communication ACCC/C/2008/23 Morgan v Hinton Organics (Wessex) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 107 
847 Case C-260/11 (Advocate General Kokott's opinion), at 49 
848 Case C-260/11 R (on the application of Edwards and Pallikaropoulos) v the Environment Agency & Ors 
(Judgment of the Court on 11 April 2013) 
849 See p. 169 
850 See p. 88 
851 R. Lee ‘Environmental Justice Costs’ (News) ERIC Group, 27 September 2012. Available at: www.eric-
group.co.uk/news_story.php?content_id=306. Indeed, the recently amended Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (Civil 
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concerns a wide array of cases given a liberal definition of environmental information.852 It is 
striking, however, that the cap for an organisation is likely to be set at £10,000, which is twice as 
much as for an individual. As noted above by reference to Greenpeace (No 2),853 environmental 
organisations play an important role in litigation by offering precious expertise. It may be 
argued, on the basis of Garnett,854 that higher protection should be offered to organisations as 
they are more likely to be granted standing regardless of their geographical proximity to the 
disputed source of the environmental pollution. Further, the data collected by E.L.F. indicates 
that the community groups initiated almost half of the inquiries; the remainder originated from 
individuals.855 The opposing argument is that organisations, especially well-established NGOs, 
are more likely to collect the necessary financial resources from affected individuals. It is 
difficult to assess the potential effect of these proposals. The £10,000 cap may constitute a 
burden for organisations unless the affected individuals are organised and able to fund the 
claims. It remains to be seen how many cases will proceed to judicial review with the cross-cap 
figure set at £35,000. 
 
Given the above, the government intends to increase the fees for access to the permission stage 
and substantive stage to £235, alongside a proposed new fee for the oral renewal to be set to 
£235. This is likely to pose an additional burden856 for the claimants – as mere access to a 
judicial review judgment may cost about £700. The focus on increasing the access costs sits 
Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013/262, which came into force on 1 April 2013) indicate difficulties faced by the 
drafters. Rule 45.41 provides a definition of ‘Aarhus Convention claim’, which means ‘a claim for judicial review of 
a decision, act or omission all or part of which is subject to the provisions of the UN ECE Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at 
Aarhus, Denmark on 25 June 1998, including a claim which proceeds on the basis that the decision, act or omission, 
or part of it, is so subject’. The claimant must state in the claim form that ‘the claim is an Aarhus Convention claim’, 
which can be challenged by the defendant (see Rule 45.44) 
852 Aarhus Convention, Art. 2(3); See also p. 132 
853 See Greenpeace (No 2) above, n. 206 
854 See Garnett above, n.214 
855 See p. 233 
856 In the Equality Impact Assessment, the government could not, with certainty, indicate the income of the 
individuals who tend to apply for judicial review. See Ministry of Justice ‘Equality Impact Assessment Initial 
Screening’ (London 2011). Available at:  https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/appeal-high-court-
fees-cp15-2011/supporting_documents/appealhighcourtfeesconsultationeia.pdf. The ELF data indicates that about 
60 per cent of claimants had an income below £15,000 (see p. 223) 
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uneasily with the government’s intention857 to decrease the number of judicial reviews. The fees 
are dwarfed by the costs awards, thus the government should logically direct its policy to the 
latter to deter the applications. Further, the introduction of a fee for oral renewal is surprising as, 
in light of proposals to remove the oral renewal for weak cases, it will affect cases with good 
prospects of success. It is important to note that, potentially, many such cases will be filtered out 
at the application for judicial review which is undertaken on a paper basis. This offers few 
possibilities for the careful consideration of the skeleton arguments of the parties and often 
requires an oral hearing. The data collected in E.L.F. indicates that out of 100 cases which were 
advised to proceed, seven were quashed at the permission stage and 16 were settled either out of 
court (nine) or by consent order (seven). The former seems to imply more of a political 
agreement to avoid further litigation, whereas the latter implies more of a legal agreement to 
avoid an expensive challenge in the courts.  
 
The proposal to limit the time available to make an application for judicial review to six weeks is 
most unwelcome. Although, the government emphasises that it will apply to ‘planning cases’ 
and omits references to environmental cases, it is clear that these will be affected. This is a 
setback to the recommendation by the Law Lords that the planning system should be used to 
resolve complex environmental disputes.858 Indeed, almost 90 per cent of the 197 E.L.F. 
environmental judicial review inquiries between 2005 and 2009 were concerned with planning 
law.859 Crucially, it is a backwards proposal in light of the Burkett860 ruling which criticised 
judicial discretion concerning time limits and provided clarity as to the three-month period. It is 
difficult to envisage the tangible effect if the proposal is implemented. Certainly, some of the 
109 E.L.F. cases which received a negative opinion as to the prospects of success were filtered 
out because they breached the three-month time period for making an application. Thus, 
857 Ibid (Equality Impact Assessment). at p. 1. 
858 Supra note n. 247  
859 See p. 290 and Table 50.  Crucially, ELF has rigorously filtered out the non-environmental planning inquiries 
and those carrying no public interest element, see above p. 180 Further, the filtered out inquiries were transferred to 
other organisations such as Planning Aid. 
860 See above n. 219 
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logically, some potential cases with a good prospect of success may never reach the courts 
because there will be no time to assess their material facts. A further consequence may be that 
the courts become littered with applications of poorer quality under tighter time limits. 
 
Judicial review process in environmental justice context 
 
The government intends to rationalise the judicial review process by eliminating the possibility 
of a renewed oral hearing at the permission stage for weak cases. As indicated above861, the 
judicial review process is highly complex and attempts to streamline it are welcome. However, 
these proposals, coupled with the proposals to increase the fees at the point of entry and reduce 
the time limits for making a judicial review application may provide fewer possibilities for 
reviewing cases with good prospects of success. This may significantly reduced the possibilities 
for success in the narrower sense discussed in the Introduction.862 Crucially, in the wider context 
of success, the judicial review process offers ample opportunities for negotiation and settlement 
both out-of-court and by consent order. The latter is of particular importance. As discussed 
above863, Collins J provided guidance as to the practical implementation of the rule. Thus, at any 
stage of the judicial review process, the parties can agree the terms of the settlement and apply to 
the court for a consent order. The settlement, although made by the parties, requires judicial 
intervention because the court must be satisfied that the consent order should be made. To assist 
the court, the parties should enclose their justification for settlement. The court must be 
primarily satisfied that it is in the public interest to make the order and ‘[t]he court will not make 
an order’ if the agreement does not meet this threshold.864 Lodging the consent order costs 
£45,865 unless the claimant qualifies for a remission. It can be submitted prior to, or after, the 
permission stage order with an important variation. 
861 See p. 79 
862 See the discussion on the meaning of success in judicial review, p. 25 
863 See p. 732 
864 H. Woolf, J. Jowell and A. Le Sueur, supra note 733 
865 Administrative Court Guidance, ‘Notes for Guidance on Applying for Judicial Review’ (London 2011). See 
www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/administrative-court/judicial-review.pdf (last 
accessed 28 January 2013) at 16.  
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Summary 
This thesis analysed unique data collected in the Environmental Law Foundation (E.L.F) with a 
particular emphasis on judicial review (JR) in context of environmental justice (EJ). Its main 
purpose was to prove that costs constitute a cost barrier to judicial review in the UK. The thesis 
had a second main purpose, namely to understand better the EJ concept and the EJ claims which 
are said to be polycentric. The empirical study reviewed 774 cases referred by E.L.F to an 
adviser between 2005 and 2009. The thesis was organised into nine Chapters. 
Chapter 1 analysed the concept of EJ by looking into its inception, evolution and 
conceptualisation. EJ focuses on patterns of disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards 
and promotes increased access to information and participation in decision-making. EJ 
researchers focused originally on two variables to measure the extent of environmental 
inequalities, namely race and income. The Chapter argued that the concept of EJ is multi-faceted 
thus covering a multitude of matters beyond purely environmental issues such as: medical issues, 
food justice, 'toxic environments' and the overall wellbeing of the populations. Crucially, 
Chapter 1 suggested that EJ is polycentric due to a variety of interests that have to be addressed. 
Thus, EJ concerns various groups and is measured through such variables as age, gender, 
disability.  
Chapter 2 focused on analysing the usefulness of judicial review in overcoming environmental 
inequality in the UK. It looked initially at the US literature which insisted that EJ movement 
should not resort to a legal challenge. As to adjudication in the UK, Law Lords had favoured 
preventive public law based claims over private law claims requiring proprietary interests. The 
Chapter provided an overview of judicial review and Protective Costs Orders system in England 
and Wales. It also argued that it was difficult to measure polycentricity in environmental 
litigation. The Chapter suggested that one possible avenue is to conduct statistical analysis of 
available cases, as was conducted in E.L.F. 
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Chapter 3 analysed the UNECE Convention on access to information, participation in decision-
making and access to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus Convention) which is binding in 
the UK through EU law. It is alleged by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee and the 
EU Commission that the UK Government is in breach of the Convention’s third pillar which 
requires access to a review procedure not to be “prohibitively expensive” (art 9(4)). 
Chapter 4 provided an overview of E.L.F, which  is a London-based charity with a network of 
legal advisers located throughout the UK. It receives calls for support from primarily poor 
communities (thus EJ claimants) facing environmental problems and refers the viable ones to a 
legal adviser for free initial advice. The Chapter captured the E.L.F.'s modus operandi by 
analysing the relevant terms of references and forms that the charity uses to refer inquiries to the 
lawyers.  
Chapter 5 provided an overview of the methodology for analysing the referrals to address the 
main purposes of this thesis. Firstly, the statistical analysis of 774 referrals would allow 
measuring various interests involved and would allow for limiting the pool of cases to judicial 
review referrals for further analysis. The latter would form a basis for establishing whether or 
not costs were the barrier for some claimants in starting judicial review proceedings. It would 
also form a basis for measuring polycentricity of environmental judicial review cases.  
Chapter 6 measured the key characteristics of the E.L.F. clients whose cases have been referred 
to an adviser. It was possible to establish the mainstream characteristics of the whole sample that 
is the majority of the clients were British, middle-aged and poor. The findings suggest weak 
polycentricity - most of the persons who reported an environmental issue seem to reflect the 
needs of the economically disadvantaged British people. In this sense the results reflect the 
traditional understanding of EJ. 
Chapter 7 measured the key characteristics of the referred cases over the study period. The 
quantitative analysis confirmed that the referrals carried a significant public interest element 
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affecting, on average, 1,000 persons. Further, the majority of referrals were classified primarily 
under planning law which suggests strong polycentricity. Finally, the Chapter identified 219 
judicial review cases which was a base number for further analysis in the following Chapter. 
Chapter 8 showed that the judicial review sample consisted of planning law-based claims which 
are said to be polycentric due to the variety of involved interests.  A half of these referrals 
received a negative opinion as to the prospects of success at judicial review and the remaining 
half were advised to proceed. In the latter pool there were 54 cases which were prevented by the 
cost barrier. A small number of referrals ended with a full judgment in the High Court and a 
significant number concluded in out-of-court/in-court settlement.  Chapter 8 analysed spatial 
distribution of the referrals which originated in England by matching the postcode with the 
English Indices of Multiple Deprivation. Such methodology allowed for measuring interests 
involved in each judicial review referral. It found that the majority of cases were polycentric. 
Given the polycentricity of the JR referrals and a small number of full judicial reviews, it was 
appropriate to see the data through the participatory thesis of judicial review and the limits of 
adjudication developed by Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisenberg  cited occasionally by the UK 
judiciary and scholars. Chapter 9 suggested that polycentric EJ claims were unsuitable for 
adjudication and suitable for negotiation and settlement. The cost barrier to JR prevents access to 
settlement and negotiations. Settlement creates opportunities for considering wider options 
which may include greater input by claimants. The Aarhus Convention’s third pillar – typically 
seen by lawyers as having a solely remedial function – is seen in this thesis as a continuation of 
the participatory Aarhus pillar. Thus access to adjudication may create opportunities for 
engagement and contributes to achieving EJ.  
Overall, the thesis addressed the first main purpose of the thesis successfully by proving that 
there was a cost barrier to judicial review in the UK. This finding was released into the public 
domain earlier through the BRASS/E.L.F Report and informed the public debate on this matter. 
The second main purpose of the thesis relating to polycentricity of environmental judicial review 
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cases was addressed albeit with certain limitations. The limitations stemmed from the limited 
resources and time allowing for narrow statistical analysis of the spatial distribution of the 
referrals which originated in England only. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that the cases are 
indeed polycentric and that the cost barrier to judicial review prevents access to both 
negotiations and settlement.  
All in all, the judicial review process, as it currently stands, encourages settlement supported by 
judicial intervention which is important in the context of environmental justice and 
polycentricity. The proposals to streamline the process would certainly strengthen incentives to 
settle the case. If not, the proposed cap to limit the exposure to costs following the full 
substantive hearing and judgment may present further stimulus for claimants to defend their 
arguments. However, additional government proposals concerning time limits and fees at the 
point of entry constitute a setback to earlier liberal judicial developments. Despite the liberal 
standing rules, fewer environmental cases may reach the judicial review process. Further, 
government proposals to fix recoverable costs to £5,000 for an individual and £10,000 for an 
organisation may not be in line with Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion discussed above866. In 
light of the Court of Justice’s ruling the UK Government may consider allowing some flexibility 
into the costs regime. Fixed recoverable costs, accompanied by a subjective test, which could be 
triggered in cases involving large degree of public interest brought by individual claimants, 
would probably constitute a good solution.867 
 
Finally, the author would like to acknowledge that judicial review is not and should not be the 
only avenue to address the issues of environmental justice. As this thesis attempted to show, the 
866 Supra note 843 
867 As of 1 April 2013 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 incorporated the cost regime policy by reference to Practice 
Direction 45 (r. 45.43). The latter fixes recoverable costs to £5,000 for an individual and £10,000 for an 
organisation. Further, Rule 45.43(2) states that ‘Practice Direction 45 may prescribe a different amount’ [...] 
'according to the nature of the claimant'. This seems to be accommodating Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion in 
advance of the Court of Justice’s ruling. 
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environmental justice disputes involve many interests at local, regional or even national level868. 
Such complex cases could be better suited for informal or formal settlement out of courts, 
political lobbying or alternative dispute resolutions. 
 
  
868 See Appendix 4 
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Appendix 1: Timing of the research 
 
 
  
  
    
   
    
    
  
April 2009 Drafting research questions and making 
initial contact with Environmental Law 
Foundation (E.L.F.) 
  
May  2009 Preliminary research in E.L.F.; negotiating 
the relationship 
  
June - December 2009 Data collection in E.L.F. 
  
January 2010 Publication of a BRASS/E.L.F. report based 
on initial findings 
  
February 2010- May 2010 Analysis of the data and a collection of 
additional data 
  
June 2010 - June 2011 Further analysis and write-up 
  
July 2011 - September 2012 Write-up stage 
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Appendix 2: Request for Assistance Form 
 
Form 10: RFA 
 
Date ……………………… Caseworker  …………… Inquiry no. ……………. Referral no.
  
 
 
Environmental Law Foundation 
Request for Assistance 
 
If you would like to use ELF’s Advice & Referral Service please check, complete and sign this form. Your 
details will remain confidential and be used to match your request for assistance to an ELF member for 
advice and information. 
 
1. Name 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 Address   …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Postcode ………………………. 
 
 Tel   …………………………..     Fax  ……………………… e-mail:   
………………………………….. 
 
         Organisation …………....…………………………………………….Position   
……………………………….. 
 
 
2. What is the environmental problem? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
 
3. What is the likely cause of the problem? (eg. planning decision) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………… 
 
4. No. of people being affected?   
          
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………. 
 
5. Who is your complaint against? Business     Developer      Council     
Other     
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a)  Name 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………… 
 
 Address
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….. 
 
b)  Name
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………. 
 
 Address:
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….. 
 
 
6. Are there any deadlines? (eg, judicial time limits, dates of hearings, inquiries or 
meetings) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………. 
 
 
7. How would you like ELF to help? 
Refer me to a  a) solicitor     b) a barrister     c) technical 
consultant     
Assist me with  d) a workshop      e) publicity      f) forming a 
community group     
 
 
 
 
8. Please list the relevant documents supporting your case 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………... 
 
 
9. How did you hear about ELF? ………………………      Have you had any 
previous contact? ……………….. 
 
 
Please read the following terms carefully. If you agree to the terms please sign in 
the space provided below. 
 
Terms of Referral 
 
a)  If you request a referral, the solicitor, barrister or consultant you are referred to will be an 
ELF member who will provide an initial free consultation to identify and clarify how the law 
might assist. This may be in the form of a meeting, written correspondence and/or telephone 
advice. 
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b) If legal action or further assistance is recommended, ELF members agree to charge reduced 
rates (whether or not public funding can be obtained) and, where possible, to provide further 
voluntary assistance. ELF is unable to fund cases directly and costs must be agreed between 
the ELF member and you, the client. 
 
c)  Once referred, the case is co-ordinated by the member. ELF takes no part in the advice and is 
unable to accept responsibility for how the solicitor conducts the case. If you have a query 
about the service you receive, or comments about how the service was delivered, we would 
like to hear from you. 
 
d)  ELF monitors referrals through periodical reporting by both members and their clients. ELF 
therefore requires your authority for the member to report to ELF. 
 
e)  ELF is, in certain circumstances, able to help with publicity. If you would help, please 
indicate this in Section 6 above. 
 
 
 
10. Please read and sign the following: 
 
• I give my permission to the Environmental Law Foundation to refer me to a legal and/or 
technical expert. 
 
• I agree to the Terms of Referral detailed above. 
 
• I authorise the solicitor, barrister and/or technical consultant to periodically report to the 
Environmental Law Foundation. 
 
Signed …………………………………………………………….            Date        
……………………………………… 
 
ELF may send information about its activities and services from time to time. If you prefer not to receive this, please tick this 
box.     
ELF may be contacted by other groups with similar concerns as yours. If you prefer not to be put in contact them, please tick   
  
 
Please return this completed form together with two copies of any relevant documents to: 
 
The Advice and Referral Service 
Environmental Law Foundation, Suite 309, 16 Baldwins Gardens, London EC1N 7RJ 
t. 020 7404 1030  f. 020 7404 1032 email. info@elflaw.org web. 
www.elflaw.org 
 
 
 
As a small charity ELF welcomes 
donations or stamps to help cover its 
administration expenses 
 
 
ELF’s Advice & Referral Service is supported by the Community Fund, the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation and Bridge House 
Estates Trust Fund. 
  
352 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 Case Referral Form 
 
FORM 11 CASE REFERRAL FORM 
 
                                          Environmental Law Foundation 
Case Referral Form 
 
To:   
 
 
Case Reference: .………………………………  Date: .…………………………………………………… 
Client name: ………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
Re: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
.. 
 
With the agreement of the above client, this case has been referred to you through the Environmental Law 
Foundation (“ELF”). Please refer to the Terms of Referral on the ‘ELF Membership’ form that you 
received when becoming a member. 
 
Please find enclosed: 
Copy of the completed Request for Assistance Form 
Copies of support documents 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
 
Description of matter: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………… 
 
 
On accepting this case please update the Environmental Law Foundation as to how the case develops and 
any action taken. You will find the client’s authorisation for this activity on the Request for Assistance 
form. 
 
I accept this case and acknowledge receipt of the enclosed documents 
 
 
…………………………………………………..                                 
…………………...…………………….. 
Signed (for and on behalf of the above named barrister,             Date: 
solicitor(s) and/or technical consultant)                  
 
Please return this form to ELF at: Suite 309, 16 Baldwins Gardens, London, EC1N 7RJ. 
Tel: 020 7404 1030    Fax: 020 7404 1032     DX:  ELF 138300 LDE 
PTO 
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Appendix 4 Polycentricity Matrix 
Case 
no Year District 
Number 
of 
SOAS Income 
District 
average score 
District 
average Rank 
SOAS rank 
nationally 
Rank within 
district 
1  2005 Wycombe 107 7 254 258 21812 42 
2  2005 South Lakeland 59 1 242 231 18453 14 
3  2005 Uttlesford 43 2 312 311 25070 13 
4  2005 South Lakeland 59 7 242 231 20524 22 
5  2005 Liverpool 291 2 1 5 1600 113 
6  2005 Salford 144 1 18 26 1747 33 
7  2005 Durham 320 4 62 70 22850 270 
8  2005 City of Derby 147 1 88 108 8532 53 
9  2005 Swindon 119 1 178 201 2880 8 
10  2005 Tunbridge Wells 68 4 249 246 23419 32 
11  2005 Uttlesford 43 4 312 311 24275 11 
12  2005 Aylesbury 112 2 284 288 24534 42 
13  2005 Canterbury 90 1 166 163 23758 72 
14  2005 Richmond 114 5 261 261 28387 89 
15  2005 Camden 133 1 74 55 4826 12 
16  2005 Cheshire East 99 1 226 243 24142 41 
17  2005 York 118 1 234 244 15341 28 
18  2005 Adur 42 4 145 135 20465 31 
19  2005 Tameside 141 1 42 34 15079 100 
20  2005 Brighton & Hove 164 2 66 67 8971 61 
21  2005 Torridge 37 2 130 101 10480 7 
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22  2005 Reading 93 7 129 125 30227 90 
23  2005 East Lindsey 80 1 73 58 11134 39 
24  2005 Rochdale 135 1 23 29 26445 132 
25  2005 City of London 5 3 262 259 22503 3 
26  2005 Epping Forest 78 1 209 203 23733 50 
27  2005 Enfield 181 7 64 63 28606 174 
28  2005 Shropshire 192 7 180 166 22159 140 
29  2005 Purbeck 29 2 218 199 20636 17 
30  2005 Cannock Chase 60 1 128 123 23195 48 
31  2005 Richmond 114 1 261 261 31492 112 
32  2005 Daventry 45 5 248 253 27639 36 
33  2005 Richmond 114 5 261 261 25861 56 
34  2006 Redbridge 159 1 134 116 16358 95 
35  2006 Guildford 84 1 300 300 31917 75 
36  2006 Richmond Upon Thames 114 7 261 261 30689 109 
37  2006 South Tyneside 103 1 52 47 14941 73 
38  2006 Three Rivers 53 5 291 297 21176 18 
39  2006 Camden 133 1 74 55 23137 122 
40  2006 West Oxfordshire 64 6 316 317 30158 50 
41  2006 Brighton & Hove 164 1 66 67 18046 119 
42  2006 Doncaster 193 1 39 39 8496 90 
43  2006 
King's Lynn and West 
Norfolk  87 2 123 120 14914 44 
44  2006 East Hampshire 72 2 301 302 25581 32 
45  2006 Greenwich 143 2 28 19 23291 141 
46  2006 Tendring 90 4 86 81 7872 22 
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47  2006 South Lakeland 59 2 242 231 17387 12 
48  2006 Wirral 207 1 60 103 11706 95 
49  2007 East Dorset 57 2 302 304 18827 10 
50  2007 East Lindsey 80 2 73 58 6883 18 
51  2007 Kensington and Chelsea 103 1 103 98 10633 39 
52  2007 Sunderland 188 3 44 38 21620 163 
53  2007 Islington 118 1 14 6 10558 104 
54  2007 Bristol 252 1 79 93 11174 106 
55  2007 Cambridge 68 4 193 188 30447 67 
56  2007 Camden 133 7 74 55 13445 80 
57  2007 Mid Suffolk 54 4 283 274 22467 23 
58  2007 Thanet 84 3 49 50 17992 64 
59  2007 Forest of Dean 50 1 186 164 19077 30 
60  2007 Suffolk Coastal 71 4 258 257 22819 36 
61  2007 Enfield 181 1 64 63 11099 93 
62  2007 City of Peterborough 104 4 71 79 12526 61 
63  2007 Telford and Wrelin 108 5 96 105 23141 85 
64  2007 Windsor and Maidenhead 88 4 303 303 11377 2 
65  2007 Ashford 70 4 198 192 24290 52 
66  2007 Haringey 144 1 13 11 16138 130 
67  2007 Wiltshire 281 1 245 245 31181 266 
68  2007 Erewash 73 4 148 150 30538 70 
69  2007 Haringey 144 1 13 11 23239 144 
70  2007 Elmbridge 81 4 320 322 31734 68 
71  2007 Stevenage 52 6 173 158 23104 43 
72  2007 Rother 58 2 139 132 23036 48 
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73  2007 Daventry 45 1 248 253 27639 36 
74  2007 East Lindsey 80 1 73 58 17086 60 
75  2007 Sunderland 188 2 44 38 6712 75 
76  2007 Basildon 110 3 131 141 19857 70 
77  2007 Harrogate 104 4 282 283 18208 18 
78  2007 Middlesbrough 88 4 8 27 23613 76 
79  2007 Hull 163 4 10 15 13191 118 
80  2007 West Oxfordshire 64 4 316 317 29423 42 
81  2007 Harrow 137 5 194 184 19891 79 
82  2007 Southwark 165 2 41 25 13120 134 
83  2007 Telford and Wrelin 108 4 96 105 30350 104 
84  2007 North Devon 58 1 137 126 17166 37 
85  2007 Newark and Sherwood 69 1 147 147 24995 56 
86  2007 Daventry 45 3 248 253 27311 33 
87  2007 Islington 118 1 14 6 13041 113 
88  2007 North Somerset 124 1 201 224 6758 14 
89  2008 Sevenoaks 74 7 276 279 31907 70 
90  2008 Bexley 146 1 174 180 23058 92 
91  2008 Purbeck 29 1 218 199 13426 2 
92  2008 Camden 133 1 74 55 21065 114 
93  2008 Bracknell Forest 74 1 296 291 19181 19 
94  2008 East Dorset 57 3 302 304 23122 15 
95  2008 Taunton Deane 66 5 181 183 21170 42 
96  2008 West Lancashire District 73 3 136 153 14444 29 
97  2008 Waltham Forest 145 3 15 7 4662 40 
98  2008 Camden 133 1 74 55 12965 79 
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99  2008 Doncaster 193 1 39 39 6472 72 
100  2008 Spelthorne 60 1 260 262 22188 26 
101  2008 Arun 94 6 154 151 23329 73 
102  2008 Carlisle 68 2 109 109 6968 16 
103  2008 Wycombe 107 7 254 258 22396 44 
104  2008 Torbay 89 3 61 49 7884 25 
105  2008 Sandwell 187 7 12 9 17623 173 
106  2008 Camden 133 1 74 55 11259 66 
107  2008 Richmond 114 5 261 261 27798 81 
108  2008 Stockport 190 3 151 167 20189 106 
109  2008 East Devon 82 2 215 209 13671 13 
110  2008 Epping Forest 78 4 209 203 26418 59 
111  2008 Forest of Dean 50 1 186 164 17884 26 
112  2008 Shropshire 192 5 180 166 22337 142 
113  2008 Plymouth 160 4 72 80 29278 158 
114  2008 West Dorset 57 1 190 170 14344 12 
115  2008 Herefordshire County 116 5 157 145 22011 95 
116  2008 Southwark 165 2 41 25 2813 2 
117  2008 Elmbridge 81 1 320 322 32029 76 
118  2008 Lewisham 166 1 31 16 2678 4 
119  2008 Liverpool 291 2 1 5 380 49 
120  2008 
Bath and North East 
Somerset 115 1 247 254 24732 60 
121  2009 Mid Devon 43 1 165 155 14147 13 
122  2009 City of Derby 147 1 88 108 2092 9 
123  2009 Canterbury  90 7 166 163 22956 66 
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124  2009 Barnet 210 1 165 176 23868 163 
125  2009 Lewisham 166 1 31 16 6218 59 
126  2009 Northumberland 199 1 135 144 13714 79 
127  2009 Canterbury 90 5 166 163 22864 64 
128  2009 Stroud 69 3 255 256 27774 53 
129  2009 Fareham 74 6 315 311 28281 34 
130  2009 Aylesbury 112 7 284 288 31488 102 
131  2009 Brentwood 45 6 295 294 24624 21 
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